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This thesis explores the structure of the criminal law and, in particular, the structural device 
of element analysis. Building upon the classical actus reus/mens rea distinction, element 
analysis further sub-divides both parts of an offence into acts, circumstances and results. In 
doing so, element analysis offers advantages within the criminal law, both as a structure for 
legal discussion and analysis, and as a structure for law reform. In relation to the latter, 
recent reform of inchoate assisting and encouraging (as well as a range of Law Commission 
recommendations) has made use of element analysis to structure the reform of the general 
inchoate offences, requiring different levels of fault in relation to different offence 
elements. 
 
However, despite the increasingly important role played by element analysis, it remains a 
controversial device. Critics have exposed a lack of objectivity within the separation of 
elements, and an unacceptable level of complexity, particularly in relation to assisting and 
encouraging. Accepting much of their criticism, but rejecting the viability of the alternatives 
offered, this thesis therefore seeks to reinterpret and remodel element analysis in order to 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In order to have a meaningful discussion about any legal area it is first necessary to identify 
and (to some extent) agree upon the structural building blocks of that subject.1 Within the 
criminal law of England and Wales,2 these building blocks can be identified as the central 
concepts of actus reus (the conduct element of an offence), and mens rea (the fault element 
of an offence).3 Although the distinction between actus reus and mens rea does not directly 
affect the substance of the law, it is almost universally adopted by those that work within 
the criminal law.4 This is because by distinguishing between parts of an offence, 
commentators have a straightforward method of focusing their discussion and analysis. For 
example, within criminal law text books and Law Commission material it is very common to 
see mens rea and actus reus discussed separately in different chapters. The technique of 
separating actus reus and mens rea is commonly referred to as ‘offence analysis’.5    
 
Element analysis refers to a technique that has been developed in order to expand upon the 
basic actus reus/mens rea distinction (offence analysis). Essentially, element analysis claims 
                                                          
1
 See, Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986) Chapter 1, where Dworkin contends that 
disagreement about the concept of law is often confused by (or even based upon) a disagreement about the 
definition of the terms used within the debate. A criticism he labels as the ‘semantic sting’.   
2
 To avoid wearisome repetition, I will simply refer to ‘the English criminal law’.   
3
 Criminal defences may also be included as a separate element.  
4
 For a minority opinion contending that the distinction is not a useful one, see Robinson, ‘Should the criminal 
law abandon the actus reus – mens rea distinction?’ in Shute, Gardner and Horder (eds) Action and value in 
criminal law (Clarendon Press, 1993), 187.  
5
 For example, see Robinson and Grall, ‘Element analysis in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and 
beyond’ (1983) 35 Stanford Law Review, 681, 683.  
2 
 
the ability to taxonomize the actus reus of an offence into three further elements: acts, 
circumstances and results.6 
 
Take the following example:  
 
D intentionally throws a stone at V’s window. The stone breaks the window. 
   
In this example D has committed the offence of criminal damage.7 According to the Law 
Commission’s interpretation of element analysis,8 D’s act is the throwing of a stone, the 
result is the broken window and the circumstance is the fact that the window does not 
belong to D.9 All three elements must be satisfied for D to have completed the actus reus of 
criminal damage.  
 
In common with criminal damage, many other offences are made up of all three elements. 
However, this is not necessarily the case. For example, the actus reus of several strict 
liability offences do not include a result element.10  
 
                                                          
6
 Although the focus of element analysis is the dissection of the actus reus of an offence, as we will see later, 
this will lead, inevitably, to a dissection of the mens rea corresponding to that actus reus as well.  
7
 Contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1. We are assuming that D satisfies the mens rea of the offence 
and lacks a valid defence.    
8
 For a discussion of problems apparent in the Law Commission’s definition of element analysis, see, Chapter 2, 
pp41-48.  
9
 This is an example that has been employed regularly by the Law Commission in their recent work on inchoate 
liability and complicity, see, for example, Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging 
Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006) [5.23].   
10
 For example, within the offence of driving over the prescribed alcohol limit: the act element is driving, the 
circumstance element is the alcohol level and there is no result element. The Road Traffic Act 1988, s5(1)(b) 
and the Road Traffic Act 1998, s4(1).     
3 
 
The potential utility of element analysis as a structure to aid legal discussion and criticism is 
relatively obvious. Just as the basic actus reus/mens rea distinction allows us to focus both 
analysis and thought, greater sub-division offers the opportunity to narrow that focus even 
further. Indeed, as a vehicle through which to analyse and evaluate the criminal law, 
element analysis is already popular among a minority of academics and law reformers and 
has been for many years.11  
 
Perhaps less obvious is the potential that element analysis has as a model for law reform. 
However, this potential is extremely important. Within the US Model Penal Code for 
example, the use of element analysis to define the offence of criminal attempt opens up 
policy options that would not have been possible under the simple offence analysis 
approach.  
 
§5.01. Criminal Attempt. 
(1) Definition of Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting 
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he: 
(a) purposely engages in conduct that would constitute the crime if the attendant 
circumstances were as he believes them to be; or 
(b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do 
anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result 
without further conduct on his part; or 
                                                          
11
 For one of the first commentators to discuss a variation of element analysis, see, Cook, ‘Act, Intention and 
motive in the criminal law’ (1916) 26 Yale Law Journal, 645.   
4 
 
(c) purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he 
believes them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of 
conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.12 
 
As we can see from section 5.01(1), the basic mens rea requirements of criminal attempt 
are to be determined by reference to the substantive offence being attempted. However, 
within each of the three potential variations of attempt liability set out in the section, we 
are also told that specific fault requirements will apply to certain elements of the actus reus. 
For example, for an attempt under section 5.01(1)(a) D must act purposely in relation to his 
or her conduct (referring to the act element13) and must at least believe in the existence of 
the requisite circumstances. On this basis, element analysis becomes integral to the offence 
itself: in order to identify the mens rea required by D, one must first separate the actus reus 
of the substantive offence attempted into acts, circumstances and results.   
 
In this manner, element analysis is able to facilitate novel methods of law reform that would 
not otherwise have been available using only offence analysis. Indeed, it is this, alongside its 
potential in the field of legal debate, which has led Robinson to hail the American 
codification of element analysis in the US MPC as ‘the most significant and enduring 
achievement of the Code’s authors’.14 
 
However, outside of America, the rest of the common law world has taken a much more 
cautious approach to element analysis. Reflecting on the potential benefits outlined above, 
                                                          
12
 US Model Penal Code 1962 (hereafter US MPC). 
13
 US MPC §1.13(5). ‘”Conduct” means an action or omission and its accompanying state of mind, or, where 
relevant, a series of acts and omissions’.  
14
 Robinson and Grall, ‘Element analysis in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and beyond’ (1983) 35 
Stanford Law Review 681, 691.  
5 
 
commentators often concede element analysis’ ‘intuitive attractions’15, but then rapidly 
proceed to the conclusion that it is unworkable. Although several reasons are provided for 
this conclusion, the central criticism of element analysis invariably focuses on its perceived 
inability to separate the elements of the actus reus of offences objectively. Rather, it is 
maintained that the process of separation relies on a series of potentially inconsistent value 
judgements. However, if it is to be used as a vehicle for discussion that refines the current 
actus reus/mens rea distinction, and especially if it is to be used as a tool for law reform, 
critics contend that such objectivity is essential.    
 
THE FOCUS OF THIS THESIS 
 
The aim of this thesis is to discover whether element analysis, in any of its subtly different 
guises, is capable of providing a positive addition to the English criminal law. This is not a 
new debate. Indeed, it is a question that has been exercising the minds of those within the 
criminal law for almost a century, a period that has included several notable attempts to 
incorporate element analysis both within specific offences16 and even as a basis for a 
criminal code.17 However, despite the failures of element analysis to take any meaningful 
hold within the English criminal law for so many years, recent Law Commission projects 
have again chosen to adopt it as a structure for reform. This re-emergence is particularly 
notable because, at least in relation to the reform of criminal incitement (now assisting and 
                                                          
15
 Duff, Criminal Attempts (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996) 14.  
16
 See, for example, Law Commission, Inchoate offences: Conspiracy, Attempt and Incitement (Working Paper 
No 50, 1973) where the Working Party proposes that each of the inchoate offences should be structured using 
element analysis.  
17
 Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (2 vols) (Law Com No 177, 1989) where element 




encouraging), the Law Commission’s recommendations have been adopted into 
legislation.18 
 
It is this unexpected development, combined with the Law Commission’s decision not to 
engage with the critics of element analysis,19 which provides the basis for this research. In 
what follows, we will trace the emergence of element analysis as a technique both to aid 
legal discussion and to structure criminal offences. In Parts I and II, exploring both sides of 
the debate, we will examine the potential benefits of element analysis that have for so long 
appealed to those within the criminal law, as well as the criticisms that many believe 
undermine them. Reflecting upon this debate, we are then able to look critically upon the 
several different conceptions of element analysis in order to decide which of them, if any, is 
capable of forming part of the criminal law.  
 
Having identified the best possible conception of element analysis, Parts III and IV of the 
thesis will examine its usefulness in action. Here we will focus on the use of element analysis 
in relation to the general inchoate offences, and to a lesser extent, to secondary liability.20 
This investigation will focus jointly on the usefulness of element analysis as a vehicle for 
academic discussion, as well as a structure for law reform. It will also provide an opportunity 
to contrast element analysis with some recent alternatives that, whilst not finding favour 
                                                          
18
 The Serious Crime Act 2007, Part 2. It is important to note that the Law Commission’s recommendations 
have not been adopted verbatim and this will be explored later. However, for present purposes, it is enough to 
note that the use of element analysis to structure the new offences of assisting and encouraging is reflected in 
the legislation.   
19
 In the report on assisting and encouraging crime for example, the Commission’s only reference to the critics 
of element analysis is contained within a footnote that does no more than simply state that a criticism exists 
without attempting to answer it. Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law 
Com No 300, 2006) [5.23] (fn 24).   
20
 We will focus on these offences in particular because this is the area where element analysis is able to 
provide new policy options. See the discussion of criminal attempt and the US MPC above, pp3-5.   
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with the Law Commission, claim to provide equally appropriate results without the 
problems seemingly inherent within element analysis.21     
 
A MEASURE FOR SUCCESS 
 
At this point it is useful to highlight the measures that will be employed later in the thesis to 
gauge the success of any one version of element analysis. These measures will be revisited 
at various points within the thesis. 
 
To a certain extent, we can identify the success indicators for element analysis in line with 
those used for offence analysis, the technique that element analysis claims to refine and 
improve upon. One of the essential characteristics of offence analysis as a structure for legal 
discussion is that it applies universally across the criminal law: whatever offence is being 
discussed, it is possible to analyse it in terms of its actus reus and mens rea requirements. 
Therefore, if element analysis is to provide a desirable replacement for (or refinement to) 
offence analysis, then it too should be able to apply universally across the criminal law. 
Beyond this, a further essential aspect of offence analysis is that the process of separating 
actus reus and mens rea elements is reasonably settled. Although there may still be 
legitimate debates about whether it is possible to completely (and objectively) separate the 
two sides,22 it is possible to have these debates from a relatively secure footing and it is not 
always necessary to have them at all: in the vast majority of cases it will be clear if an aspect 
of an offence represents an actus reus or a mens rea element. This is essential because 
                                                          
21
 See Chapter 14.  
22
 See, for example, our discussion of the problems caused by ulterior fault in Part III.  
8 
 
without an agreed foundation, offence analysis could not function as a structure for debates 
about other areas of the criminal law; it would simply represent a further (and unnecessary) 
layer of disagreement. Likewise for element analysis, which also claims to provide a 
structure for discussion as opposed to providing any form of normative steer, a basic agreed 
foundation is equally important. 
 
Beyond these basic requirements however, it is important to recognise that the essential 
measures for element analysis must also go beyond those for offence analysis. First, this is 
simply because of the increased potential for problems with a technique that further sub-
divides offences. Although we may be able to tolerate some disagreement in relation to the 
actus reus and mens rea distinction, this is because such disagreement rarely interferes with 
a general discussion of offences. However, not only is it widely contended that element 
analysis involves an even greater degree of uncertainty in the separation of elements,23 but 
simply by virtue of there being more divisions to be made will increase the potential for 
debate: debate that risks encroaching into unwanted areas of discussion in a manner that 
offence analysis would not have done. Therefore, for element analysis to represent a 
desirable refinement to current offence analysis, it is clear that it must operate in a manner 
that minimises the potential for disagreement in the process of separating elements. 
 
Decreasing and minimising the role of subjective judgements within the separation of 
elements is a difficult target for element analysis to meet. However, as we recognise the 
second area of concern for element analysis, it becomes clear that this measure for success 
must be elevated still further. This is because, as we have already introduced, element 
                                                          
23
 See generally Part I.   
9 
 
analysis has been employed beyond offence analysis as a structure for the definition of 
certain generally applicable offences. As the mens rea requirements of these offences will 
now be dependent upon how element analysis separates the elements of each principal 
offence, legal certainty in this area will require all blurring between elements to be 
removed. Applying universally across the criminal law (though these general offences), any 
lack of objectivity within the separation of elements has the potential to lead to 
inconsistency and, ultimately, to the potential for injustice. 
 
The measures for success for element analysis are therefore set, to a large extent, in line 
with those for offence analysis: requiring universal applicability across the criminal law, and 
a settled means for separating elements. However, it is also clear that within these fields, 
element analysis sets the bar rather higher. Refining the second requirement without 
sacrificing the first, element analysis must provide a process for objectively separating 
offence elements that does not rely on individual value judgements and is universally 






The terminology employed within a discussion of element analysis, much like the detail of 
the technique itself, is far from uniform amongst academics. It is therefore important to 




Although element analysis is a technique that is widely recognised, it has been labelled in 
several different ways. For example, the Law Commission has traditionally employed the 
term ‘external elements’.24 The US MPC, by contrast, refers to the ‘material elements’25 of 
an offence, and the Australians to the ‘physical elements’.26 Although each of these terms 
are intended to mean broadly the same thing, it is questionable whether any of them 
accurately reflect the full range of elements that can be found within the criminal law. For 
example, certain offences require D to possess a fault element that does not relate to 
conduct that has already taken place. This includes general inchoate offences like assisting 
and encouraging and conspiracy where D must intend P to complete a future criminal act, as 
well as traditionally choate offences such as burglary that require D to complete an act with 
the intention to go on to complete a further act.27 Building upon the basic structure of act, 
circumstance and result, this fourth element will be referred to as ulterior fault and it is one 
that is not external, material or physical.28 In light of this, the more general term element 
analysis, which is used by Robinson in his commentary on this subject,29 is preferred. Where 
necessary, reference will be made simply to the elements of an offence.  
 
The decision to move away from the Law Commission’s preferred term external elements is 
also partly motivated by a level of inconsistency in its application. For example, in recent 
                                                          
24
 See, for example, Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales: Volume 2 Commentary on the 
Draft Criminal Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) Part 7. 
25
 US MPC §2.02 (Proposed Official draft 1962).  
26
 Australian Commonwealth Criminal Code, Ch 2.  
27
 D commits the offence of burglary if he or she ‘enters any building ... as a trespasser and with intent to 
commit any such offence as is mentioned *in following provisions+.’ The Theft Act 1968, s9.  
28
 In part, the decision to include a fourth element reflects a policy choice that ulterior fault issues should be 
removed from the analysis of D’s fault in relation to his or her own conduct. By failing to achieve this 
separation, the current literature causes unnecessary complication and risks undermining the actus reus/mens 
rea distinction. For further discussion of this point, see Chapter 9 generally.  
29
 See, for example, Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997). 
11 
 
Law Commission papers the label external elements, although very rarely used,30 has been 
employed in a similar manner to the way we will be using element analysis in this thesis.31 
However, in a previous Law Commission paper we can see the term external elements being 
employed to refer to the act and result elements of an offence without including the 
circumstance element.32 Given the everyday meaning of the label external, this alternative is 
not an unreasonable interpretation. However, the inconsistency between the papers 
provides a further reason to prefer the new label element analysis.   
 
When referring to each individual element there has also been an inconsistency of labelling 
within the literature. Each of these will be explored in turn. 
 
 
The act element  
 
Employing the term act to describe the part of the offence that focuses on D’s physical 
activities is not without its critics. In the criminal damage example outlined above, in which 
D’s act is the throwing of a stone, the label would appear to be relatively unproblematic. 
However, what if the offence that D commits does not involve any obvious physical 
movement? 
                                                          
30
 For example, in two of the most recent Law Commission Reports that have employed element analysis, the 
term ‘external elements’ is used just once. The Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and 
Encouraging Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006) [5.23] and The Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com 
No 305, 2007) [1.6].  
31
 See, for example, The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales: Volume 2 Commentary on 
the Draft Criminal Code Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) Part 7; The Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for 
Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006) [5.23].  
32
 See, for example, The Law Commission, Inchoate offences: Conspiracy, Attempt and Incitement (Working 




Consider the following two examples: 
 
D intentionally withholds food from her young child V. V dies as a result. 
 
In this example, D has committed the common law offence of murder.33 The act element of 
D’s offence is constituted by her omission to provide food for her child.   
 
D is apprehended by the police. They discover a class A drug in one of his pockets. 
 
In this example, D has committed the offence of possession of a class A drug.34 The act 
element of D’s offence relates to D’s on-going possession of the drug.   
 
In both examples above, the term act does not seem to be entirely appropriate. Using act to 
describe an omission and an on-going state of possession certainly represents a broadening 
of its everyday meaning.35 However, it is one that is unlikely to trouble the courts. It is 
already commonplace, for example, for a court to interpret certain statutory language 
broadly in order to allow for omissions liability.36 It is further noted that the Law 
                                                          
33
 We are assuming that D does not have a legitimate defence.  
34
 Contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s5. Again, we are assuming that D does not have a legitimate 
defence. 
35
 For a discussion about the importance of using the natural meaning of terms like ‘act’, see Duff, Criminal 
Attempts (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996) 254-5. 
36
 For example, the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s1(1) where ‘act’ has been interpreted to include omissions 
(Gibbons and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr. App. R. 134). See also, the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, s8 where the 
terms ‘aid, abet, counsel or procure’ have been interpreted to include omissions (Tuck v Robinson [1970] 1 
W.L.R. 741).  
13 
 
Commission in their Draft Criminal Code Report also used the term act in this very broad 
sense, although they did include a clause to make it clear that they were doing so.37   
 
In their most recent publications however, the Law Commission have substituted the term 
act and replaced it with conduct.38 Although they do not explicitly discuss this change at any 
stage, there are cogent reasons why the term conduct may be preferred. The most 
compelling of these reasons is the greater ease with which conduct, as arguably a more 
general term than act, is able to cater for cases like those in the examples above. However, 
for the following reasons, this thesis continues to employ the term act rather than follow 
the Law Commission.     
 
The first reason for preferring the term act is the apparent inconsistency between the Law 
Commission’s discussion and their recommended draft legislation. In their three recent 
reports in which element analysis has formed an integral part,39 the Commission have 
employed the term conduct within all of their discussion, and yet the term act is still 
preferred within the appended draft Bills. Presumably this has resulted because of 
Parliamentary Counsel’s preference for the latter term. But it is an observation that lends 
further support to act as the more appropriate label. It is also an observation that is likely to 
lead to considerable confusion for those reading Law Commission material. The offences 
that the Commission have sought to codify and reform in these reports are some of the 
                                                          
37
 Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales: Volume 2 Commentary on the Draft Criminal Code 
Bill (Law Com No 177, 1989) [7.6]-[7.13].  
38
 See, for example, Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007). 
39
 These reports have focused on the inchoate offences of assisting and encouraging, attempt and conspiracy, 
as well as the offence of complicity. 
14 
 
most complex within the criminal law, and a change in terminology between the body of the 
report and its appended Bill represents an unnecessary complication. 
 
The second reason for preferring act relates simply to an issue of presentation and 
discussion. When isolating the various elements of an offence for analysis, it is often 
necessary to refer with precision to, for example, the conduct or fault elements of the act 
element. If the act element is relabelled as the conduct element, there is the unfortunate 
consequence that it becomes necessary to refer to the conduct element of the conduct 
element. The Law Commission avoid this problem in their recent publications by simply 
referring in shorthand to the conduct element. However, this solution means that the 
context within which the term is used effectively replaces the term itself, and at times it is 
even difficult for the knowledgeable reader to identify which of their two meanings of 
conduct they are intending to employ. This is an unnecessary problem that not only has the 
potential to confuse the reader, but also to mislead them as to the intended policy. For 
example, the Law Commission’s secondary liability policy is such that D need not intend P to 
complete the full conduct element (actus reus) of the principal offence because D need only 
have knowledge in relation to both the circumstance and the result elements. However, D 
must intend P to complete the conduct (act) element of the conduct element (actus reus). 
Thus, where the Commission simply refer to D needing to intend P to complete the conduct 
element of the principal offence, they are liable to mislead their reader.40 
                                                          
40




The circumstance element 
 
The circumstance element (or elements) of an offence relates to the facts that provide the 
context for D’s act. Although it is the focus for much academic discussion, the label 
circumstance is comparatively unproblematic and is consistently employed by all the major 
contributors in this area.  
 
However, certain commentators have suggested that the content of the circumstance 
element is too vast to be contained within a single element. For example, as part of 
Smith’s41 discussion of criminal attempts, he has suggested that the circumstance element 
should be further subdivided into two separate classes of circumstance: ‘pure 
circumstances’ and ‘consequential circumstances’. According to Smith, pure circumstances 
are those which are ‘not essential to the occurrence of the consequence *result element+’42 
but merely provide it with a context. For example, if we draw again upon the facts of the 
criminal damage example above, a pure circumstance of D’s conduct is the fact that he or 
she does not own the property that has been damaged. By way of contrast, consequential 
circumstances are essential to the occurrence of the result element. Thus, in reference to 
the same example, these would include the fact that D had a stone in his or her hand and 
the fact that V’s window was in the way of the stone when it was thrown.  
 
                                                          
41
 Smith, ‘Two problems in criminal attempts’ (1956) 70 Harvard Law Review, 422.   
42
 Ibid, 424. 
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Smith presents this separation in order to discuss whether each of the two different types of 
circumstance should have a different fault element attached to it. However, in doing so, it 
soon becomes clear that an objective separation of the two species of circumstance would 
be very difficult to achieve for every offence. It would be unacceptable for two identical 
cases to lead to different results simply because the court in one case interpreted a fact as a 
pure circumstance (leading to the application of a certain fault requirement), whereas a 
court in the other case interpreted it as a consequential circumstance (leading to the 
application of a different fault requirement). Even more importantly, it is also unclear how 
even an objective separation of this kind could provide any substantive or theoretical 
benefits to the criminal law. Indeed, there is every indication from Smith’s later work that 
he too came to the conclusion that a singularly defined circumstance element is preferable 
to his dual conception.43 A conclusion accepted within this thesis.  
 
The result element 
 
The result element of an offence relates to an event or a state of affairs that is caused by D’s 
act. An obvious example would be the requirement for the common law offence of murder 
that D’s act causes V to die.  
 
Although there is no discernable difference in meaning, there is a split in the literature 
between the use of the term result and the use of the term consequence. In order to 
maintain consistency within this thesis, the term result will be employed throughout. In 
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 In Smith’s two follow-up publications, ‘Two problems in criminal attempts re-examined – I’ (1962) Criminal 
Law Review, 135, and ‘Two problems in criminal attempts re-examined – II’ (1962) Criminal Law Review, 212, 
Smith does not revisit this part of his previous argument.    
17 
 
support of this preference, it is noted that the New Zealand Crimes Consultative Committee 
(one of the very few bodies to have explicitly discussed this issue) also prefer the term 
‘result element’.44  
 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS 
 
Part I: In this Part, chapters 2 and 3 will trace the history of element analysis. We will 
explore the problems with the current law that have led to the call for element analysis, the 
criticisms of element analysis that have (at least) delayed its adoption, and finally, how 
different jurisdictions have responded to those criticisms.   
Part II: In this Part, chapters 4 to 7 will focus on the first area of criticism: whether element 
analysis can separate the actus reus elements of an offence objectively. Critically, this will 
involve the act element being identified and isolated within simple bodily movement.  
Part III: In this Part, chapters 8 to 13 will focus on the second area of criticism: whether 
(even if objective) element analysis can operate successfully within a criminal law system 
that values clarity and simplicity. A separate area of the criminal law will be explored within 
each chapter.    
Part IV: Finally, within chapters 14 and 15, having constructed our preferred method of 
element analysis, we will be in a position to compare it to the various alternative 
approaches to the reform of general inchoate liability. From here, we may then draw 
general conclusions. 
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PART I  
ELEMENT ANALYSIS: AN EVOLVING DEBATE 
 
The purpose of Part I is to explore three interrelated questions:  
 
1. What are the benefits of element analysis/problems with the current law that have 
led to calls for its adoption into the English criminal law? 
2. What are the criticisms of element analysis that have prevented (or at least delayed) 
its adoption into the English criminal law? and 
3. How, and to what extent, have the proponents of element analysis in England and 
other jurisdictions attempted to adapt their conception of element analysis in order 
to answer these criticisms? 
 
The answers to these questions will lead us up to the current stage of the debate. Beyond 
this, they will also provide the necessary foundation upon which to assess the various 
conceptions of element analysis that currently exist. Within Parts II and III, we will then 






THE ATTRACTIONS AND CRITICISMS OF ELEMENT 
ANALYSIS 
 
In order to understand the potential role of element analysis in the future of criminal law 
discussion and reform, it is first important to understand its attractions and perceived 
weaknesses. 
 
THE ATTRACTIONS OF ELEMENT ANALYSIS 
1) Element analysis as a structure for legal discussion and presentation 
 
The earliest and in many ways the least controversial attraction of element analysis lies in its 
use as a structuring technique for legal discussion and analysis.45 By refining the more basic 
actus reus/mens rea distinction (offence analysis), element analysis provides an opportunity 
for greater precision when referring to different parts of an offence.  
 
Element analysis operates by subdividing the actus reus of offences into a maximum46 of 
three separate parts (elements): 
 
 Act element: The physical conduct (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
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 Whether the use of element analysis in this area should be considered less controversial than its use as a 
structure for law reform is discussed below at p41.  
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 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence.47 
 
Progressing from the basic actus reus/mens rea distinction, offences may now be divided 
into six separate elements: the act, circumstance and result elements that make up the 
actus reus, and the fault elements that attach to each one.48   
 
 Act Element Circumstance Element Result Element 
Actus Reus 1 2 3 
Mens Rea 4 5 6 
 
Analysing the current law 
 
One of the primary advantages of greater granularity is evident where element analysis has 
been employed to discuss complex criminal offences. As early as 1917, Professor Walter 
Cook49 contended that in order to undertake an investigation of the offence of criminal 
attempt and provide ‘analysis somewhat more careful than that usually given’, the 
investigator must first trace the subdivision of actus reus and mens rea into ‘(1) the act (or 
acts); (2) the concomitant circumstances; (3) the *results+; (4) the actors state of mind’.50 
Employing this technique (that we might now label as element analysis), Cook accused his 
contemporaries of confusing the very general term actus reus and employing it 
                                                          
47
 These definitions reflect those employed by the Law Commission. See, Law Commission, Conspiracy and 
Attempts: A Consultation Paper (Consultation No 183, 2008) [4.6]-[4.15].  
48
 As we will examine in Chapter 9, certain offences such as inchoate offences and offences of specific intent 
may require us to include an additional element. We have labelled this as the ‘ulterior fault element’.  
49
 Based, at this time, in Yale University.  
50
 Cook, ‘Act, Intention and motive in the criminal law’ (1916) 26 Yale Law Journal, 645, 646-647.   
22 
 
inconsistently as a result. He believed that through element analysis, he would be able to 
avoid similar inconsistency because of the relatively confined investigation within each 
element.51      
 
Returning to the present day, the usefulness of element analysis as a tool for discussing 
complex offences remains clearly evident. In the Law Commission’s recent report on 
complicity, for example, element analysis is not only used to construct a new and reformed 
offence, it is also used to explore the current law as it stood at the time of publication. 
Within this, the Commission pay particular attention to the current mens rea of secondary 
liability, describing it as ‘complex and difficult’,52 with ‘no single case set[ting] out a general 
test and the cases from which a general test may be inferred *being+ inconsistent.’53  The 
Commission explains that the reason for this complexity is that ‘D’s state of mind is relevant 
to his or her conduct, to P’s conduct and to P’s state of mind’.54 With so many different 
facets to D’s mens rea, a single answer to the question what is the mens rea requirement of 
secondary liability?, demanded by offence analysis, would be impossible: there is no one 
mens rea requirement. Therefore, the Commission separated the elements of the actus reus 
of complicity using element analysis and then explored the fault that attached to each 
element in turn.55 In this way, the Commission is able to lead its reader through a very 
complex offence one section at a time. At the end, it is the accumulation of these individual 
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 Cook, ‘Act, Intention and motive in the criminal law’ (1916) 26 Yale Law Journal, 645, 646. Cook makes the 
point that where ‘*o+ne writer or judge will use *terms such as act+ in one sense, another in a different sense; 
indeed, the same writer will not always be consistent in his usage.’  
52
 Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007) [B.67]. 
53
 Ibid. [B.68]. 
54
 Ibid. [B.68]. 
55
 Ibid. Appendix B. It is a technique that is particularly evident in what are arguably the most complex parts of 
the analysis. For example, the Commission’s discussion of D’s state of mind in relation to the actus reus of the 
principal offence committed by P [B.79-B.100].  
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discussions that is able to provide the Commission’s answer to the question what is the 
mens rea requirement of secondary liability? 
 
Evaluating and codifying the current law 
 
Through the separation of complex offences into manageable sections, the systematic 
approach required by element analysis also offers the potential for greater clarity and 
comprehensiveness within one’s evaluation of the law. The argument here is that although 
the simplistic language of offence analysis can allow problems within the law to remain 
hidden, analysing the elements of an offence individually can have the effect of shining a 
light into a dark corner.56 Commenting on codification generally (for which he believes 
element analysis forms an integral part), Robinson comments that: 
 
The rambling paragraphs of case opinions and scholarly literature ... provide a 
permanent haven for the murky rule. Leaving the law’s rules to the shadows of case 
law and scholarly literature, where there is never a clear target, means less likelihood 
of seeing and correcting law’s flaws.57    
 
As the quotation suggests, it should not be forgotten that the important corollary of 
exposing problems in the law is the opportunity for their correction. Here too, law 
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 For examples of this, see the discussion of general inchoate offences in Chapter 10. Exploring each element 
of each offence, this discussion exposes gaps and inconsistencies in both the current law and within the 
relevant Law Commission recommendations.   
57
 Robinson, ‘In defence of the Model Penal Code: A reply to Professor Fletcher’ (1998) 2 Buffalo Criminal Law 
Review, 25, 42.  
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reformers may be aided by a technique that allows them to focus on the precise elements of 
offences rather than having to tackle them as a whole.58  
 
Beyond the greater clarity discussed above, it has been claimed that reform structured by 
element analysis will also promote greater democratic control and improved consistency in 
application: each of which form integral parts of the ‘principle of legitimacy’ that underpins 
the normative basis of the criminal law.59      
 
The democratic claim is premised upon the contention that many offences currently on the 
statute book (which have not been created with element analysis in mind) are either 
incomplete or too open-textured. Where this is so, there is effectively a delegation of 
legislative responsibility from Parliament to the courts to fill in the gaps in order to resolve 
the cases before them. An example of this, which will be fully explored later in this chapter, 
can be found in the law of criminal attempt. Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 
states that to be guilty of criminal attempt D must intend to ‘commit an offence.’ Based 
upon the Law Commission’s report that preceded the Act, this statement was intended to 
apply generally to the actus reus of the principal offence (every element of it).60 However, in 
the case of Khan,61 the Court of Appeal interpreted the Act to require intention as to the act 
and result elements, but to allow the fault attached to the circumstance element to mirror 
that of the principal offence.  
 
                                                          
58
 Although, of course, maintaining an overview of the offence is also essential.  
59
 Moore, Act and Crime: The philosophy of action and its implications for criminal law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1993) 240. 
60
 Law Commission, Criminal law: Attempt and impossibility in relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement 
(Law Com No 102, 1980) [2.14-18].  
61
 [1990] 1 WLR 813. 
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Whether or not one agrees with the result in this particular case, it must lead us to question 
the ability of offence analysis to secure the will of Parliament. Proponents of element 
analysis claim that its use would enable the ‘legislature to reclaim from the courts the 
authority to define the grounds of criminal liability.’62 The argument here is that, had the 
offence been codified using element analysis, clearly stating that intention was required for 
every element of the principal offence, the court’s interpretation in Khan would not have 
been possible.63 This democratic claim, of course, requires some qualification. For example, 
many offences are likely to continue to be drafted in an intentionally open-textured way in 
order (partly) to allow the courts some manner of discretion. However, the greater potential 
of element analysis to confine courts discretion in those areas deemed necessary by 
Parliament, remains a significant benefit of the technique. 
 
The contention that element analysis would also facilitate greater consistency in the way 
statutes are applied, follows a very similar line. First, if element analysis results in there 
being fewer gaps in the law because such gaps are clearly visible on the face of a statute, 
judges will not be forced to make decisions on how they should be filled in order to decide 
cases. As a result, it is arguably less likely that inconsistent lines of authority will develop in 
the courts as different judges peruse dissimilar approaches. An example of this is the 
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 Leader-Elliott, ‘Benthamite reflections on codification of the general principles of criminal liability: Towards 
the panopticon’ (2005) 9 Buffalo Criminal Law Review, 391, 391.    
63
 See, The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: A Report to the Law Commission (Law Com No 
143, 1985) [14.30], where it is proposed that the Criminal Attempts Act should be redrafted to state that 
intention is required for every element of the principal offence. Support for the point can also be gained from 
a comparison with the offence of conspiracy. Unlike the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, section 1(2) of the 
Criminal Law Act 1977 specifically rules out the possibility of any fault element lower than intention or 
knowledge being sufficient for the circumstance element of conspiracy. As a result, in the case of Saik [2006] 
UKHL 18, [2007] 1 AC 18, the House of Lords felt bound to apply the law as set out in the statue despite the 
‘unattractive outcome’ (Lord Nicholls *33+). However, Saik may be contrasted with Sakavickas [2004] EWCA 
Crim 2686 where the court held that s1(2) of the Criminal Law Act could be satisfied by D that ‘knew’ that his 
or her state of mind was ‘suspicion’.       
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current law of complicity, where although the actus reus of the offence is set out (in the 
barest terms) in section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861, the mens rea is left 
entirely undefined by the statute. In an attempt to fill this void, the courts have developed 
several approaches which now stand inconsistently with one another.64  
 
Secondly, in relation to cases like Khan, if judges are confined by very precise drafting, then 
this too may improve consistency.65 Gainer contends that, by narrowing the choices judges 
are left with through the use of element analysis, we are able to ‘reduce the opportunities 
for, and probably the instances of, different conclusions being reached on the basis of 
reaction rather than reason.’66 This is not to advocate the complete removal of the judicial 
role, and there remains some scope within the structure of element analysis for judicial 
discretion.67 However, with this discretion confined within each individual element of the 
offence, the use of element analysis can be seen as a refinement in favour of consistency.    
 
Preventing the enactment of thought crime 
 
Within his book Structure and Function in Criminal Law, Robinson makes the further claim 
that employing element analysis as a structure for the law would have the effect of ‘barring 
punishment for unexternalised thoughts’: as every offence must contain an act element.68 
However, as Simester has observed, the act requirement is neither adequate nor desirable 
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 For discussion of this, see, Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007) Appendix B.    
65
 For example, the question whether the authority in Khan can be extended to allow a fault element less than 
intention to apply in attempts to the result element of a principal offence remains, to some extent, an open 
debate. See the contrasting cases of Millard and Vernon [1987] Crim. L.R. 393 and AG Reference (No3 of 1992) 
[1994] 1 W.L.R. 409.    
66
 Gainer, ‘The culpability provisions of the MPC’ (1987) 19 Rutgers Law Journal, 575, 583.  
67
 See the discussion in Part III generally.  
68
 Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 32.   
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as a lone defence against the enactment of ‘thought crimes’.69 It is not adequate because a 
statute could simply require D to have performed any act, however remote form the 
eventual harm. For example, as Simester states, ‘moving one’s arm whilst contemplating the 
death of the King would not violate Robinson’s act requirement.’70 It is not desirable as a 
lone defence because the aversion to thought crime shared by Robinson and Simester is not 
structural but normative, relating to the values of free speech and autonomy.71 
 
Robinson may well reply to this criticism, with some justification, that his comments 
concerning the act element (as a defence against the creation of thought crime) have been 
taken out of context. After all, the examples provided by Robinson clearly demonstrate that 
he had in mind only those acts which either cause the eventual harm or are a clear 
indication of D’s criminal intent.72 However, such a response is to concede that element 
analysis is not able to prevent the enactment of thought crime. The use of element analysis 
may provide greater clarity when exposing what may be seen as normatively inadequate act 
elements. However, element analysis, like offence analysis, does not prescribe any 
particular policy. Rather, it provides a structure around which various policies can be 
constructed: including policies that require act elements to be proximate to harm and/or a 
manifestation of intention.     
 
The rejection of this particular potential advantage as unsustainable does no damage to the 
other potential benefits of element analysis outlined in this chapter. Indeed, the 
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 Simester, ‘Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law’ (Book Review, 1998) Cambridge Law Journal, 
616.   
70
 Ibid, 617. 
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 Ibid, 617; Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 31 and 32.  
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 Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 31 and 32. 
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acceptability of element analysis (or any other devise) cannot hang on its ability to solve all 
of the problems within the criminal law.  However, its inclusion (and rejection) comes as 
useful reiteration of the limits of element analysis. To a certain extent, there must be links 
between the structure of the criminal law and its normative content. Indeed, in our 
discussion below, we highlight that one of the principal benefits of element analysis is that it 
is able to facilitate certain policy options within the law of attempt that would not be 
possible using only offence analysis. However, if the technique is to remain flexible to the 
needs of a changing society, it is also a benefit that it is normatively neutral as to the 
content of the law. Element analysis provides the basis for an expanded variety of policy 
options, but contrary to Robinson, it does not (and is not equipped to) go beyond that.   
 
Analysis and codification of the fault terms 
 
Arguably the most visible use of element analysis across the common law world relates to 
the exploration of fault terminology. Whether or not it is judged to be an acceptable 
structure for the analysis of offences or even as a structure for law reform, it seems that 
element analysis (in this area at least) has emerged as the preferred option to offence 
analysis.73  
 
The main reason for the use of element analysis in this area seems to relate to the greater 
flexibility that it provides: flexibility required both to reflect the common law (which often 
distinguishes between the elements of an offence when discussing fault) and to conform to 
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 See, for example, the discussion of fault terms in Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford 
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the requirements of the law reformer. Whereas, using offence analysis, the definition of a 
fault term would have to be capable of applying to any part (element) of an offence, 
element analysis allows each fault term to be tailored depending on the element it is 
applied to. For example, section 18 of the 1989 Draft Criminal Code74 sets out the fault 
terms in the following manner: 
 
18. For the purposes of this Act... a person acts–  
(a) ‘knowingly’ with respect to a circumstance not only when he is aware that it exists 
or will exist, but also when he avoids taking steps that might confirm his belief that it 
exists or will exist; 
(b) ‘intentionally’ with respect to– 
 (i) a circumstance when he hopes or knows that it exists or will exist; 
 (ii) a result when he acts either in order to bring it about or being aware that it will 
occur in the ordinary course of events; 
(c) ‘recklessly’ with respect to– 
 (i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist; 
 (ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur; and it is, in the circumstances 
known to him, unreasonable to take the risk; 
 
Several important aspects of this section would not have been possible if the Law 
Commission had not chosen to structure it using element analysis (separating the elements). 
For example, we can see considerable differences in the way the single terms intentionally 
and recklessly apply as between circumstances and results. Beyond this, element analysis 
also allows the fault terms to overlap with one another in limited areas without losing the 
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 The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales: Volume 1 Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill 
(Law Com No 177, 1989) 51.  
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distinction between them completely. Examples of this include the definitions of knowingly 
and intentionally which overlap when applied to the circumstance element of an offence, 
but not the result element.  
 
In certain instances, the use of element analysis to define fault terminology can be placed 
within a wider acceptance of element analysis as a structure for drafting all criminal 
offences.75 However, in those jurisdictions that have not fully incorporated element analysis, 
its use in this particular field has had a relatively unusual history. This is because even those 
academics that have criticised element analysis generally as being unworkable, have still 
tended to employ it in this limited capacity. For example, the 1980 Law Commission report 
on preparatory offences is notable for its total rejection of element analysis as a structure 
for the reform of inchoate offences: 
 
Since the new statutory offence of attempt in place of common law will ... apply to all 
existing offences, it seems to us that the terminology of ‘circumstances’ and *results+ 
will not be appropriate.76  
 
However, an integral part of the reform recommended within the report is based upon the 
assumption that intention includes knowledge in relation to the circumstance element of an 
offence, but not the result element.77 Whether it is logically sustainable to reject element 
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It is clear from the preceding discussion that there are several potential advantages for 
those within the criminal law to employ element analysis as a structure for legal discussion 
and presentation. Element analysis provides a ‘building-block technique’ which supporters 
claim is capable of simplifying the law, whilst simultaneously increasing its level of 
sophistication.78 Therefore, although each of these advantages will require further 
examination before they are fully accepted, a task that is taken up in later chapters, there 
appears to be a relatively strong prima facie case for the technique.  
 
However, standing alone, the potential benefits of element analysis outlined above may be 
of a limited appeal. This is because, like the more general project of codification, the use of 
any common structures within the law requires a level of political consensus in its support. 
Thus, although the benefits of general codification are well known,79 without the necessary 
consensus, the project has now been abandoned.80 Equally, although individual academics 
and law reformers may find benefit in the use of element analysis, its full potential will not 
be realised unless it becomes a common structure.81  
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 See, Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales – Volume 1 – Report and Draft Criminal Code 
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For proponents like Robinson, building a consensus in favour of element analysis has 
focused on highlighting the top-down benefits that it can bring to the study and operation 
of the criminal law (outlined above).82 However, unlike the case for codification more 
generally, element analysis can also be advocated using a bottom-up approach: that it is 
necessary in order to create individual offences that operate fairly. It is to this potential 
benefit that we now turn. Although each benefit is often discussed separately, and they are 
in no way mutually dependant, they may be mutually reinforcing.83  
 
2) Element analysis as a structure for the reform of general offences 
 
Arguably the most important, but certainly the most contentious, attraction of element 
analysis concerns the creation of new policy options in the reform of inchoate offences and 
complicity.84 Each of these offences and the potential role played by element analysis will be 
explored in detail in chapters 10 and 12. However, for present purposes, we will briefly 
discuss why and then how element analysis has been used in the reform of the offence most 
commonly associated with it in this jurisdiction, that of criminal attempt.  
 
 
Consider the following example: 
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 See generally, Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997). 
83
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84
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D picks up a stone. Just as he motions to throw the stone, X, realising that it might 
hit and damage V’s window, prevents D from doing so. 
 
In this example, the issue is whether D should be liable for having attempted to cause 
criminal damage to V’s property.85 D’s act in trying to throw the stone would come 
comfortably within most people’s conceptions of the actus reus of attempt.86 However, 
before D can be found liable for an attempt, we must also consider what mens rea should 
be required by D in relation to the substantive offence. It is whilst dealing with this second 
normative issue of mens rea that structural benefits offered by element analysis have 
proven to be particularly attractive.   
 
In order to appreciate why law reformers (and the courts) have looked to element analysis 
for assistance in this area, it is first important to understand the alternative approaches 
available in its absence. Without employing element analysis, law reformers have 




Option 1: Mirror the substantive offence 
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 Contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1. 
86
 It would certainly be sufficient to come within the conduct element of attempt set out in the Criminal 
Attempts Act 1981, s1. 
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The first option, a technique never garnering much support,88  would require D to have the 
same mens rea as he or she would be required to have for the principal offence. Therefore, 
having identified the mens rea required for the principal offence (in this case criminal 
damage), we then require for attempts liability that D should posess this same mens rea at 
the time of his or her attempt. A potential advantage of this approach is that it recognises 
the moral equivalence of D that completes the offence and D that, though no choice of his 
or her own, is prevented from completing the offence. If the conduct of each defendant is 
morally equivelant, then surely the mens rea requirments should be the same.   
 
However, although this policy might seem attractive if we imagine D in our example as an 
enemy of V intent on damaging his property, it becomes much less atractive if we discover 
that D is a friend of V and is simply trying to get his attention from outside the house. Here, 
if D forsees the possibility that the stone might damage V’s property, even if he does not 
want it to and even if (as in the example) he is prevented from throwing the stone, he will 
still be guilty of attempted criminal damage.89  
 
Similarly unsatisfactory conclusions would appear in other areas of the law as well. The 
offence of murder, for example, does not require D to intend or even foresee the result 
element of the actus reus (death) in order to be convicted.90 However, if D is arrested just 
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 For a rare exception, see Loftis, ‘Criminal law: Requiring the same intent for prosecution of criminal attempt 
and the consummated crime’ (1984) 36 University of Florida Law Review, 545.  
89
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before attacking V, it is surely wrong to convict him or her of attempted murder unless he or 
she intended to kill V.91  
 
There would also be problems with several strict liability offences. Consider the following 
example:  
 
D and P go out to a pub together to celebrate D’s birthday. D is intending to drive 
home and so he does not drink any alcohol. However, unaware that D is intending to 
drive, and anxious that D should enjoy himself, P mixes alcohole into D’s drinks. Just 
as D gets into his car to drive home P spots him and tells him what he did. D does not 
drive home. 
 
If D had driven the car and been in excess of the prescribed alcohol limit then he would have 
committed an offence regardless of his lack of fault.92 D’s conviction (on these terms) is 
justified on the basis that, whether or not he intended to commit the offence, drink driving 
poses a considerable danger to other road users. However, in a case such as that in the 
example, where D does not actually go on to create the danger, it is surely inappropriate to 
convict him of attempt unless he at least foresaw the risk that he might be over the alcohol 
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Option 2: Intending every element of the substantive offence 
 
This option was preferred by both the Law Commission and by Parliament leading to the 
enactment of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.93 Setting aside the mens rea requirements of 
the principal offence, this approach to criminal attempts simply requires D to intend every 
element. Unlike option one, this option is predicated upon the contention that D (who fails 
to bring about a specific harm) is equally deserving of punishment as P (who actually brings 
about the harm) only if D intended to bring that harm about. Preventing the net of 
criminality being cast too widely, this approach ensures that ‘as the form of criminal liability 
moves further away from the infliction of harm, so the grounds of liability ... become more 
narrow.’94 
 
In this manner, option two is able to deal much more satisfactorily with the examples 
outlined above that proved problematic for option one. It would convict, in the criminal 
damage example, D1 that intended to break V’s window, but acquit D2 that simply intended 
to get V’s attention whilst foreseeing the possibility of damage. It would also require D to 
intend to kill V before he or she could be convicted of attempted murder. And likewise, in 
the drink driving example, it would be necessary for D to know that he was in excess of the 
alcohol limit before he could be convicted of attempting to drive in excess of the alcohol 
limit.  
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 The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s1.  
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 Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law (4th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003) 425.  
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However, as with option one, this policy also encounters problems when it is applied to 
certain offences. Consider the following example involving the offence of rape: 
 
D and P go out to find a woman (V) with whom to have sex with. Without caring 
whether V consents or not, but recognising the likelihood that she will not, both D 
and P attempt penetration. Only P is successful. 
 
In this example,95 P has committed the offence of rape.96 P commits rape because he does 
not reasonably believe, at the time of penetration, that V is consenting. However, if 
attempts liability were to require intention as to every element of the offence, D’s 
recklessness as to V’s lack of consent would not be sufficient to ground his liability in 
attempt. Therefore, D would not be liable for attempted rape. In fact, to be liable for the 
attempt, it would appear necessary for D to either intend V to lack consent, or at best to 
have full knowledge of V’s lack of consent. It is little wonder therefore that this approach 
has been widely and almost universally criticised for being unduly restrictive in its 




As we have already highlighted, element analysis (like offence analysis) does not provide an 
alternative policy as to the normative content of the law. Indeed, although the two options 
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above are noted because they do not require the use of element analysis to function, either 
one could also be expressed using an element analysis structure. However, having rejected 
the two options above as either over or under-inclusive, it is the use of element analysis that 
provides the structure for further (mid-way) options. It is the normative appeal of these 
further options, only available through the use of element analysis, which has made 
element analysis so attractive.98 Thus, when setting out the fault element of attempt, 
instead of mirroring the substantive offence or requiring a single level of fault for the whole 
offence, it becomes possible for different levels of fault to apply to different elements of the 
actus reus.   
 
Element analysis has been used to structure the criminal attempts policy in this way for 
many years within the US MPC,99 but has, for some time, only attracted limited support in 
England.100 That is, until the case of Pigg.101 Pigg was heard after the enactment of the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 (which codified option two), but as the facts of the case 
preceded the Act,102 it was decided under the old common law. In Pigg, D attempted to 
have sexual intercourse with V who did not consent. D foresaw the possibility of V’s non-
consent but did not perceive the risk as a serious one. The Court of Appeal upheld D’s 
conviction for attempted rape.  
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The decision in Pigg was based upon option one rather than element analysis. However, 
being heard so soon after the enactment of the Criminal Attempts Act, Pigg demonstrated 
the inadequacy of the approach just codified: under option two, D in Pigg would not have 
been convicted of attempted rape because he did not intend or know that V was not 
consenting.103 As a result, commentators began to look for ways to interpret the language of 
the Act104 in order to allow for a conviction if a case like Pigg was to come before the courts 
again. 
 
Chiefly, this search led to element analysis.105 By employing element analysis to structure 
the law, it would become possible to require intention as to the act and result elements, but 
to allow the circumstance element to reflect the fault required by the principal offence 
(often to a minimum floor of recklessness).106 In this way, element analysis facilitates the 
creation of an approach that plots a midway course between options one and two. It aims 
to avoid over-inclusiveness. It does so in cases like attempted murder, for example, by 
requiring that D intend to kill V (result) as a condition of liability. Further, in the attempted 
drink driving example, D will not be liable for attempting to drive in excess of the prescribed 
alcohol limit unless he is at least reckless as to the fact that he is over the prescribed limit 
(circumstance). The approach also aims to avoid being under-inclusive. In the attempted 
rape example, D will be liable for attempted rape because he was reckless as to the 
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circumstance of whether V was consenting, a level of fault that would be sufficient for the 
principal offence. 
 
Convinced by their Scrutiny Group on preliminary offences that the law of attempts should 
allow for recklessness as to circumstance,107 the Law Commission in 1989 also decided that 
reform should be based on element analysis (abandoning option 2).108 However, despite the 
Law Commission’s recognition of element analysis’ potential benefits, following the failure 
of the Criminal Code Bill, the issue was again left to the courts. It was the case of Khan,109 
mirroring the facts of our attempted rape example above, which confirmed that the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981 should be interpreted to require intention as to acts and results, 
but only recklessness as to the circumstance element. This approach can only function 
through the use of element analysis.    
 
Post-Khan, this nuanced approach provided for and facilitated by element analysis, 
represents the current law of attempts.110 Beyond this, recognising the considerable overlap 
between the inchoate offences, the Law Commission are now perusing a similar approach 
within the codification of the inchoate offences of incitement, attempt and conspiracy, as 
well as the choate offence of complicity.111 The old common law offence of incitement, for 
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example, has already been replaced with a new offence (assisting and encouraging crime) 




If element analysis is employed by Parliament to reform general offences like the inchoate 
offences and complicity, then, theoretically,113 the courts could be called upon to separate 
the elements of any offence within the English criminal law. In this manner, the bottom-up 
attraction of element analysis explored in this section has the potential to provide the 
common usage required to realise the top-down attractions explored in the previous 
section. Unlike the general case for codification, a common language of element analysis 
will be effectively forced upon the criminal law, making it much more likely that it will begin 
to shape both discussion and presentation in a more general way.   
 
THE CRITICISMS OF ELEMENT ANALYSIS 
 
In this section we explore the major criticisms of element analysis that have prevented (or 
at least substantially delayed) its adoption into the English criminal law.  
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1) The problem of objective separation of elements 
 
The separation of offence elements might (at first glance) seem quite straightforward:  
 
 Act element: The physical conduct (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
 
However, critics have pointed out that the process of separating elements inevitably 
requires subjective judgements to be made. This simple point is the single most damaging 
criticism of element analysis. Focused upon the use of element analysis as a structure for 
the reform of inchoate offences, which in turn must apply to offences across the criminal 
law, objectivity is essential. For example, the approach explored above in relation to 
criminal attempts is that D must intend the act and result elements of the principal offence, 
but may be reckless as to the circumstance element. The mens rea of attempts does not 
simply reflect the principal offence (option 1) and it is not based on a single level of fault 
(option 2). Rather, the fault required is directly related to the manner in which the principal 
offence’s actus reus is separated into elements. Therefore, if the process of separation is 
subjective to each court, it will be impossible to predict the result of individual cases in 




An offence often used to illustrate this point is the ‘abduction of an unmarried girl under the 
age sixteen from her parent or guardian’.114 Attempting to place this example within an 
element analysis structure, critics have claimed that the task of separating offence elements 
becomes ‘virtually a matter of taste’115 in which different parts of the offence can be 
defensibly placed in almost any of the elements.116 For example, although one commentator 
might describe D’s act element as ‘taking’ with all other aspects of the offence considered 
circumstances. Another might legitimately claim that D’s act element is the ‘taking of a girl’ 
or even the ‘taking of an unmarried girl under the age of sixteen from her parent or 
guardian’. Further, as one looks to isolate the result element, the same problems arise.  
 
The issue of objectivity within the separation of elements is not aided by the language used 
within the criminal law. Without element analysis in mind, offences are discussed and 
codified using terms that combine elements and defy separation. For example, instead of 
stating that a particular act must be shown to have caused a particular result, the use of 
terms like ‘kills’117 and ‘wounding’118 combine both act and result elements. Other terms like 
‘abduction’, discussed in the previous paragraph, could even be interpreted to include all 
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three elements: the act involved in taking, the result of being taken and the circumstance 
that it is done without legal authority.119    
 
All of this leaves the court with a rather unenviable task. In order to apply a general offence 
that relies upon element analysis they must separate the elements of (potentially) any 
principal offence. However, without being provided with the means to do this objectively, 
and various options seeming to be equally compelling, subjective considerations about 
individual case fairness will be both inevitable and correct. However, to the extent that such 
value judgements may lead to inconsistencies between courts and the analysis of offences, 
they have the potential to undermine any policy based on element analysis that has claims 
of legal certainty. This is because, although a circumstance element may allow for 
recklessness for example, if the same term is also an act and/or a result element, then it 
would be equally possible for a court to require intention.  
 
Element analysis as a structure for discussion and presentation 
 
As previously mentioned, the criticism of element analysis’ inability to separate the 
elements of individual offences objectively is usually aimed at its role in the reform of 
inchoate offences. However, it is important to note that the criticism applies with equal 
force to the use of element analysis as a structure for discussion and presentation. As 
element analysis does not provide answers to substantive policy questions, the only 
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advantage it can offer in this area is the provision of a common structure to focus the 
debate of academics and the choices of law reformers. However, if this structure is not 
objectively discoverable, then it is unlikely to be common between all academics. Far from 
being useful as a framework, element analysis is therefore liable to provoke simply a further 
and unnecessary layer of complication.120  
 
2) The problem of complexity 
 
Unlike the previous criticism, the criticism that element analysis and the processes of 
separating offence elements are overly complex does not seek to undermine element 
analysis’ theoretical foundation. However, particularly in relation to the use of element 
analysis to reform inchoate offences, the criticism is potentially very damaging. It is usually 
presented in one of the two ways: as part of a general criticism or as a sole concern. Each 
will be discussed in turn. 
 
Complexity as part of a general criticism 
 
The first way in which the criticism is presented is part of a general critique of the use of 
element analysis to reform the inchoate offences. This form of the criticism is most closely 
associated with Richard Buxton.121 Despite the growing support for element analysis 
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following its rejection by the Law Commission in 1981,122 Buxton maintained that such an 
approach would have required too much of the court. Without the aid of clear definitions 
and a method of identifying the elements of an offence, he noted that ‘a formidable 
programme [of interpretation and analysis] would have awaited the judge, let alone the 
jury.’123 Part of this criticism reflects the problem of objective separation of elements 
already discussed. However, beyond this, the policy achieved through element analysis is 
unquestionably more complicated than the intention for all approach first envisaged by the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981. The judge not only has to separate the elements of the 
principal offence, he or she must also lead the jury through the process so that they can 
understand it sufficiently to decide whether D has the requisite fault for each element.  
 
It is partly this added complexity that also led Professor Ormerod to label the new offence 
of assisting and encouraging crime (structured using element analysis) as ‘torturously 
complex.’124  
 
Complexity as a sole concern  
 
The second group of critics agree (at least in general terms) that a policy structured on 
element analysis is desirable, but lament the complex product of its codification. Calling for 
simple and concise drafting is, of course, uncontroversial. The danger, however, is that the 
desire to create a simple statute may end up undermining the policy itself. For example, the 
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reform of complicity recommended by the Law Commission in their 2007 report 
Participating in Crime is structured using element analysis.125 The crime of complicity and 
the reform of it recommended by the Law Commission are very complex. The choice for the 
Commission was between recommending a draft Bill that fully set out the detail of the 
offence, and one that was more simply worded (leaving the detail to be read in by the 
courts). Following a consultation exercise that revealed a clear preference for the simpler 
draft Bill, the Commission chose that course.126            
 
Where, as with the draft Complicity Bill, the details omitted from the legislation are 
essential to its operation,127 it seems that the course chosen by the Commission may be 
regrettable. First, it is regrettable because if enacted, the legislation will not provide citizens 
with a clear and complete description of the law.128 
 
Secondly, there is the danger that open textured legislation will be interpreted in a way that 
is not intended by its authors. Indeed, we have already discussed above, in relation to the 
interpretation in Khan of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, how a lack of element analysis 
within the presentation of the law can leave it particularly vulnerable in this way. Professor 
Sullivan for example, who fundamentally disagrees with the Law Commission about how 
complicity should be reformed, has already highlighted the open texture of the draft Bill as 
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an opportunity for the courts to avoid the parts of the Law Commission’s policy that he 
disagrees with.129 
 
Lastly, the Law Commission’s response is regrettable because it does not remove the 
offence’s complexity, it simply disguises it. Despite what appears in the draft Bill, the 
Commission does not concede the substance of the reforms that it is recommending: the 
underlying policy remains the same. Therefore, the complexity of the recommended policy 
will simply be left as a matter for the courts. The advantages of this, besides the stated 
desire to ‘set out the law in a simple and intelligible manner’,130 are not discussed by the 
Commission. However, with the Commission repeatedly criticising the current law for the 
failure of the courts to adopt and maintain a consistent approach in this area,131 the 
potential dangers are relatively obvious.     
 
In this manner, it is clear how even this second milder variation of the complexity criticism 
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Element analysis has an ‘intuitive attraction’132 both as a structure for discussion and 
presentation (top-down) and as a structure for the reform of inchoate offences (bottom-up). 
However, if they hold, it appears that the criticisms outlined above are sufficient to 
undermine its viability in both areas.133 In order for the attractions of element analysis to be 
realised, it must be possible to separate the elements of every criminal offence objectively 
and it must be done in a manner that can be replicated in the courts. Indeed, it is this 
challenge that will define our search for a workable model of element analysis. However,  as 
Thornton has rather wistfully stated, such an objective can begin to look like the struggle for 
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FINDING A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISMS 
 
In line with the conclusions from chapter 2, for element analysis to function in an acceptable 
manner, it is essential for the identified criticisms to be overcome. This will be the principal 
task of Parts II and III. However, the first of these criticisms requires some preliminary work. 
This is the potentially very serious criticism that element analysis does not provide a method 
for the objective separation of offence elements. In this chapter, we survey the efforts that 
have already been made by various academics and law reformers to answer this criticism.  
 
The definition of element analysis identified within chapter 2, and set out below, will remain 
our point of reference: 
 
 Act element: The physical conduct (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
 
The obvious solution  
 
Arguably the most straight forward solution, at least on first reflection, would be to create a 
list of all criminal offences already divided into their various elements using element 
analysis. With this to hand, the complexity of the court’s task would be much reduced and 
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the required standards of objectivity and consistency would be assured. Indeed, there is 
precedent for such an approach in international criminal law. Supplementing the Rome 
Statute,135 for example, ‘The Elements of Crimes’136 provides a list of criminal offences and 
their separation into elements. Aiding the interpretation and use of Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the 
Rome Statute, ‘The Elements of Crimes’ have been generally welcomed as a useful 
addition.137 
 
Despite the undoubted merits of such an approach, however, it is very unlikely to be 
replicated within the English domestic criminal law. First, this is because of the sheer size of 
the project. It is one thing to trace the separation of the elements of the offences within 
Articles 6 to 8 of the Rome Statute, but quite another to do so with the many thousands of 
criminal offences within the English criminal law.138 Secondly, even if reformers were to 
focus upon a core body of offences,139 it is still unlikely that the project would be successful. 
With the 1989 Draft Criminal Code now almost forgotten as a going concern, and the Law 
Commission formally conceding its grand project of codification for the foreseeable 
future,140 it is very unlikely that a similar codification project designed to aid element 
analysis would gain the necessary political support.     
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However, this approach should not be abandoned entirely. Just as the Law Commission have 
revised their codification project to focus on specific areas of the criminal law rather than a 
full criminal code,141 we can revise our ambitions here in a similar way. If we are able to 
identify an objective method of element separation to be employed by the courts, then over 
time, although the courts will have no direct equivalent to ‘The Elements of Crimes’, they 
will have the precedents of previous decisions to aid them. Further, if element analysis is 
accepted, then the drafting of new or reformed offences are likely to reflect that 
acceptance: clearly separating elements or at least avoiding the terms that combine 
them.142  
 
The discussion leaves us with some hope that the use of element analysis and the process of 
element separation will become easier over time. However, the search for a magic formula 
that is able to separate the elements of offences objectively remains a necessary one.  
 
England and Wales 
 
The subject of element analysis has provoked a ‘spirited debate’143 in England and Wales 
ever since it was adopted into the US MPC. It has also proven to be a rather curious debate. 
With many commentators clearly torn between the attractions of element analysis on one 
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hand, and the criticisms that threaten to undermine them on the other, we have seen some 
of the most notable writers on the criminal law switching from one side to another. In the 
case of the Law Commission, a periodic change of personnel is probably a sufficient 
explanation. But the phenomenon is also true of individuals. For example, both Glanville 
Williams144 and J C Smith145 have been considered as central proponents of element analysis 
and its use for the reform of inchoate offences. However, at different times, both concluded 
that objective separation of elements (and element analysis as a result) is unworkable.146 
Williams outlines the dilemma in these terms: 
 
The conclusion [of a policy structured using element analysis] is wholly satisfactory, 
which tends to cloud the critical faculty. I confess to having changed my mind on the 
subject twice, but my present opinion is that the reasoning behind the argument 
(though not the conclusion) is very shaky indeed.147 
 
It is notable too, that Richard Buxton, probably the leading critic of element analysis,148 was 
the Criminal Law Commissioner in 1989 when element analysis was employed as a structure 
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for the Law Commission’s draft Criminal Code.149 As we move on to trace how the element 
analysis debate has progressed, we can see a similar struggle in the writings of many of 
those involved.   
 
The origins of the debate 
 
Following the adoption of element analysis within the US MPC in 1962, it is clear from the 
early Law Commission (Working Party) material that it believed that England would soon 
adopt a similar model.150 Still fostering this belief as late as 1973, the Working Party’s 
Consultation Paper on the reform of inchoate offences expressly employed a form of 
element analysis to structure their proposals: the fault of each offence relying on the 
separation of elements.151 There is no indication in the paper that the Working Party 
recognised a problem with the objectivity of that separation. Interestingly, there is also no 
indication in the introduction to the paper, written by the Law Commission, that it 
recognised any problems in this area either.152   
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However, by the time its report was published in 1980, the Law Commission had fully 
rejected the use of element analysis.153 Part of the reason for this rejection, that should not 
be neglected, was policy based. The Law Commission were recommending that the defence 
of impossibility should be removed and were concerned about the breadth of the criminal 
law if it were to convict those that recklessly attempt, incite or conspire to commit an 
impossible offence.154  
 
The other reason was that the Law Commission, convinced by Richard Buxton, now believed 
that element analysis could not provide for the objective separation of offence elements 
and was overly complex. Referring to the work of Buxton, 155 the Commission stated that: 
 
We agree with this criticism. The separation of elements of an offence into 
circumstances and [results] may in some instances be a useful means of analysing 
them. But to ask in the case of every offence what is a circumstance and what is a 
[result] is in our view a difficult and artificial process which may sometimes lead to 
confusion. Since a new statutory offence of attempt in place of the common law will 
(subject to express exceptions) apply to all existing offences, it seems to us that the 
terminology of ‘circumstances’ and *‘results’+ will not be appropriate.156  
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Following the recommendations in the Law Commission’s report, Parliament enacted the 
Criminal Attempts Act 1981. Employing offence analysis, the mens rea requirement set out 
in the Act simply states that D must intend to ‘commit an offence’ (option 2).157    
 
The first defence: Denial 
 
Reacting with surprise, the first line of defence offered by advocates of element analysis was 
to deny the criticism. For Williams, the Law Commission’s rejection of element analysis was 
‘demonstrably a mistake.’158 Analysing the offence of ‘abduction of an unmarried girl under 
the age sixteen from her parent or guardian’, Williams claimed that Buxton and the 
Commission had been misled by Smith and Hogan.159 Although Smith and Hogan had 
separated the elements of the offence to include a result element (leading to the confusion 
between circumstances and results), Williams believed that it was a conduct crime and thus 
had no result element. Therefore, with the mistake put right, the ‘alleged difficulty’ is ‘not 
proved by the example.’160   
 
However, the defence offered by Williams can be exposed as inadequate for two reasons. 
The first reason relates to the method of element separation set out by Williams in his 
article. With his sole concern being to distinguish between circumstances and results, 
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Williams concedes a ‘haziness’161 in relation to the definition of the act element and uses it 
interchangeably with the circumstance element.162 This may have been adequate in order to 
implement the 1973 Working Party’s proposals on Attempt (which did not discuss fault in 
relation to the act element),163 but it would not be adequate to implement modern 
proposals that require a different level of fault to apply to acts and circumstances.  
 
When discussing the offence of ‘assaulting a constable in the execution of his duty’, 
Williams’ method of element separation ran into further problems.164 He noted that a rioter 
attacking a policeman could be described as:  
 
wounding a policeman (in which case the fact that the victim is a policeman is part of 
the act, or a circumstance of the act), or we may say that his act is throwing a stone, 
and the [result] of the act is the wounding of the policeman (in which case the fact 
that the victim is a policeman is part of the [result]).165  
 
In order to resolve this problem, Williams introduced a ‘subsidiary rule’ stating that: 
 
… when a particular consequence of a bodily movement is customarily regarded as 
part of the act, it is nevertheless to be regarded as a [result] (and not a circumstance) 
of the act for the purpose of the distinction.166  (emphasis added) 
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On this basis, Williams concluded that he ‘could not see any possibility’ of the distinction 
between circumstances and results ‘involving difficulty in its application.’167 We may 
respectfully disagree. In the search for an objective method of separating the elements of 
offences, it is not sufficient to rely on there being a common ‘customary use’ of action 
descriptions. For example, Williams talks of ‘wounding a policeman’ being a customary 
description of an act, but why not ‘wounding an on-duty policeman’? If the latter was 
accepted as being customary, presumably the policeman’s on-duty status would also 
become part of the result element (and therefore have to be intended).168  
 
The second way in which Williams’ defence is exposed as inadequate relates to the reply 
given to it by Smith and Hogan. Although they recognised Williams’ criticism of their 
separation of offence elements, they did not accept that they had made a mistake. Rather, 
they continued to believe that the example (abduction offence) includes a result element.169 
A very real inconsistency is therefore exposed between the leading advocates of element 
analysis; an inconsistency that not only makes it very easy to label the process of element 
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The second defence: Concede and tolerate the problem 
 
Despite the failure of the proponents of element analysis to construct an objective method 
to separate the elements of offences, following the case of Pigg,171 there was a second wave 
of support for the technique. For example, in the run up to the Law Commission’s 1989 draft 
Criminal Code, the Commission’s Preparatory Offences Group172 recommended to them 
that the new code should again adopt element analysis. A paper by J C Smith that forms part 
of the group’s recommendations173 clearly sets out the injustice done by a policy in 
attempts that requires D to intend every element, and the benefit of one (structured on 
element analysis) that allows for recklessness as to circumstances.174 Recognising the 
criticism concerning objective separation of elements, the paper simply states that: 
 
I suspect that the difficulties are more theoretical than practical. The test seems easy 
enough to apply in relation to offences like rape and obtaining by deception which 
specify recklessness as a sufficient mens rea for circumstance.175 
 
Expressly referring to both Pigg and the scrutiny group’s recommendations, the Law 
Commission accepted that its previous position (option 2)176 had to be changed. The 
Commission agreed that the reform of attempts should allow for recklessness as to 
circumstance and that this should be achieved by structuring the inchoate offences using 
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element analysis.177 The perceived inability of element analysis to distinguish the elements 
of an offence objectively, the criticism that had led the Law Commission to reject element 
analysis nine years earlier, was referred to as merely a ‘minor complication’.178 The 
Commission’s response, mirroring that of Smith, was: 
 
We are prepared to tolerate the difficulty because in the mainstream cases where the 
rule is likely to operate, namely, rape and obtaining property by deception, the rule 
appears to work well. The distinction between act (sexual intercourse) and 
circumstance (non-consent) or between result (obtaining) and circumstance (the 
falsity of the representation) is plain on the face of the definitions of the offences.179 
 
In this manner, the Law Commission were clearly convinced by the attractions of element 
analysis (especially the ability to deal with cases like Pigg). However, it may well be that the 
Commission had not taken the objectivity criticism sufficiently seriously.  
 
First, the Law Commission’s approach can be criticised on the same terms that it used to 
reject element analysis in 1980. Although the Commission claim that the separation of 
elements of a few specific offences is a straightforward process, the inchoate offences that 
are being reformed will have to ‘apply to all existing offences’.180 Therefore, the Commission 
are conceding that in many cases the use of element analysis will not work well: leading to 
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unpredictability, inconsistency and complexity.181 For the courts and the parties involved in 
these cases, the fact that element analysis works well in other areas will be of scant 
comfort. 
 
Secondly, one may even question the claim that element analysis works well in relation to 
its paradigm examples like rape. According to the Law Commission,182 the actus reus of the 
offence of rape should have its elements separated in the following manner: 
 
 Act element: Penal penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth (sexual intercourse); 
 Circumstance element: Lack of consent; and 
 Result element: None. 
 
Separating the elements of rape in this way is very useful for the Commission. When it 
comes to attempted rape for example, their policy (requiring intent as to the act and result 
elements and recklessness as to the circumstance element) would achieve a conviction in a 
case like Pigg without being over-inclusive. 
 
However, critics claim that the conclusion of this separation of elements has not been 
reached as a result of an objective process, but rather it is the desired conclusion that has 
defined that process: the Commission want to allow recklessness for non-consent so it 
defines non-consent as a circumstance element.183 If this is the case, even the offence of 
rape will remain open to re-interpretation by a body that disagrees with the Commission’s 
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policy. For example, a court in Australia has recently separated the elements of the offence 
of rape to include non-consent within the act element (i.e. non-consensual sexual 
intercourse).184 As a result, in this case, intention is also required in relation to the fact of V’s 
non-consent. Beyond this, similar confusions surround whether the act element of rape 
includes the status of V as a woman or even as a person (i.e. intercourse with a female 
human) or whether such facts are circumstances.185 It is the inability of the Law 
Commission’s approach to element analysis to show that the Australian court was 
demonstrably incorrect, and the fact that other areas of uncertainty still persist, which 
clearly shows the inadequacy of their position.  
 
The third defence: Re-defining the elements 
 
Proponents of element analysis have at various points attempted to re-define the elements 
themselves in order to facilitate a greater level of objectivity and consistency. For example, 
several commentators (following the US MPC186) have chosen to define the act element in 
terms of simple bodily movement.187 
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence.      
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By stripping down the act element in this way, the hope is that it will be much easier to 
distinguish it from the circumstance and result elements. For example, if the act element of 
an offence simply relates to body movement, then the fact of non-consent in rape is clearly 
not part of the act element. 
 
Despite the attraction of this approach, it has been subjected to several criticisms and has 
remained on the fringes of the debate. Critics claim, for example, that to describe an 
offence like rape as the moving of the pelvis or abduction offences as the moving of muscles 
does not adequately reflect what the offences are about.188 In support of this, they also 
demonstrate how the proponents of this method are often inconsistent with their examples 
and go beyond simple bodily movement. For example, Duff has pointed out that: 
 
Enker ... describes the ‘act’ in possessing stolen goods as ‘possession of stolen goods’ 
and in smuggling as ‘bringing goods into the country without paying a duty’ ... *and+ 
Dressler ... describes ‘acts’ such as ‘positioning ... dynamite around V’s house and ... 
activating ... the detonator.’189      
 
Examples like this make it very easy for critics of the approach to claim a consensus for their 
belief that the act element must contain certain circumstances to be understood. And thus, 
that element analysis does not achieve objectivity. 
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Duff, in his article ‘The Circumstances of an Attempt’,190 has offered an alternative method 
for separating the elements of offences for the purposes of attempt (again assuming the 
Law Commission’s policy). For him, the priority should not be the stripping down of the act 
element, it should be to reflect the intention required for the principal offence. Thus: 
 
 Act element: Whatever part of the principal offence requires intention. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act that do not require intention. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence (whatever 
fault is required). 
 
Duff avoids having to reduce the act element to bodily movement, but his approach is still 
very problematic. First, the method is designed purely for the use of element analysis as a 
tool for the reform of inchoate offences and not as a structure for discussion and 
presentation. This is because the process of separating offence elements is heavily 
dependent on the offence being separated. Referring to, for example, the act element of 
the offence will not pinpoint a certain area of that offence, it will merely require the reader 
to investigate the offence to see where intent is required. It will also make the comparison 
of act elements of different offences (when discussing thought crime for example) 
irrelevant, because the act elements of different offences will bear little or no relation to 
one another. 
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Secondly, although Duff spends some time distinguishing between acts and circumstances, 
he spends relatively little time distinguishing between circumstances and results. If there is 
a blurring between the two, as Duff claims there is when criticising similar approaches by 
other academics,191 then there is still the potential that intention will be required in relation 
to a fact that Duff would rather class as a circumstance.192  
 
Finally, there is the problem of complexity: the method of element separation that Duff sets 
out is not straightforward and it will differ significantly for every offence.193 In fact, it is the 
increased complexity of this approach that leads Duff to reject it himself before moving on 
to introduce his alternative to element analysis.194  
 
The current defence: Re-defining the problem 
 
Over the last few years the Law Commission has again turned its attention to the reform of 
inchoate offences and has again opted to employ the structure of element analysis in order 
to do so.195 Indeed, even beyond the general inchoate offences, the Commission has also 
relied upon element analysis to structure their recommendations in relation to the offence 
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of complicity and the rules regarding intoxication.196 Notably, the recommendations of the 
Commission for the reform of incitement have already formed the basis of legislation that 
explicitly relies upon a form of element analysis.197 
 
However, despite the Commission’s extended use of element analysis, they have not 
attempted to follow the third defence by seeking to objectify the process of separating 
offence elements. Rather, in a recent attempt to re-cast the debate, the Commission has 
contended that a certain degree of subjectivity within element analysis is actually an 
advantage of the technique rather than a problem.198 Maintaining their line from the second 
defence, the Commission still believes that in the majority of core cases the process of 
separation will be simple and uncontroversial.199 However, going beyond the previous 
defence, they have contended that certain offences require discretion on the part of those 
separating the elements. This is because, for these offences, the manner in which they are 
separated may change depending upon the factual background of the case before the court, 
and even the manner in which the prosecution presents that case. Therefore, if a rigid and 
objective system of element analysis were to be developed, it would actually hinder the 
operation of those offences.200 
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In order to demonstrate the benefits of this discretion, the Commission provide two 
examples. The first relates to the offence of sexual assault,201 and the second, to the offence 
of dangerous driving.202 In each case, they discuss the offences in the context of a 
conspiracy charge. We will explore each example in turn. 
 
To be liable for the offence of sexual assault, D must intentionally touch V without consent 
in a manner that a reasonable person would perceive as sexual.203 Under the Act, the 
touching can either be judged as sexual ‘because of its nature’ or, if its sexual nature is 
uncertain, ‘because of its circumstances’ or because of D’s sexual ‘purpose’.204 In this 
manner, even if D’s actions were not obviously sexual to the reasonable person, he or she 
will not escape liability if those actions contained a sexual dimension.205 According to the 
Law Commission, the variety of ways in which D’s touching can be viewed as sexual 
represents a legislative requirement for movement between elements. This is because, if D 
assaults V by forcing her to strip naked against her will for example, D’s conduct is by its 
nature sexual and thus part of the act element, whereas, if D assaults V by robbing her in a 
female changing room, then the potential sexual dimension depends on the circumstance of 
whether V is naked or partially clad.206 Accordingly, if D is charged (under the Commission’s 
recommendations) with a conspiracy to commit sexual assault in the lead up to either of 
these assaults, it would have to be demonstrated that D intended the sexual dimension in 
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the former (because it forms part of the act element), but only that D was reckless as to the 
sexual dimension in the latter (because it forms part of the circumstance element). 
 
Although the Commission have employed this example in order to demonstrate the benefits 
of flexibility, it nevertheless gives rise to a number of difficulties. First, the distinction 
between what is sexual by its nature and sexual due to circumstances will not always be a 
clear one. For example, if D slaps a stranger (V) on the bottom in the middle of a busy street, 
we may conclude that this is sexual by its nature due to the intimate area being touched. 
However, because the slapping of a bottom will not always be sexual,207 it is possible to 
disagree with this categorisation, and claim that the assault is only sexual in this example 
because of the circumstances that V is a stranger and in a public street. It should be 
remembered that as nothing hangs on this distinction within the principal offence, D could 
be convicted of sexual assault without the requirement of categorising the sexual dimension 
beyond the conclusion that it fits within at least one of the areas. However, as the 
Commission’s policy for conspiracy would make this distinction essential in order to 
ascertain D’s required mens rea, a court would have to decide on the categorisation in every 
case. As the example demonstrates, this will not be straightforward.  
 
Secondly, although the Commission attempt to explain the manner in which this example 
employs movement between elements, they do not tell us why.208 As we observed above, 
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for the principal offence of sexual assault, there is no distinction made between D1 who’s 
assault is sexual by its nature and D2 who’s assault is sexual due to the circumstances in 
which it is carried out. It is simply two ways of committing the same offence. Therefore, it is 
difficult to understand why a distinction should be brought in at the conspiracy stage. For 
example, if D1 conspires to assault V, reckless as to whether D2 will carry this out when V is 
changing, D1’s recklessness will be sufficient for the charge of conspiracy to commit sexual 
assault (whether V is changing is part of the circumstance element). However, if D1 
conspires to assault V, reckless as to whether D2 will carry this out by forcing V to strip, D1’s 
recklessness is now insufficient (being forced to strip is part of the act element). The 
introduction of any distinction that is not recognised by the principal offence would appear 
to be contrary to principle.209 But one that makes it more difficult to convict D for conspiracy 
to commit sexual assault where the agreement relates to conduct that is by its nature 
sexual, and easier where it is sexual due to surrounding circumstances, certainly requires 
further justification than that provided by the Commission. 
 
Finally, although this example is employed partly to demonstrate the problems with a rigid 
interpretation of element analysis (defining the act element narrowly as bodily 
movement210), it is remarkable how much more effectively the rejected method of element 
analysis would cater for it. This is because, if the act element of sexual assault were to be 
isolated to the bodily movements of D, then the sexual dimension would never form part of 
that act element. Whether D’s conduct is sexual due to its sexual nature, or whether it is 
sexual due to surrounding circumstances, the sexual dimension would form part of the 
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circumstance element (social perception of D’s actions in their full context).211 Therefore, 
just as no distinction is made between conduct that is sexual by its nature or sexual due to 
certain circumstances within the principal offence, so no distinction will be drawn between 
the two within the inchoate charge. For both, as circumstance elements, D must be at least 
reckless as to whether a reasonable person would perceive his or her conduct as sexual.  
 
The second example offered by the Commission, focusing on the offence of dangerous 
driving,212 is equally problematic. The Commission present the example in the following 
terms: 
 
In considering a conspiracy charge for dangerous driving the element of 
dangerousness may lie in the very nature of the driving [the act element] agreed on, as 
where D1 and D2 agree to race each other along a motorway. Alternatively, the 
danger may lie in an inherent risk, such as an agreement to drive even though D1 and 
D2 know that their car tires are bald. In such a case, we would expect a court to say 
that whether the element of dangerousness is an [act] element (as in the first 
example), or a circumstance element (as in the second example), depends on the 
factual foundation on which the prosecution seeks to rely.213 
 
The first problem, again, is that we have very few indications about how to differentiate the 
act and circumstance elements, essential in order to ascertain D’s mens rea. For example, 
although the Commission classify an agreement to race as dangerous by its very nature, if 
that agreement also involved an established racetrack and speeds not exceeding 20mph, 
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then it is very unlikely to be dangerous. Rather, one might legitimately claim, it is not the act 
of racing that is dangerous, but rather the circumstances that it is taking place on a public 
motorway and at high speeds. Equally, although the Commission classify an agreement to 
drive a car with bald tyres as dangerous due to circumstances, others might claim that 
‘driving a car with bald tyres’ should be taken as a full expression of D’s action, and thus the 
dangerous dimension would come within that act element. To imply, as the Commission 
does,214 that prosecutors and defence lawyers will find an easy common ground to the 
classification of offence elements, despite the mens rea requirements of D relying on them, 
and despite the subjectivity of the judgements involved, seems highly optimistic. Rather, it 
seems considerably more likely that the ‘common sense analysis’215 anticipated by the 
Commission will be a common sense that reflects the conflicting interests of the two sides, 
leading to dispute and inconsistency. 
 
Beyond this, the central problem is the lack of reasons given by the Commission as to why 
this approach is preferable to the rigid application of an objective method of element 
analysis. Again, there is no distinction made between dangerous acts and dangerous 
circumstances within the principal offence, and therefore no need for such a distinction 
within the inchoate charges. Rather, there is every reason to define the act element 
narrowly to include only bodily movements, allowing the entire issue of dangerousness to 
be consistently analysed as part of the circumstance element.216    
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In this manner, although the Commission’s approach represents an interesting and 
ingenious attempt to turn the objectivity debate on its head, it is not a successful one. The 
examples that they provide to show the benefits of subjectivity do not demand a subjective 
approach and are better analysed using the objective method of element analysis explicitly 
rejected by the Commission.217 With no obvious advantages forthcoming, the Commission is 
therefore left with the same problems with subjectivity analysed above in relation to the 
second defence. And again, as with the second defence, we are forced to conclude that 
unless an objective method can be discovered, the advantages of element analysis cannot 
be realised.   
  
Other Common Law jurisdictions (not including the US) 
 
The experience of other common law jurisdictions is generally very similar to that of England 
and Wales. With several of them considering the reform of inchoate offences, the 
attractions of element analysis certainly warrant consideration. The question is whether 
they are also willing to tackle its critics.  
 
No mention of criticism 
 
The jurisdictions that fall within this category include Hong Kong and Canada. Although 
these jurisdictions do not advance our search for the magic formula enabling objective 
separation of offence elements, they do demonstrate the wide appeal of element analysis.   
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The work of the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong is particularly interesting because its 
review of the inchoate offences took place in 1994.218 Therefore, as much of the report is 
spent canvassing the English law, one would imagine that the Hong Kong Commission 
gained a clear understanding of both the attractions and the criticisms of element analysis. 
However, in their report, only the positive aspects of element analysis are discussed: 
notably its ability to facilitate the policy of recklessness as to circumstance.219 Although this 
omission could be interpreted as the Hong Kong Commission’s rejection of the critics, it is 
noted that despite their recommendations, the legislation that followed their report is not 
structured using element analysis.220 Rather, it is based upon the current English 
legislation221 (originally intended to codify the rejection of the technique).222   
 
A similar review of inchoate offences (and complicity) was undertaken by the Law Reform 
Commission of Canada in the late 1980’s.223 Here, too, element analysis was employed and 
recommended.224 However, the layers of complexity that disguise its use are, arguably, a 
sign that the Canadian Commission were not whole hearted in their endorsement. For 
example, the recommended clauses dealing with attempt225 and conspiracy226 do not 
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mention mens rea, and so we must rely on a residual rule that tells us to assume a 
requirement of purpose.227 It is within the definition of purpose that element analysis is 
employed.228 The clause distinguishes three scenarios: 
 
1. Where the offence requires purpose: purpose will be required for the act and result 
elements, but recklessness will suffice for circumstances.229  
2. Where essential circumstances are not mentioned in the definition of the offence 
(for example, that the gun is loaded): these circumstances will require knowledge.230 
3. Where the offence requires only recklessness: purpose will be required for the act 
element, but recklessness will suffice for circumstances and results.231 
 
It is perhaps unsurprising that the complicated policy recommended by the Canadian 
Commission, contained within the definition of purpose, has not yet been taken forward 
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Recognising the criticisms 
 
The jurisdictions that fall within this category include Australia, New Zealand and the 
Republic of Ireland. However, although each has confronted the criticisms of element 
analysis, their solutions have proved to be largely inadequate. 
 
In Australia, the debate about element analysis is relevant to both the Model Criminal Code 
(MCC) and the common law. The MCC233 does not rely upon element analysis to structure 
the inchoate offences.234 However, it is used to define the fault terms235 and it is also relied 
upon for the presumption of fault set out in Division 5.6 of the Code: 
 
(1) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a ... element of 
an offence that consists only of [an act], intention is the fault element for that ... 
element. 
(2) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a ... element of 
an offence that consists of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is the fault element 
for that ... element. 
 
In order to apply Division 5.6 it is therefore essential to be able to distinguish acts (which 
must be intended) from circumstances and results (which require recklessness). 
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As a result of Division 5.6, the definition of the act element becomes very important. 
However, due to a strange trail of logic, the authors of the MCC chose that it should remain 
undefined (beyond the clarification that it includes omissions and a state of affairs).236 The 
authors of the Code recognised that if the act element were defined to include anything 
more than simple body movements then ‘the distinction between ‘act’ and ‘circumstance’ 
*essential for Division 5.6+ seems to collapse.’237 However, they also believed that such a 
description would be too narrow,238 and they go on to cite with approval a line of case law 
that defines acts to include where necessary certain circumstances and results.239 The 
conclusion of the Code’s authors, to leave the definition of the act element to the courts,240 
is therefore (covertly) to concede the objectivity of element analysis and of Division 5.6.  
 
Within Australia’s common law jurisdictions,241 element analysis has been employed by the 
courts as a structure for the law of attempts. In the case of Evans,242 for example, element 
analysis was employed in order to convict D of attempted rape (requiring intent for the act 
element, but allowing for recklessness as to the circumstance of non-consent). A unanimous 
decision from the Supreme Court of South Australia, the judges appear to see the 
separation of the elements of rape as uncontroversial.243  
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Despite academic support for Evans,244 however, the precedent only lasted five years. In the 
case of Knight,245 it was held by the High Court of Australia that attempts liability requires D 
to intend every element of the principal offence. As Evans is not explicitly referred to in 
Knight, it may be debated whether Knight stands for a rejection of element analysis and the 
difficulty of distinguishing elements.246 However, at a minimum (for those that agree with 
the policy achieved through element analysis), Knight exposes the frailty of a policy 
maintained within the common law.  
 
In New Zealand, it is possible to trace a similar course of indecision in relation to the reform 
of attempts. The current law, set out in section 72 of the Crimes Act 1961, requires D to act 
with the ‘intent to commit an offence’. However, in the 1989 Crimes Bill, it was proposed 
that the law of attempts should be remodelled using element analysis: allowing for a 
conviction where D is reckless as to a circumstance element.247 
 
The New Zealand Crimes Consultative Committee, reviewing the Bill in 1991, was split over 
whether this clause should be retained.248 They recognised the attractions of the policy 
(allowing recklessness as to circumstance) in relation to crimes like attempted rape, with 
one member making explicit her belief that it was ‘right in principle’.249 However, the 
majority of the Committee felt bound to reject the use of element analysis, not for reasons 
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of principle (in the sense of convicting those reckless as to circumstance), but because of the 
difficulty of distinguishing elements and of explaining the law to a jury. Their solution was 
therefore to opt for a policy that did not require element analysis: requiring D to intend the 
full offence.250 If one agrees that the policy structured on element analysis is ‘right in 
principle’, this is clearly not a satisfactory conclusion.  
 
With the Crimes Bill failing to incorporate element analysis into the law of attempts, it is 
again the courts that have taken the lead. In 2006, in a unanimous judgement of the New 
Zealand Supreme Court, it was held that ‘intent to commit an offence’ in section 72 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 does not rule out liability where D is reckless as to a circumstance 
element.251 Overruling an earlier decision in the High Court that had interpreted the law of 
attempts to require intention for each element,252 and without reference to the debate 
surrounding the 1989 Crimes Bill, the Supreme Court instead followed the English case of 
Khan.253 However, although the case is clearly a positive step for those that support an 
attempts policy structured on element analysis, it remains problematic in two respects. 
First, none of the judges addressed the issue of objective element separation and so 
criticisms in this area remain undefeated.254 Secondly, as the Australian experience 
demonstrates, the policy also remains vulnerable as long as it remains uncodified.       
 
                                                          
250
 Crimes Consultative Committee, Crimes Bill: Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee (New Zealand, 
1991) 101.  
251
 L [2006] 3 NZLR 291. 
252
 Shepherd v R (High Court, Auckland, T 192/91, 20 Feb 1992) Anderson J.  
253
 L [2006] 3 NZLR 291, Chisholm J [19] and Tipping J [17].  
254
 The reason this topic was not addressed is probably due to the fact that the principal offence was that of 
rape. As a result, the court simply followed the case of Khan.  
79 
 
The most recent review of inchoate liability, outside of England, has taken place in the 
Republic of Ireland. However, again, we see the same pattern emerging. The Irish Law 
Reform Commission accept that ‘there is no objective method or criteria for distinguishing 
*results+ from circumstances,’255 and yet it’s proposed policy (to allow recklessness as to 
circumstance for attempts)256 directly relies upon that distinction. Without any word as to 
how this problem might be solved, the Commission simply asks consultees whether the use 




The evolution of element analysis within America contrasts dramatically with the other 
common law jurisdictions already discussed. Chiefly, this is the result of the US MPC which 
explicitly uses element analysis both to define the fault terms257 and to structure the 
offence of attempt.258 Through the US MPC, element analysis has had a ‘major influence on 
all but two of the thirty-eight *US+ jurisdictions where reform has occurred,’259 and has been 
characterised by certain academics as ‘the most significant and enduring achievement of the 
Code’s authors’.260 
 
Another distinguishing factor is that the US MPC provides a definition of the act element:   
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(2) ‘act’ or ‘action’ means a bodily movement whether voluntary or involuntary261 
 
By defining the act element in this manner, advocates of element analysis claim that it 
becomes possible to objectively distinguish all the elements of an offence.262 Thus, even 
though the US MPC does not define the circumstance and result elements, each can be 
defined in relation to the act element. 
 
Employing the US MPC’s definition of the act element, and adding this to our previous 
definitions of the circumstance and result elements, we appear to be left with an objective 
method of separation: 
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence.263      
 
However, despite the potential in the code for objectivity and despite the ‘remarkable’ 
degree of acceptance that element analysis has enjoyed in America,264 problems still persist. 
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The main reason for these problems seems to be that although the definition of act set out 
above may appear objective and unambiguous, other sections within the US MPC combine 
to cause a ‘fuzziness’ that threatens that objectivity.265    
 
The main area of concern is section 2.02 of the US MPC which employs element analysis to 
define the fault terms. In this section, instead of referring to the act element (or, to use the 
language of the US MPC, the ‘conduct element’) and thus to simple bodily movement, 
reference is made to ‘the nature of’ the act element.266 The problem is that although this 
alternative to act simpliciter appears to encompass more than simple body movement,267 its 
use within the US MPC still requires the nature of the act to be distinguished from the 
circumstance and result elements. Therefore, as in the other common law jurisdictions, 
courts are forced to make subjective judgements about what the nature of the act might 
include, and the potential for objective separation of offence elements is lost.  
 
Re-modelling the previous definition of element analysis in line with this, we can see that 
with the obscuring of the definition of the act element, all three elements will be negatively 
affected: 
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 Act element: The bodily movement (including, where necessary, the essential 
surrounding facts) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
 
Another area of concern, discussed earlier, is the prevalence of statutory terms that appear 
to combine different elements in a way that defies separation. Robinson comments, for 
example, that these terms ‘create ambiguities and undermine consistency in the operation 
of the Code.’268 Certainly, where such terms are used, one would imagine that the wider 
definition of the act element offered by section 2.02 becomes more appealing for a court. 
And, to the extent that this proposition is correct, objective separation of offence elements 




Having traced the potential attractions of element analysis and the criticisms that threaten 
to undermine them in the previous chapter, the primary focus of this chapter has become 
the search for an objective method of distinguishing the elements of an offence using 
element analysis. Without such objectivity, the process of separating offence elements 
becomes unpredictable. Whether element analysis is being used as a structure for legal 
discussion and presentation, or whether it is being used to create new options for reform, 
such unpredictability is fatal.  
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Our search for an objective method to distinguish the elements of an offence has led us to a 
single solution: the act element must be defined in terms of body movement (simpliciter) or 
a lack of bodily movement (omission), with the circumstance and result elements being 
defined in reference to it.  
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
 
This is the only version of element analysis that is capable of facilitating a sufficiently 
objective method of separating offence elements. If it is applied consistently,269 it does not 
rely on subjective judgements about what the act element must include (for its nature or to 
be understood). Further, advocates claim, this method is even capable of making objective 
distinctions in the face of statutory language that appears to resist such separation.270 
Describing the process, Bentham states: 
 
As grammar is taught by sentences thrown on purpose out of regimen, and geography 
by dissecting maps, in a like manner might the art of legislation, particularly what may 
be styled the mechanical branch of it, be taught by means of shapeless laws, be taken 
to pieces and put together again after the manner of the model.271       
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However, any celebration at this conclusion must quickly be tempered. The contention that 
the act element of an offence must be defined in terms of simple body movement is not a 
new one: with several academics and law reformers having advocated it over a number of 
years.272 Despite this, our discussion has been unable to identify a single jurisdiction where 
element analysis is applied to the law in this manner.   
 
The question that emerges is an obvious one. What are the objections to this narrow 
definition of the act element that have prevented its use, even where such prevention 
effectively undermines the viability of element analysis altogether? It is to this question, and 
Part 2, that our attention must now be directed. 
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PART II  
THE COST OF OBJECTIVITY IN THE SEPARATION OF 
ELEMENTS 
 
In chapter 2 we identified the two main criticisms of element analysis: that it is impossible 
to separate the elements of an offence objectively, and that element analysis is too complex 
to be practically useful within the criminal law. Although both criticisms are potentially very 
damaging, our focus has so far been on the first. This is because, in order for element 
analysis to provide any of the benefits explored in the preceding chapters, an objective 
technique for separation must first be identified. It is only after we have developed an 
objective technique that we may then move on to evaluate the practical usefulness of that 
technique within the criminal law.273  
 
Moving a considerable way towards that end, chapter 3 concluded that it is possible for 
element analysis to be constructed to facilitate objective separation. For this to be achieved, 
the actus reus of an offence must be split up in the following manner:274   
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
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However, a complete endorsement of this model of element analysis (at this stage) would 
be premature. It may be the only model that we have identified that has the potential for 
objectivity, but we must now question whether compromises have been made to the model 
in order to make that objectivity possible. After all, despite the long history of this 
approach,275 and despite the problems caused by subjectivity within other models of 
element analysis, the previous chapter was still unable to identify a single common law 
jurisdiction that defines the elements of an offence in this way. It is this inquiry, examining 
the implications of the model of element analysis defined above, which forms the general 
mission of this Part: can we identify problems that would/should lead us to abandon our 
model of element analysis, sacrificing the objective separation of elements?     
 
As we highlighted in chapter 3, the objectivity of the preferred method of element analysis 
(set out above) chiefly relies upon the definition of the act element. By defining the act 
element narrowly to include only bodily movement, the other two elements are then 
constructed from this objective base: the result element through a causal connection, and 
the circumstance element through a non-causal temporal connection. In view of the central 
role played by the act element, it is therefore little wonder that this has become the 
overwhelming focal-point for critics of element analysis contending that such objectivity is 
not possible. It is therefore the major focus of this Part. 
 
In order to take full account of the range of criticisms identified in this regard, a separate 
area of concern will be explored within each chapter. In chapter 4, we discuss the most 
direct and all-encompassing class of criticism, contending that our preferred model of 
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element analysis, and the definition of the act element, is illogical and unsound. Deriving 
from action theory, critics have employed varying conceptions of action to deny the 
identification of bodily movement as the basis of the act element, as well as the ability of 
our model to draw clear lines of distinction between circumstances and results. In chapter 
5, we explore the claim that although our definition of element analysis (including the act 
element) may make sense in relation to certain crimes, it should nevertheless be rejected 
for its inability to operate across the full range of offences (for example, omissions and 
possession offences). In chapter 6, we analyse criticisms of the use and ability of the act 
element to facilitate the objective separation of offence element. Finally, in chapter 7, we 
discuss criticisms that, whilst not denying the potential objective operation of the preferred 
model, highlight the seemingly unintuitive and unexpected consequences of our definition 
of element analysis in order to contend that an alternative model should be found.     
 
Part I not only concluded that objectivity is essential for element analysis, but also that the 
model of element analysis set out above is the only one capable of providing that 
objectivity. Therefore, exploring each class of criticism in turn, we must now question 
whether the criticisms levelled against the preferred model are sufficient to (in effect) 







THE IDENTIFICATION OF BODILY MOVEMENT  
 
By defining the act element in terms of simple bodily movement, element analysis appears 
to be making wider claims about action theory. Where these claims are echoed in the 
philosophical literature, this may provide further grounding and support for that definition. 
However, where they find opposition, this can lead to direct challenges to the viability of 
element analysis. 
 
For those working within the criminal law, being forced to ‘leave the sheltered bays of black-
letter lawyering’276 in order to engage with philosophically based criticism can present a 
uniquely difficult challenge. It is a challenge which is evident, in particular, in the drafting of 
criminal codes where reformers are forced to look at definitions of terms like act and 
omission which appear to have such a natural convergence with philosophical debate. As we 
discussed in chapter 3,277 although it seems clear from the perspective of element analysis 
that such definitions are essential, we have seen an increasing tendency for codes to remain 
silent.278 For example, within their report on the New Zealand Crimes Bill 1989, the New 
Zealand Crimes Consultative Committee279 systematically removed clauses that had 
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attempted to define ‘act and omission’,280 ‘involuntary acts’281 and ‘omissions’,282 reflecting 
in each case that the definitions ‘raise more questions than *they+ usefully resolve’.283 
Similarly with the Australian Model Criminal Code, the drafting Committee decided to omit a 
definition of ‘conduct’ and again leave the issue to be decided by the common law. In order 
to justify their decision not to define ‘conduct’, the Australian Committee commented that: 
 
The philosophy of action is very complex and the Committee was not satisfied that the 
proposed section improved the commonsense solution arrived at by the courts.284    
 
The reasoning behind this statement appears to be, first, that the philosophy of action is 
directly relevant to the definition of conduct (the act element) within criminal law. Secondly, 
there also seems to be a concern that defining conduct in statutory form, without taking full 
account of that philosophical debate, may then open the definition to unforeseen criticism. 
However, in the absence any discussion about what the philosophy of action involves, we 
are left with very little idea of how this complex body of theory affects the task of defining 
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 Crimes Consultative Committee, Report on 1989 Crimes Bill (New Zealand, 1991) 9. Draft Crimes Bill, cl 3.  
281
 Ibid, 11. Draft Crimes Bill, cl 19. 
282
 Ibid, 12. Draft Crimes Bill, cl 20. 
283
 Ibid, 12. In this case, the Committee are referring to the definition of omissions in clause 20. However, 
similar statements are made in relation to the other clauses.  
284
 Australian Model Criminal Code (commentary) s 202. 
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INTRODUCTION TO ACTION THEORY  
 
Action theory, as a branch within the philosophy of action, is characterised by the search for 
the meaning of action. When D’s arm moves, for example, we may not know whether it was 
D that moved it. Did D intentionally perform the act of waving to a friend, of signalling for a 
taxi, of arm moving, or was it a passive response to the external influence of a powerful 
wind or a forcible manipulation by P? If D’s arm moves whilst D is in a somnambulistic state 
or whilst D is under the mental control of P,285 does D perform an act of arm moving at all?  
 
As the action theorist looks to answer these questions (and many others like them), he or 
she is looking to identify what makes an action that D performs different from a mere 
happening or event in which D is involved. Thus, as the concept of action begin to converge 
with wider notions of agency and responsibility, so we begin to look more closely at D’s 
intentions and how those intentions interact with D’s physical movement. Davidson’s 
conception of action, for example, identifies the basis of action as the things done by D that 
are ‘intentional under some description.’286 For Davidson, this intention is focused on the 
bodily movement of D. If intentional, D is directly responsible for this basic action (bodily 
movement), and from this basis, we can also ascribe D agency for the more complex act 
descriptions as well (descriptions which include the circumstances and results of D’s basic 
act). Thus, if D moves his or her arm in order to hail a taxi and a taxi stops as a result, D is 
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 Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001), Essay 3: Agency, 50. The 
qualifier ‘under some description’ is necessary to avoid conclusions like ‘D did not intend to pour the tea’ 
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the agent of the complex act of successfully hailing down a taxi. However, within this 
complex description, D is also responsible for his or her basic act of arm moving.287     
 
ACTION THEORY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Even without element analysis, it is relatively obvious why this area of philosophy has 
attracted the attention of those working within the criminal law. Just as the action theorist 
seeks to identify and isolate the acts that D is the agent of and is therefore responsible for, 
so to the criminal law seeks to punish only conduct that D has actively performed. This 
requirement is true even of strict-liability and absolute liability offences where D is said to 
be liable in the absence of fault.288 In such cases, although D may be convicted despite 
lacking fault as to certain particulars of the offence, the prosecution must still demonstrate 
that D’s performance of the actus reus was voluntary.289 Thus, for example, if D was 
unconscious290 at the time of the offence, then the common law has generally accepted that 
basic rights of autonomy dictate that he or she should not be criminally responsible for his 
or her behaviour whilst unconscious.291   
 
However, focusing our discussion further, we may identify the particular relevance of action 
theory to the act element of an offence, and even more particularly, to the identification of 
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 See generally, Davidson, ‘Essay 3: Agency’ in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford University Press, Oxford 
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 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 54-55 and 58. See 
further, the US MPC, which expressly states that D will only be liable for an offence if liability is based ‘on 
conduct that includes a voluntary act or omission’ (§2.01(1)).      
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the conduct requirement within the act element. This is because, although there is a broad 
consensus that all criminal offences (just like all action) require some manner of intentional 
behaviour, both criminal and action theorists must identify what the behaviour is that must 
be intended.   
 
The act element, as constructed in chapter 3, is designed to provide an objectively 
discoverable basis for D’s criminal liability. In order to obtain that objectivity, we reasoned 
that the focus of the actus reus requirement within the act element must be identified as 
the bodily movement of D. After that bodily movement (or omission) has been established, 
we may then ask more complex questions about the surrounding circumstances and/or 
results of that movement as the offence definition requires. Within action theory, we can 
trace a very similar experience. As we saw with Davidson above, it is very common for an 
action theorist to identify basic action as bodily movement.292 This is because, when faced 
with a complex act description like successfully hailing down a taxi, many action theorists 
perceive their task as the identification of the causal root of this complex description, the 
identification of the ‘common character’293 or ‘essence’294 of action. As a result, reducing 
the complex description to its most causally basic form,295 action theorists are often led to 
bodily movement: the most basic thing that D must have intentionally done in hailing a taxi 
is the raising of his or her arm.  
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 According to Smith, the identification of bodily movement as the basis of all action can be traced back as far 
as David Hume in 1740. Smith M, ‘The structure of orthonomy’ in Hyman and Stewart (eds), Agency and 
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Thus, despite the distinct motivations of those looking to identify the act element and those 
looking to identify basic action, the common search for the root of intentional behaviour 
marks a significant convergence between the two. It is a convergence that seems to appear 
quite naturally. However, it is also a convergence that has been actively encouraged by 
many of those theorists (for example, Moore296) that believe that the identification of bodily 
movement is a useful one. For these theorists, that wish to define the act element as bodily 
movement, there is a burden beyond objectivity to demonstrate why and how bodily 
movement can undertake its role within element analysis as the link between D and the 
criminal event. Why should the act element, for example, not include the context within 
which D is moving as well as the fact of movement? For offences like rape for example, 
surely it makes more sense to talk of non-consenting sexual intercourse rather than the 
physical movement of the pelvis and hips (with the rest of the offence being made up of 
circumstances or results).297 Yet, if it can be established through action theory that all 
complex action can be reduced to bodily movement, and that bodily movement is the 
correct basis upon which to ascribe agency for complex action, then the burden for Moore 
and others is easily met. Bodily movement becomes the outstanding choice upon which to 
define the act element and thus ground criminal liability, because in a wider sense it also 
provides the grounding of D’s responsibility for all complex action.    
 
The convergence between the definition of the act element and the definition of basic 
action has also been encouraged by the critics of element analysis.298 This is because, as 
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highlighted above, although the philosophy of action has been used to ground and justify 
the definition of the act element in terms of bodily movement, it has also created fresh 
vulnerability. This vulnerability can be exploited in two ways:  
 
1. If the success of element analysis is dependent upon a particular philosophy of 
action, then criticism of that philosophy of action will also be criticism of element 
analysis; and  
2. Element analysis’s claim to provide a universal structure for legal discussion and 
analysis will be undermined unless the definition of the act element is as inclusive (to 
different theories of action) as possible. If one specific theory is chosen and relied 
upon, then the use of element analysis will create simply another (hidden) layer of 
complication for those who do not share the views of that theory.  
 
Each of these potential vulnerabilities will be discussed in turn. 
 
The first vulnerability: Undermining the philosophical foundation  
 
The first vulnerability, which allows commentators to employ criticisms of a particular 
theory of action as part of their attack on element analysis, has been strongly targeted by 
Duff. Although the identification of bodily movement as basic action is the ‘orthodox 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
emphasises the common routes taken by theorists on either side, and how similar misunderstandings lead 
them to bodily movement.   
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view’299 within much of the philosophy of action, this is because most action theorists 
approach the subject from a realist perspective.300 Action theory realists and basic action 
theorists commit themselves to the discovery and definition of the concept of action. 
Although these theories will invariably differ from one another in several important ways, 
their common search for basic action has led to broad acceptance of the central role to be 
played by bodily movement.301 In contrast, many nominalist and linguistic philosophers like 
Duff have rejected the search for basic action.302 For Duff, as highlighted in chapter 3, the 
concept of action is not a natural kind to be discovered and defined, but rather, its 
identification will always be relative to its descriptions within a social context: 
 
Actions and events are identified and individuated only by our descriptions of them: 
what someone does can be described in various ways... [depending] not on some 
objective truth about what ‘the action’ really is (since there is no such truth), but on 
our own interests.303      
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If the definition of action is relative to its social context and the particular interests of those 
describing it within that context, then it will be impossible to discover a single objective 
criterion for it. Therefore, for Duff, any discussion of intentional action must include a full 
act-description. We cannot understand the question did D intend to act unless we know the 
context within which the question is asked. Duff gives the example of D that rings a doorbell 
which causes the waking of a baby.304 D may admit that he or she intended the act of ringing 
the doorbell, but deny that he or she intended the act of waking the child. For a realist like 
Moore, the example describes a single act of hand moving which was intentional, but for 
Duff, there may be several descriptions of the act (including different circumstances and 
results) which may or may not be intended depending upon their content. Because action is 
identified by our description of it, and because it is unnatural to describe something like 
ringing a doorbell in terms of physical movement alone, the role of bodily movement is of 
only peripheral interest.  
 
By linking realist conceptions of action to the identification of bodily movement within the 
act element, Duff’s ‘blunderbuss scepticism’305 about action as a natural kind operates 
jointly as a criticism of the preferred model of element analysis. At its mildest, Duff’s 
alternative theory makes the choice of bodily movement, as a definition of the act element, 
seem unhelpful: if action is relative to our descriptions of it then bodily movement will 
almost always constitute an incomplete account. However, more seriously, as Duff presents 
arguments in an attempt to undermine the realist conception of action, he targets claims 
that bodily movement is causally and intentionally basic (the criteria used to identify bodily 
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movement as basic action). By claiming that bodily movement is not basic in these ways, 
Duff seeks to undermine the foundations of both realist action theory and the preferred 
definition of the act element. In both cases, it is essential to justify why bodily movement 
has been singled out, and if there are no criteria to do this, then defining the act element as 
bodily movement becomes not simply unhelpful, but ‘untenable’.306  
 
The second vulnerability: Undermining the universality  
 
The second vulnerability created by the convergence of basic action theories and the 
definition of the act element relates to the latter’s claim of inclusivity. The previous chapter 
set out element analysis’s potential as a universal structure for discussion and analysis of 
criminal law as one of its main advantages. However, if our definition of the act element is 
to be predicated entirely upon a single conception of action, as it is for Moore in Act and 
Crime, then this advantage will be lost. For those who agree with the Moorian conception of 
action, element analysis may be a useful structure for discussion of the criminal law. But for 
those who employ alternative action theories, even other realists who differ from Moore on 
some of the finer points of his theory,307 element analysis will not provide a structure they 
can use.  
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In order to preserve the potential for universality, we are therefore left with two options. 
Either we must unify all theories of action by conclusively demonstrating that a single theory 
should be preferred to all others: a formidable and slightly unrealistic task in the context of 
the current project. Or we must (as far as is possible) ensure that element analysis is 
inclusive of all logical action theories. Although this second option is viable, as we will see as 
the chapter unfolds, it requires the partial abandonment of action theory as a basis for 
element analysis.  
 
MOORE, AND THE TWO VULNERABILITIES 
 
As Moore’s model of element analysis defines the act element in terms of bodily movement, 
and his theory of action provides support for this identification, it is easy to view his work as 
a helpful companion of the current project. However, this would be a mistake.   
 
Within Moore’s account of basic action and the act element, the potential damage caused 
by both of the vulnerabilities set out above must be accepted. In relation to the first, in 
which Duff criticises the search for basic action, Moore recognises what he describes as the 
criticism’s pervasive influence across the full breadth of his argument: 
 
Not only would such scepticism reject the idea that acts are willed bodily movements 
(Chs. 5, 6, 10, 11), Duff’s nominal target here; it would also undercut any fixity to the 
distinction between acts, on the one hand, and [results] and circumstances, on the 
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other (Chs. 7 and 8), and it would render unanswerable the question of act-token 
individuation raised in Chs. 11 and 14.308 
 
Having accepted the potential damage caused by Duff’s criticism, Moore spends 
considerable time countering the arguments and defending his thesis.309 However, as with 
many conceptual debates, success for Moore is never likely to progress beyond the ability to 
present a more compelling argument: with each side presenting a logical view of action, we 
simply lack the necessary facts to be able to decide conclusively in either one’s favour. 
Additionally, as Moore seeks to defend his thesis, he is caught by the second vulnerability. 
This particular problem, concerning a lack of inclusivity, is not discussed by Moore. 
Presumably his answer would be that the problem would not exist if others accepted his 
conception of action. However, from the sole perspective of element analysis, this remains a 
problem. 
 
MOVING AWAY FROM A THEORY OF ACTION 
 
Having identified the problems encountered by Moore when combining element analysis 
with a theory of action, it is tempting, in line with the heading, to try and move away from a 
reliance on action theory altogether. The task of this thesis is not, after all, to promote any 
one theory of action. If we were to change the label act element, and simply refer to the 
first element or the physical element for example, why couldn’t we avoid debates about the 
theory of action altogether? 
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Perhaps surprisingly in the light of the detailed critique provided by Duff and others, the 
route taken in the previous paragraph is not without merit. It is important to remember, for 
example, that Moore’s thesis has a different rational to our own. Moore creates a mutually 
reinforcing account of both action theory and element analysis. In doing so, he not only uses 
his theory of action to support the identification of bodily movement as the basis of the act 
element. But also, working in the opposite direction, he uses the goals of element analysis 
and the criminal law to support his preferred conception of action.310 Moore’s duel focus, 
however, is not only mutually reinforcing, but as we have seen above, it is also mutually 
dependant. This creates the vulnerability; vulnerability that may not fully undermine 
Moore’s thesis, but one that certainly weakens the general appeal of element analysis.311    
As the sole focus of this thesis is element analysis, if a debate within the theory of action is 
not relevant to element analysis, then the thesis does not require the debate to be resolved: 
in fact, it may well require there to be no comment at all.  
 
Although we are not required to identify and support any one theory of action however, we 
cannot escape every philosophical criticism of element analysis based simply on a re-
labelling of the act element. This is because, especially in the absence of a supportive 
definition of action, we still need to justify why we have identified bodily movement as the 
initial ingredient required for all criminal offences (whether we call this the act element, the 
first element, or any other variation). In chapter 3, we identified the appeal of bodily 
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movement as the definition of the act element, partly for its potential in terms of 
objectivity, but also because of its universal role within every criminal offence.312 As 
identified above, however complex an offence, it is always necessary for D to have 
completed and intended to complete certain bodily movements. Therefore, bodily 
movement holds an intuitive appeal as a base ingredient for element analysis. The act 
element (bodily movement) provides the most basic ingredient, and then further 
requirements in terms of circumstances and results can be constructed upon it. In this 
manner, the act element (as bodily movement) provides the essential nexus between the 
elements of an offence: causally linked to the result element and temporally linked to the 
circumstance element. 
 
As we begin to flesh out this intuitive appeal, it is obvious that we cannot entirely jettison 
debates within action theory. This is because; just as action theorists dispute the role of 
bodily movement as the most basic ingredient of action, so our intuitive preference for 
bodily movement within the act element (set out above) follows a very similar script. 
Indeed, in order to test our intuition, and in order to establish the role of bodily movement 
within element analysis, we too require a criterion of basicness that confirms our 
preference. Therefore, although this thesis does not propose to advocate a theory of action 
more generally, it is still affected by the criticisms of realist theories of action that content 
that bodily movement cannot be identified as a basic ingredient of action (criminal or 
otherwise). 
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Although it is essential to explore the theoretical debate concerning the basicness of bodily 
movement, it is therefore equally important to distinguish between actions in the 
philosophical sense (actionp) and actions in relation to the act element (actione). Whether 
bodily movement is the basic ingredient of actionp is only relevant if it provides us with 
criteria that will establish bodily movement as the basic ingredient of actione within the 
criminal law. Without criteria to establish bodily movement as the basic ingredient of 
criminal behaviour, our definition of the act becomes artificial (objective, but lacking a 
principled identifier).   
 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF BODILY MOVEMENT AS BASIC ACTIONP 
 
In this section we will explore the basis upon which basic action theorists have identified 
bodily movement as basic actionp.  
 
The Causal Criterion 
 
One of the central justifications for the identification of bodily movement, both as basic 
actionp and as the basis of the act element, is that it is causally basic. In relation to basic 





… a non-basic action of agent [D] is an action [D] performs by performing some other 
action; a basic action of [D] is an action [D] does not perform by performing some 
other action.313 
 
Following this logic, D might describe his or her complex (non-basic) actp as hitting a 
bullseye whilst playing darts. If asked how this was done, logically, D may reply that it was 
done by throwing a dart accurately into the centre of a dartboard. If asked the same 
question again, logically, D may reply by moving my arm and fingers. However, if asked the 
question again, the reply is likely to be more difficult. D does not move his or her arm by 
doing something else, he or she simply moves it. Therefore, D’s bodily movement appears to 
be causally basic to all other complex actp descriptions.  
 
In relation to criminal offences, we can trace a very similar course. If D murders V; D does so 
by shooting V; D does so by pulling the trigger of a gun; D does so by moving his or her 
finger. Once more, within the causal chain, bodily movement represents the most basic actp 
description. This is not to say that bodily movement will always be causally basic. For 
example, if D pulled the trigger with his or her finger, but the finger was in turn caused to 
move by a pulley system that D operated with his or her foot, then the basic actionp would 
be the movement of the foot and not the finger. Rather, the essential premise is that 
causally basic actionp is always bodily movement.
314  
 
The premise that causally basic actionp is always bodily movement appears to be essential 
both to realist actionp philosophers like Moore within their conception of actionp, and to the 
                                                          
313
 Annas, ‘How basic are basic actions?’ (1977) 78 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 195, 195.  
314
 For further discussion of this point, see Moore, Act and Crime 44.  
104 
 
preferred definition of the act element. Within a theory of actionp, the premise is used to 
identify the root of D’s agency: although D’s movement might be the cause of various other 
complex actions, on a basic level, D can ‘never do more than move *his or her+ bod*y+: the 
rest is up to nature’.315 Therefore, bodily movement provides an essential nexus between D 
and the complex descriptions of his or her actp. If D intended the bodily movement then he 
or she is not only responsible for it simpliciter, but D will also have some degree of agency 
for the complex descriptions flowing from it.316  
 
Likewise within the criminal law, we are searching for the appropriate manner within which 
to link D to a certain event. The role of the act element (defined as bodily movement) is to 
provide that link. Within element analysis, once it can be established that D intentionally 
performed the body movement required for the offence, it is upon this basis that we may 
then go on to analyse the other aspects of the offence in order to establish possible 
liability.317 However, if D does not satisfy the act element, if D’s movement cannot be 
identified as the causal root to the offence definition (for offences containing a result 
element), then the law will be unable to isolate D as the perpetrator of the offence.   
 
Duff contends that bodily movement is not causally basic.318 In doing so, he aims to 
undermine its identification both within the philosophy of action (as the nexus between D 
and a complex actp description) and within element analysis (as the nexus between D and a 
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criminal event). When D is repeatedly asked how did you do that? in relation to a complex 
actp description, he or she is likely (as discussed above) to see bodily movement as a natural 
stopping point. However, just because an individual does not understand the full breadth of 
a causal chain, does not mean that further links do not exist. For example, an expert 
neurophysiologist could explain to D that, actually, his or her bodily movement was caused 
by the contraction of muscles, which were caused to contract by the firing of certain 
neurons, which were caused to fire by certain brain activity and so on.319 Therefore, it is 
clearly incorrect that bodily movement alone is causally basic. 
 
If the criticism is accepted, one option for the basic action theorist would be to continue the 
search for basic actionp by going beyond bodily movement. After all, if actionp does exist as 
a causal chain, then logically that chain cannot continue ad infinitum. As long as basic 
actionp can be identified the realist philosopher’s theory will not be compromised, he or she 
will still be able to identify the nexus between D and a complex actionp description, in fact, 
the only change will be in relation to what is identified as the basic actp.
320 Equally, in 
relation to the act element within the criminal law, perhaps the acte should be identified as 
a mental or internal event.  
 
As soon as the identification of bodily movement is conceded in the search for more basic 
actione/p however, it is very difficult to identify a natural stopping point. Baier highlights this 
problem in the work of Prichard, an early basic action theorist: 
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‘Prichard begins by instancing simple bodily movements [as basic actionp], but finds 
them ... to be indirect, the uncertain outcomes of volitions. In later essays he realises 
that volitions in turn are the uncertain outcomes of desires for volitions, desires the 
outcomes of thoughts about the goodness of the outcome of the to-be-willed action, 
thoughts the outcome of volitions to think and so on. The search breaks off, the quarry 
still not in sight.321      
 
The purpose of Duff’s criticism is to try and force those attempting to define basic actionp 
and the act element to follow Prichard down a similar path.322 Bodily movements may have 
an intuitive appeal as the definition of basic actionp and the act element.
323 But once the 
basic action theorist is forced into an indeterminate class of mental acts, identifying basic 
acts as tryings or volitions, that intuitive appeal is soon lost. In relation to tryings for 
example, although it might sound logical to say that the most anyone can do is try to move 
their body,324 the separation of the actp of trying from actual movement ‘alienates us, as 
agents, from our bodies.’325 Beyond these intuitive problems, if volitions and tryings are 
correctly identified as basic actionp, the definition also has the potential to be unacceptably 
wide. For example, if D wills the movement of another person’s body (without performing 
any physical movement him or herself), under this definition, D has performed an actp.
326 
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However, the conclusion D performs an acte/p in this example is not something that would 
be supported by any basic action theorist.    
 
There is considerably more that might be said in relation to the definition of basic actionp if 
we go beyond bodily movement.327 However, before we abandon bodily movement as a 
possible definition of actionp and (more importantly) as a possible definition of the act 
element, we need to be sure that this is essential.  
 
For basic action theorists like Moore, one response has been to combine the identification 
of bodily movement with the mental process that brings it about. Thus, for Moore, basic 
actionp is not simply bodily movement, but ‘volition causing a bodily movement’.
328 
Similarly, for Davidson:  
 
It may be true that I cause my finger to move by contracting certain muscles, and 
possibly I cause the muscles to contract by making an event occur in my brain. But this 
does not show that pointing my finger is not a [basic] action, for it does not show that I 
must do something else that causes it. Doing something that causes my finger to move 
does not cause me to move my finger; it is moving my finger.329  
 
The advantages for action theorists like Moore and Davidson of combining pre-bodily 
movement processes within their definition of basic actionp are quite clear. In relation to at 
least two of the criticisms mentioned above, for example, both theories now have adequate 
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responses. Thus, although their definitions of basic actionp still identify bodily movement, 
they are causally basic because they also include the pre-movement processes. Further, 
because they go beyond these processes to include movement, they also avoid labelling 
purely mental processes, for example willing the movement of another person’s body, as 
actionp.    
 
Despite these advantages however, exactly how the pre-movement processes should be 
conceptualised has proven to be very problematic. This is because, although it is clear that 
mental processes have an important role in actionp, the philosophical debate is predicated 
upon a science that is unable to explain the process in the necessary detail. It is on this basis 
that Moore (despite advocating a volition based theory) openly concedes that ‘volitions may 
not be the right answer’,330 and it is also upon this basis that the door is opened to a variety 
of other competing explanations.331 
 
As well as causing problems for the basic action theorist, the contested nature of these 
theories is also problematic for our definition of the act element. If we have to supplement 
our definition of the act element by including pre-movement mental processes, then we are 
left with a very difficult choice concerning which conceptualisation of these processes 
should be chosen. Further, no matter which theory is preferred, we will inevitably be falling 
foul of the vulnerabilities discussed earlier: the additional element will provide fresh scope 
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for criticism and also alienate (from the use of element analysis) those who prefer an 
alternative approach. We must therefore question, for the purposes of the act element, 
whether it is essential to go beyond bodily movement in order to answer the causal 
criticism. 
 
Distinguishing the definition of basic actionp from the identification of actione within the act 
element, it seems that bodily movement alone (without the inclusion of pre-movement 
processes) can answer the causally basic criticism. For the basic action theorist, the debate 
concerning the possibility of actionp being identified (wholly or partly) in a pre-movement 
process is an essential boundary setting exercise to the concept of actionp. However, these 
debates are not relevant within the criminal law. This is because the criminal law is only 
concerned with actse that D performs that are external from his or her body (the external 
world). D may desire to perform a certain actionp; he or she may perform the relevant 
mental process; fire the relevant neurons and contract the relevant mussels, but unless this 
translates into physical movement (or omissions to move) within the external world then 
D’s activity will not come within the definition of an offence.332 Therefore, the criticism that 
bodily movement is not causally basic does not require us to follow basic action theorists 
into the conceptualisation of pre-movement processes. Bodily movement is a causally basic 
acte in the external world, and as the criminal law is only concerned with actionp in the 
external world (i.e. actione), bodily movement is causally basic within the criminal law.  
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We are now able to recognise that the causal criticism affects the search for a definition of 
basic actionp differently from the identification of actione within the act element. It is a 
recognition that not only helps us avoid the search for basic actsp beyond bodily movement, 
but also one that can be employed to deal with a further set of examples that have troubled 
basic action theorists: examples of a failure to move. Common examples include where D is 
temporarily paralysed or restrained without his or her knowledge. When asked to raise an 
arm for example, D may complete all the relevant pre-movement processes and may even 
believe that he or she is raising the arm, but in the absence of physical movement, the basic 
action theorist can say nothing accept that D has not actedp.
333 On the one hand, the 
example is used, like the causal criticism, to encourage basic action theorists to abandon 
bodily movement for more causally basic definitions of basic actionp.
334 However, on the 
other, it has also been usefully employed to attack theorists like Moore and Davidson that 
have combined bodily movement and pre-movement processes within their definitions of 
basic actionp. This is because, although theorists like Moore and Davidson analyse bodily 
movement and pre-movement processes as part of the same event (basic actionp), the 
example forces them apart. Bodily movement becomes the uncertain result of the pre-
movement processes, and thus, very similar to other non-basic actp descriptions.
335   
 
Despite the problems caused by these examples for theories of basic actionp, they do not 
cause a problem for element analysis and the preferred definition of the act element. This is 
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because, as discussed earlier, evidence that D has performed pre-movement processes 
(where those processes do not result in bodily movement) is not relevant to the criminal 
law. Criminal law only focuses on D’s movement or lack of movement as it directly affects 
the external world.336 Therefore, it is sufficient for the purposes of element analysis to 
regard D’s behaviour as a simple lack of bodily movement. Where D is charged with a 
criminal omission, D may wish to employ evidence of restraint or of temporary paralysis to 
prove that the omission was unintentional.337 However, even in this case, the evidence will 
be relevant to the mens rea attached to D’s failure to move, not to a question of whether 
D’s pre-movement processes themselves constituted an actp.   
 
Our exploration of the criticism that bodily movement is not causally basic has so far 
focused on pre-movement processes. However, the same criticism has also been made from 
a different perspective, this time focusing on complex actp descriptions that include more 
than mere bodily movement. For example, having outlined the contention that bodily 
movement is causally basic, Annas criticises it in the following terms. 
 
But we can easily think of cases where I perform an action such as tying my laces or 
playing a scale, without performing other actions by doing which I do the action in 
question. ... Different by-chains give us different results.338  
 
If examples of this type were able to demonstrate that bodily movement is not causally 
basic, either in the context of actionp or actione, then they would have the potential to be 
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very damaging. However, to present the examples, as Annas does, as criticism of the 
contention that bodily movement is causally basic, is highly misleading. This is because, if 
we focus solely on the causal mechanics of actione/p, then it must be accepted that even 
when D ties his or her laces or plays a scale, D has done so by moving his or her body. 
Therefore, the bodily movement remains causally basic to the complex actp description.
339 
Where these examples do become problematic for theories of basic action and the act 
element, is where they conflict with the separate contention that bodily movement is 
intentionally basic: claiming that D’s intentions in these cases will always include more than 
simple bodily movement. This contention, and criticisms of it, will be explored in the 
following section. However, for present purposes, it suffices to say that such examples do 
not undermine the causal claim.  
 
For Duff, the criticism that bodily movement is not causally basic is sufficient to undermine 
its identification, both as basic actionp, and as the definition of the act element. 
 
... we need note only that the simple thesis that basic actions are always bodily 
movements seems to be undermined by the impossibility of providing a criterion of 
basicness which will identify only such bodily movements as absolutely basic 
actions.340   
 
Duff draws this conclusion based upon his observation that basic actsp (defined as bodily 
movement), like complex act descriptions, are in fact the fallible results of internal pre-
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movement processes.341 Without seeking to undermine this observation however, we have 
found that Duff’s reasoning (and therefore his conclusion) does not apply to the preferred 
definition of the act element. Even if we accept that bodily movement is not causally basic 
actionp, as long as it is causally basic actione, the preferred definition of the act element is 
not affected. Bodily movement is causally basic actione because the act element, serving the 
interests of the criminal law, is only concerned with actione/p that takes place in the external 
world: bodily movement is the only form of actione/p in the external world that is not always 
caused by other external action.342 On this basis, the preferred definition of the act element 
does have a criterion of basicness which will identify only such bodily movements as 
absolutely basic actionse, and thus Duff’s conclusion, in relation to the act element, can be 
refuted.      
 
The Intentional Criterion 
 
The second limb to the identification of bodily movement as basic actionp is the contention 
that bodily movement is intentionally basic. Intentional basicness can be illustrated in the 
following manner. 
 
Y is a basic action relative to X if I do or could do Y in order thereby to do X; and an 
action is absolutely basic when it is the immediate or direct object of the agent’s 
intention.343   
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Therefore, in order to establish that bodily movement is intentionally (absolutely) basic to 
all other actionp, it must be demonstrated that intentional complex actsp are always brought 
about through intended bodily movement. Further, it must also be demonstrated that 
intended bodily movement cannot be brought about by intentionally doing anything other 
than that movement.344    
 
The contention that bodily movement is intentionally basic has a very important role to play 
both for theories of basic actionp, and for the preferred definition of the act element. This is 
because, if bodily movement is the only form of actionp that can be directly intended (D 
performs it without intending to do something else in order to bring it about), then 
intentional bodily movement must lie at the root of every complex actionp and conduct 
based criminal offence. Thus, basic action and criminal law theorists are justified in their 
initial focus on bodily movement: if it is established that D intended this movement then his 
or her agency for the complex actionp or offence can be constructed upon this basis.
345  
 
This is not to say that we only intend our bodily movement, with all the facets of the 
complex actp description resulting as unintended consequences. Such a position would 
clearly be false. In fact, theorists like Moore, that rely upon the intentional criterion, readily 
concede that when people perform everyday complex actionsp like brushing teeth and 
engaging in conversation, the conscious object of their intention is much more likely to be 
                                                          
344
 The exception, where D uses one part of his or her body (for example, the arm) to move another part of his 
or her body (for example, the leg), does not undermine the claim that bodily movement is intentionally basic. 
In this case, the movement of D’s leg is not intentionally basic. However, this is only because D’s leg is being 
moved indirectly by D through the intentionally basic movement of another part of D’s body (his or her arm).     
345
 If it is established that D did not intend the bodily movement, then this is also the correct basis upon which 
to deny agency for the more complex descriptions. Moore, Placing Blame: A general theory of the criminal law 
(Clarendon Press, 1997) 303.  
115 
 
the complex actionp as a whole rather than each physical movement.
346 Rather, Moore’s 
claim relies on the fact that, whatever our intentions are concerning the more complex actp 
descriptions, we always directly intend our bodily movements when we actp. Thus, even if, 
when brushing our teeth we do not consciously intend every movement of our hand, if we 
were asked to think back carefully over the event it would be possible to recall that within 
the intended complex actionp, these basic actsp were directly intentionally performed.
347 
 
The intentional criterion has also proven to be a useful argument for basic action theorists 
as they respond to the causal criticism discussed above. This is because, the claim that 
bodily movement is causally basic actionp has to deal with the observation that, technically, 
bodily movement is caused by a host of pre-movement processes. However, although we 
may be able to recall intending bodily movement, we do not generally think of ourselves as 
intending the pre-movement processes that lead to that bodily movement. If we intend or 
will the movement of our bodies, then they move without the separate willing of muscles 
contracting or neurons firing. In fact, if we wanted to contract our muscles or fire neurons, 
we would only know how to do so by intending to move our body.348  
 
Since we do not know how to will such things [as pre-movement processes], their 
occurrence when we move our bodies is no basic act of ours.349 
 
                                                          
346
 Moore, Act and Crime 150-154.  
347
 Ibid, 153. 
348
 Ibid, 103.  
349
 Moore, Act and Crime 103.  
116 
 
Thus, although certain action theories may have struggled to defend the causal criterion for 
bodily movement when discussing pre-movement processes, the intentional criterion offers 
them fresh support for the identification of bodily movement.  
 
Duff, however, contends that bodily movement is not intentionally basic.350 Attacking the 
proposition from either side, Duff argues that certain intentional complex actionsp can be 
performed without intentional bodily movement, and that it is possible to intend certain 
pre-movement processes. If successful with either of these lines of argument, the 
intentional criterion will be undermined. 
 
The first line of criticism contends that certain intentional complex actionp can be 
performed without directly intended bodily movement. The most common example in this 
regard is of D tying his or her shoelaces. Although D’s bodily movements cause the laces to 
be tied, critics contend that D’s intention will always focus on the complex actionp (tying the 
laces) and not upon the basic actionp (the individual movement of D’s fingers). In response, 
as mentioned above, basic action theorists could maintain that although D’s focus may be 
on the more complex actp, he or she is still directly (if not fully consciously) intending the 
basic actionsp and, if asked, would be able to recall them. However, this response does not 
undermine the criticism. This is because, the criticism is not simply that D will rarely intend 
his or her basic actionp in examples like this, it is that:  
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… *D+ cannot directly intend those movements simply as bodily movements; [D] can 
identify them only by reference to the actions in which they are involved.351  
 
Thus, because D can only intend the bodily movements necessary to tie his or her laces by 
intending the full complex actp of lace tying, the bodily movement is not intentionally basic 
to the complex description.  
 
If successful in relation to the tying of laces, it is a criticism that can be expanded to include 
almost any example of co-ordinated behaviour.352 This would mean that for a large 
proportion of human behaviour, including a large proportion of criminal offences, 
intentional bodily movement (if possible to intend at all) would not be intentionally basic. 
Such a conclusion would undermine the uses made of the intentional criterion discussed 
above. Beyond this, if the intentional criterion actually identifies variations of complex actp 
descriptions rather than bodily movement as the basis of actionp, the conclusion has the 
potential to undermine the search for basic actionp altogether.
353  
 
Moore, whose theory of basic actionp relies upon the intentional criterion, has provided an 
interesting response. He maintains that although D may not consciously intend each bodily 
movement when performing various complex actionsp, they are still intentionally basic 
because when D first learnt to tie his or her shoe laces, or first learnt to ride a bike or to 
speak etc, bodily movement was intentionally basic within the learning process.354 It is 
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acceptable that, over time, complex actionsp become more routine and we no longer have 
to think consciously about the basic actionsp within them. This is because, if we encounter a 
new task, or if we have to think carefully about a routine one, the intentional basicness of 
bodily movement becomes clear. The problem with this response, as Duff highlights, is that 
complex actsp like tying laces are not learnt in an abstract form of bodily movement and 
then applied to the task of lace tying: even during the learning process, the focus is on the 
complex actionp rather than D’s individual movements. Further, even if we accept Moore’s 
position, accepting that bodily movement was intentionally basic at one stage in the past 
does not translate into them being intentionally basic to D’s current actionsp.
355 Thus, 
following the same logic employed by Moore to conclude that pre-movement processes are 
not basic actsp, bodily movement also appears vulnerable:   
 
Since we do not know how to will such things [as bodily movements], their occurrence 
when we [complete complex actionsp like tying laces] is no basic act of ours.
356      
 
The second line of criticism against the intentional criterion is constructed as a companion 
to the first: focusing upon the ability of D to intend certain pre-movement processes. If basic 
action theorists wish to escape the first line of criticism, one option is the contention that 
bodily movement is basic, not because it is always directly intended, but because it is the 
most causally basic actionp that can be intended.
357 Thus, although the intentional criterion 
alone might establish that the complex actp of tying laces is basic to the bodily movements 
involved, because the bodily movements are performed intentionally, and because they are 
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causally basic to the complex description, they still represent basic actionp. Thus, the basic 
action theorist is able to accept Duff’s criticisms of both causal and intentional criteria, but 
through the combination of the two, still maintain that bodily movement is correctly 
identified as basic actionp.
358 
 
Despite the approaches initial plausibility, however, an individual’s ability to intend (directly 
or not) anything that is causally basic to bodily movement will undermine it. It is an ability 
that, without the qualifier of directness, seems eminently plausible. A common example 
employed by critics is of an expert psychologist or neurophysiologist who intentionally 
moves a limb in order to measure brain patterns or the firing of neurons. In such a case, 
although the pre-movement processes are not directly intended, they are fully understood 
by the expert and thus clearly intentional under some description.359 Beyond this, it is also 
possible to imagine a non-expert moving his or her limbs in a certain way intending to 
perform pre-movement processes, certainly in order intentionally to contract muscles: a 
scientific understanding of movement has never been a criterion of actionp. Thus, in a 
similar manner to the causal criterion, theories of basic action are encouraged to concede 
bodily movement in favour of pre-movement processes. 
 
Theories of basic action are therefore caught between the two criticisms. On the one hand, 
theorists might argue that the intentional criterion, combined with the causal criterion, 
highlights bodily movement as the most causally basic form of actionp that can be intended. 
However, in doing so, they are undermined by the observation that it is possible to intend 
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(though not directly) pre-movement processes. On the other hand, theorists might argue 
simply that bodily movement is intentionally basic because it is the only form of action that 
is directly intended. This avoids the regression into pre-movement processes (as these are 
not directly intended). However, it is undermined by the observation that when performing 
certain complex actionsp, D’s bodily movements are not always directly intended.
360 A 
theory of basic action may deal adequately with one of these lines of attack, but it is very 
difficult to avoid them both.361    
 
Before going into further detail about how basic action theorists might be able to respond 
to these criticisms, it is important to take stock of element analysis’s essential requirements 
in relation to the intentional criterion. If the intentional criterion were able to establish that 
bodily movement is intentionally basic to all other actionp, then as discussed above, this 
would lend considerable support to the preferred definition of that act element. However, it 
appears that any attempt to incorporate the intentional criterion fully into element analysis 
would lead inevitably to the two vulnerabilities discussed earlier. Therefore, partly in light of 
the serious criticism that the intentional criterion has received, but also in light of our 
conclusion that the causal criterion already identifies bodily movement as basic on one 
level, our construction of element analysis will avoid relying on the full intentional criterion.   
 
We concluded our discussion of the causal criterion with the observation that the criminal 
law is only interested with actionp that takes place within the external world. On this basis, 
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we were able to identify bodily movement as a causally basic acte within the criminal law, 
and it is also upon this basis that we should avoid an intentional criterion that again (within 
at least one of its guises) threatens to re-define the act element in terms of pre-movement 
processes.  
 
The causal criterion alone, however, is not sufficient to establish bodily movement as an 
appropriate definition of the act element. For the act element to perform its role effectively 
as a nexus between D and the criminal event, a milder version of the intentional criterion 
will still have to be established: it must be demonstrated that within every intentional 
complex actionp, D also intends his or her bodily movement. Although bodily movement 
might provide a causal nexus between D and the criminal event, if D can intentionally 
commit a crime without intentionally moving his or her body, then bodily movement will 
not always be the appropriate starting point from which to construct D’s agency. If the act 
element is to be useful, an inquiry into the mens rea requirement within the act element 
must always make sense: if movement is intended then it will form the basis upon which to 
assess D’s agency for the more complex actionp (the circumstance and result elements 
within the offence), and if the movement is not intended then it will be the basis upon 
which D is freed of agency/criminal responsibility in relation to both the basic and complex 
acte/p descriptions.
362       
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Therefore, if the act element (defined in terms of bodily movement) is to be able to perform 
its role effectively, a role that is essential to the nexus between D and the criminal event,363 
it must be established that within every complex actionp D also intends his or her bodily 
movement. Thus, in relation to the criticisms of the intentional criterion discussed above, 
we need only engage with those criticisms that would seek to undermine this milder 
criterion. 
 
Having re-defined the intentional criterion, it appears that the main objection will come in 
relation to co-ordinated complex actionp. As we discussed above, where D performs a 
complex actionp like tying shoe laces or riding a bike, he or she will generally do so by 
intending the full complex actionp rather than through the willing of each individual bodily 
movement. In fact, if asked to perform the bodily movements without the relevant 
circumstances being present, without the laces or the bike, D is likely to find it very difficult 
(if not impossible).364 Therefore, we may conclude that D, in these cases, does not intend his 
or her bodily movement at all: he or she only intends the full complex actionp.     
 
Such a conclusion, however, seems to be wholly unintuitive. Although we may accept that D 
does not directly intend his or her bodily movement, if the complex actionp is intentionally 
performed, and if D’s bodily movements form an integral part of that complex actionp, 
surely D’s complex actionp intention encompasses an intention to perform the required 
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rather than its object, Duff questions whether it retains an essential role. As we can now see, the provision of a 
nexus between D and the criminal event (the other elements of the offence) represents that essential role. See 
Duff, ‘Action, the act requirement and criminal liability’ in Hyman and Stewart (eds), Agency and Actions 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004) 69, 79.  
364
 Duff, Criminal Attempts 258-9.  
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bodily movements. Indeed, when discussing the nature of intention more generally, Duff 
too seems to accept the logic of this proposition:  
 
If the occurrence of X entails that of Y, the non-occurrence of Y will entail the non-
occurrence of X, and thus the failure of the action which was intended to bring X 
about: the agent must therefore be taken to intend Y as well as X, since she intends 
any effect whose non-occurrence would entail the failure of her action.365 
 
Despite this form of composite intention, in which the intentional complex actionp 
necessitates and therefore assumes the intention of certain bodily movements, there may 
still be a remaining concern about how this intention might be expressed. For Davidson, this 
is satisfied by the broad notion of intention under some description. Thus, although it might 
seem unnatural to speak of intentional bodily movements in relation to a co-ordinated 
complex actionp, if such movement is either directly intended or must be intended as part of 
the wider complex actionp, then it is intentional ‘under some description’:
366 
 
Such descriptions are, to be sure, apt to be trivial and unrevealing; this is what ensures 
their existence. So, if I tie my shoelaces, here is a description of my movements: I 
move my body in just the way required to tie my shoelaces.367  
  
                                                          
365
 Duff, Intention, agency and criminal liability (Blackwell, 1990) 90. Duff comments (p91) that the rule will not 
always be easy to apply, for example, if it is unclear whether X really does entail the occurrence of Y. However, 
in relation to complex actionsp, it will usually be relatively clear whether bodily movement is required or not.      
366
 Davidson, ‘Essay 3: Agency’ in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 43, 50. 
Interestingly, it may also be satisfied where a facet of the complex actionp is not intended. For example, where 
a pilot intentionally depresses levers that have the unintended result of turning off the engines, only the bodily 
movement and not the result is intentional. See, Hornsby, ‘Action and aberration’ (1993) 142 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1719, 1728. 
367
 Davidson, ‘Essay 3: Agency’ in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001) 43, 51.  
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The problem with this approach, for Davidson and other basic action theorists, is that it 
creates the potential for infinite regression in relation to what can be intended. Where D 
completes a complex actionp entailing certain bodily movement, this movement will always 
be intentional under some description. However, what about the pre-movement processes 
that led to that bodily movement? If these can also be intentional under some description 
then surely they too will count as actionp. Could we not say, for example, that when I tie my 
shoelaces, I fire neurons and contract my muscles in just the way required to tie my 
shoelaces, or that the tying of my shoelaces entails the movement of my fingers (such that a 
failure to move my fingers would result in a failure to tie my laces)?  
 
Although this may cause problems for theories of basic action, however, infinite regression 
in terms of what can be intended does not harm element analysis even if it is successfully 
established. With the causal criterion already justifying the identification of bodily 
movement as the act element, all that is required of the intentional criterion is to 
demonstrate that bodily movement is always intended (within intentional complex actp 




Although we have rejected Moore’s coupling of action theory with the preferred definition 
of the act element, it is clear that the essential justification for bodily movement as the 
conduct requirement within the act element has remained intact. Bodily movement can 
provide a nexus between D and a criminal event (circumstances and results) because it is 
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the most causally basic intentional acte/p that D can perform in the external world. If 
intended, bodily movement is therefore a basis upon which to construct D’s wider agency 
and liability for the full offence. However, if it not intended, it is a clear basis upon which to 
excuse D criminal responsibility.  
 
In this manner, the preferred model of element analysis is able to avoid the specific 
criticisms advanced nominalist action theorists. However, although element analysis has 
been decoupled from action realists, there remains a question as to whether it now has the 
potential to co-exist with a nominalist perspective. This final question within this chapter 
remains important if the preferred definition is to avoid the second vulnerability identified 
above.  
 
THE IDENTIFICATION OF BODILY MOVEMENT WITHIN A NOMINALIST THEORY OF 
ACTION 
 
As discussed in the previous section, Duff (in line with other nominalist action theorists368) 
has contended that bodily movement is neither a causally nor an intentionally basic 
description of actionp. Therefore, any attempt to define actionp in these terms is misguided. 
Actionp is not a natural kind to be discovered and defined, but rather a concept which is 
always relative to socially contextualised descriptions of it.369 Therefore, as criminal actione/p 
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 See, for example, Annas, ‘How basic are basic actions?’ (1977) 78 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
195, 198-199.  
369
 See Duff, Attempts 310. See also discussion above at pp94-97.  
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is also relative to its descriptions, a version of element analysis that defines the act element 
in the strict terms of bodily movement is untenable.370 
 
As we have discussed in the context of the causal and intentional criteria above, nominalist 
theorists have provided a series of fundamental criticisms to the identification of bodily 
movement as basic actionp.
371 Despite this, by distinguishing between basic actionp and the 
act element, we have so far been able to avoid Duff’s conclusion that criticism of the criteria 
establishing bodily movement as basic actionp also undermines element analysis. However, 
the ability to defeat these specific lines of attack is not yet to demonstrate that element 
analysis (with the preferred definition of the act element) can work within a nominalist 
conception of actionp. The latter task, neglected by the traditional advocates of element 
analysis,372 is nevertheless essential in order to avoid the second vulnerability. The preferred 
definition of the act element does not claim to provide a definition of actionp, and therefore, 
if it is to be established as a general structure for discussion and analysis within the criminal 
law, neutrality between the various logical theories of actionp must be maintained.  
 
In the way of this neutrality, however, is the apparent conflict between the act element’s 
rigid identification of bodily movement, and the fluidity of a nominalist conception of 
actionp (varying depending upon individual descriptions). The conflict results from the very 
different manner in which each approach seeks to identify intentional behaviour. Within the 
preferred definition of the act element (much like a realist conception of actionp), we begin 
by isolating the relevant bodily movements and then ask whether D performed them 
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 Duff, Criminal Attempts 13 and 254.  
371
 See Moore, Act and Crime 60-77.  
372
 For theorists like Moore, whose advocacy of element analysis takes place within a realist conception of 
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intentionally.373 In contrast, within a nominalist conception of actionp, intention becomes 
the starting point. Asking simply what did D do intentionally, the resulting actionp 
description, which is very likely to include more than simple bodily movement, is 
nevertheless what constitutes D’s actp. For example, if D brushed his teeth intentionally, 
then D’s actp is not limited to the intentional hand movement involved, it extends to the full 
complex description: intentional brushing of teeth. As a result, the identification of bodily 
movement within element analysis (where this conflicts with an action’sp natural 
description) has the potential to be artificial and misleading.374  
 
This is not, however, a problem that is entirely unique to element analysis. If actionp is 
synonymous with its most natural description, and if we can only understand intentional 
behaviour by also focusing upon that single description, then nominalist theories of actionp 
will always present problems for the criminal law. This is because, unlike actionp 
descriptions that will inevitably vary between individuals and over time, the criminal law can 
only have one definition (setting out the proscribed actus reus and mens rea) for each 
offence. Therefore, accepting the nominalist conception of actionp, the criminal law would 
either have to create many millions of offences, each with subtly different requirements in 
order to cater for various actionp descriptions, or it must be possible for the definition of an 
offence to encompass lots of different actionp descriptions under a single banner. For 
example: 
 
V owes D (a violent drug dealer) a considerable sum of money. Upon seeing D on the 
street, V tries to run away. D shoots V to stop him getting away. V dies as a result. 
                                                          
373
 Whether this is always a correct representation of basic action theorists will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
374




The offence of murder requires D to kill V with the intention either to kill or to cause serious 
harm.375 Thus, in the example, D appears to be quite straightforwardly liable for the offence 
of murder.376 However, if D’s intentional conduct can only be viewed in relation to actionp 
descriptions, then potential problems arise: if asked to describe his conduct and intentions, 
D may well answer that he was merely trying to stop V getting away. The risk here is that, 
because D’s descriptions of his own conduct and intention do not match the offence 
definition verbatim, nominalist actionp theorists may be forced to claim that he has not 
actedp in the manner proscribed by the offence.
377 However, such a claim has the potential 
to lead to the highly unacceptable position that D will only be liable for an offence when his 
or her actionp descriptions correlate with the offence definition exactly. An occurrence that 
is likely to be very rare unless D was actively seeking to break the law as a primary motive.  
 
Despite the apparent conflict, however, this kind of criticism of nominalist actionp theory is 
relatively easy to dispatch. For example, when discussing a similar problem in relation to 
intention and criminal attempts, Duff comments that: 
 
An agent acts ‘with intent to commit an offence’ if the content of her intention is such 
that, given the context in which she forms and acts on it, she would necessarily 
commit an offence in carrying it out.378 
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 Woollin [1999] 1 A.C. 82. 
376
 We are assuming that D does not have a valid defence.  
377
 Although a third party viewing the offence might describe D’s actionp in a manner more reflective of the 
offence definition, when it comes to the fault requirements of an offence, it is D’s view of his or her own 
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Therefore, although D (in our example above) would describe his actions and intention in a 
different manner from the offence definition, he is still caught by the offence because his 
intentional conduct necessarily involved the intentional infliction of serious harm upon V: 
the infliction of serious harm was entailed within the wider intended actionp because, 
without it, the intended actionp could not have come about. In this way, Duff is accepting 
that D’s actionp description and possibly even the most natural description of D’s actp does 
not have to be reflected in the offence definition.379 The definition of an offence is not 
claiming to be an exact description of an individual actp. Rather, it is a construction that is 
employed to forbid multiple harmful actsp under a single provision, and, as such, it is 
legitimate to look within actionp descriptions in order to establish potential liability.
380    
 
Returning to element analysis and the preferred definition of the act element, we may now 
employ the same logic (as that explored above) to justify the use of element analysis 
alongside a nominalist conception of actionp. Duff criticises the preferred definition of the 
act element because actionp is relative to socially contextualised descriptions and is 
therefore not always constituted by bodily movement. However, we have already concluded 
in the previous section that the definition of the act element is different from, and not 
dependent upon, the contention that basic actionp should be identified as bodily 
movement. Therefore, although the preferred definition of the act element is unlikely to 
reflect an actp description from a nominalist perspective, unlike the clash between 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
is an essential part of the wider intended action: without the occurrence of the event, D’s intended enterprise 
would have failed.    
379
 For further discussion, see Duff, Intention, agency and criminal liability (Blackwell, 1990) 89-91.  
380
 A further example, discussed by Duff, related to duress. If D is forced to commit an offence under duress 
then he or she may well claim that it was done against his or her will, and may describe the actionp in terms of 
the prevention of injury. However, the offence is still done intentionally ‘on some level’. Ibid, 52-53.  
130 
 
nominalist and realist actionp theories, this lack of correlation is more akin to the current 
lack of correlation between nominalist actionp descriptions and a standard (offence analysis) 




 As soon as the definition of the act element is liberated from any ties with the realist 
conception of actionp it can be correctly identified alongside any other method of offence 
definition. In relation to the murder example above, nominalist actionp theorists can only 
accept D’s conviction for murder by accepting that D’s description of his own intentional 
actionsp do not have to be reflected exactly by the definition of the offence. Rather, D is 
liable because his intentional actionsp necessarily included the intentional conduct 
proscribed by the offence definition. Therefore, although a description of D’s bodily 
movement (the act element) will rarely reflect a nominalist actionp description, it may 
nevertheless be employed by the criminal law: D may not describe his actionsp (when 
shooting V) in relation to the intentional movement of his body, but such movements will be 
necessarily involved within (will be an essential ingredient of) any description that D does 
provide. Therefore, if a nominalist actionp theorist can accept the compatibility of their own 
actionp theory with offence analysis, then it must also be compatible with element analysis.   
 
                                                          
381
 This is why Duff’s criticism of the identification of bodily movement in relation to theories of basic actionp, 
that it strips so much detail away from actionp that it undermines the search for its essence, does not apply to 
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The preceding discussion does not claim to have demonstrated that nominalist actionp 
theorists should employ or even approve of the use of element analysis within the criminal 
law. Rather, it has shown that despite the preferred definition of the act element focusing 
on bodily movement, element analysis (like offence analysis) is not incompatible with a 
nominalist actionp theory. Element analysis and the preferred definition of the act element 
are not attempts to define a conception of actionp, but rather devices of the criminal law. 
Thus, for example, although Smith and Hogan believed that ‘obviously the sensible way of 
describing’382 actionp is to do so including relevant circumstances and results, it is entirely 
consistent for them to have also believed that ‘for the purposes of the criminal law it is 
sometimes necessary to break down an ‘act*p+’, so comprehensively described, into the 
constituents’ involved in element analysis.383      
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 Smith and Hogan, Criminal law (5th Ed, Butterworths, London 1983) 35. 
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CHAPTER 5  
THE UNDER (AND OVER) INCLUSIVITY OF THE ACT 
ELEMENT 
 
We have so far demonstrated (in chapter 4) that the preferred definition of the act element, 
neutral between the various philosophies of actionp, is nevertheless capable of providing an 
effective nexus (in terms of agency) between D and a criminal event. However, in doing so, 
we have tended to focus our discussion of the criminal law upon a relatively small selection 
paradigm offences (for example, murder and rape), each of which contain a very obvious 
requirement of bodily movement. The challenge for the preferred definition of the act 
element, within this chapter, is to demonstrate that it is capable of operating within any 
criminal offence, even those that do not appear at first glance to contain a requirement of 
bodily movement. As stated earlier in chapter 4, the viability of element analysis partly 
hinges upon the contention that every offence contains an acte: the act element provides 
the link between D and the criminal event384 and it is only then, grounded upon this link, 
that D’s potential liability can be determined. Thus, if it can be demonstrated that certain 
offences do not require an acte (as defined), and yet we still believe that these offences 
have a place within the criminal law, then the preferred definition of the act element must 
be rejected.         
 
                                                          
384
 The criminal event refers to the full complex description of the offence, including its circumstance and 
result elements.  
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Objections to the preferred definition of the act element, based upon the contention that 
certain offences do not require bodily movement, have been widely explored in the 
literature. The debate has centred on verbal offences, omissions offences, possession 
offences and (the potential criminalisation of) thought and status based offences. Discussing 
each in turn, we must now assess whether the preferred definition of the act element is 




The first area in which the preferred definition of the act element has received criticism is in 
relation to its treatment of offences that can be committed verbally, such as harassment,385 
inciting racial hatred386 or encouraging crime.387 The question here is to what extent 
speaking can be labelled as bodily movement in order to come within the act element. For 
Robinson, who also defines the act element in relation to bodily movement, speaking would 
come within this category quite straightforwardly. Thus, when discussing the offence of 
harassment, Robinson states that: 
 
… the *act+ element is the simple act of speaking; the conduct’s characteristics – it’s 
insulting character, its likelihood of provoking a violent response – should be treated 
as circumstance elements.388 (emphasis added) 
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 Contrary to the Public Order Act 1986, s5. 
386
 Contrary to the Public Order Act 1986, s18.  
387
 Contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, Part 2. 
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 Robinson and Grall, ‘Element analysis in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and beyond’ (1983) 35 
Stanford Law Review, 681.  
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Robinson’s separation of the elements of harassment is very appealing. Certainly, in terms 
of simplicity, it would be most natural to describe and analyse D’s acte as one of speaking. 
However, as Duff has correctly pointed out, the simple act of speaking describes 
considerably ‘more than simple bodily movements.’389 For example, it would be very 
difficult to maintain that the sounds emitted from D’s mouth are in any manner an 
extension of D’s physical being. Thus, if we accept Duff’s criticism, as it seems that we must, 
we can either extend the definition of actione to include speaking or we can reject 
Robinson’s reasoning and isolate only the bodily movement involved in speech, but we must 
do one of these. 
 
Although the first solution of extending the definition of actione might have an initial appeal 
in terms of simplicity, to allow ourselves to move away from bodily movement has the 
potential to bring into question our definition of the act element more generally. Moore, 
when discussing the problem cases of status, possession and omission offences in a chapter 
headed ‘the doctrinal unity of the act requirement’,390 does not deal explicitly with verbal 
offences. Indeed, Act and Crime (as I read it) provides a mixed response to the question of 
whether there can be an act element of speaking.391 However, Moore’s general thesis about 
the identification of bodily movement as the basis of the act element, that bodily movement 
is the most basic thing that can be intentionally done, may be interpreted to lend support to 
the further identification of speaking. For example, Moore (like Davidson) excludes pre-
movement processes as a lone form of actione/p because if D sets out to perform them, he 
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 Moore, Act and Crime 82.  
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 Moore, Act and Crime 17-37.  
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 Moore, Act and Crime. On the one hand, Moore refers favourably to Austin’s separation of speaking in 
terms of the acte of bodily movement and the result of sound being emitted (p221). However, on the other 
hand, Moore also refers without qualification to ‘ones bodily movements (of speaking)’, which implies that the 
noise is also part of the acte (p220).  
135 
 
or she can only do so by intentionally moving part of his or her body: the two are 
intrinsically linked.392 Likewise, if D wanted to perform the vocal cord and mouth 
movements required to speak, he or she would only be able to do so by intentionally 
speaking. Thus, it could be argued that upon this basis speaking should be identified 
alongside bodily movement within the definition of the act element.   
 
However, just as we distinguished our reasoning from Moore’s when identifying bodily 
movement as actione (free from volitions), so we must do so again. This is because if we 
accept the line of reasoning that includes speaking (including noise) within the act element, 
we must also accept the same conclusion for all variations of complex co-ordinated 
behaviour. As Duff explains, just as D cannot intentionally move his or her mouth and vocal 
cords without intentionally speaking, so must D actually tie his or her laces or ride his or her 
bike in order to perform the bodily movements involved in those tasks as well.393 Thus, to 
extend the act element in relation to verbal offences would be to effectively undermine our 
preferred definition.          
 
Therefore, staying true to our preferred definition, we must reject Robinson’s identification 
of sound as part of the act element. As Austin contends,394 the act element should relate 
solely to the bodily movement of D. Bodily movement that in this case will include the 
movement of D’s mouth. The sound created by these movements, like anything caused by 
an acte of D, will constitute a result element. Thus, drawing back to Robinson’s example of 
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 Moore, Act and Crime 103-108.  
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 Duff, Criminal Attempts 258-259.  
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 See, Austin, How to do things with words (2nd ed, Harvard University Press, 1975) 114.   
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harassment that has led to this criticism, we may now separate the elements of the actus 
reus in a way that compliments (rather than undermines) our version of element analysis: 
 
Act: The bodily movement required to make a noise; 
Result: The sounds emitted; and 
Circumstance: The sounds meaning, the insulting character etc.   
 
Although we have chosen this method chiefly to avoid creating problems for our analysis of 
other offences, we may well find that this method of separation is better equipped to deal 
with a few problem cases. For example, if D is restrained and his or her voice is muffled in 
some way, it may well be that although the act element is satisfied the muffler prevents any 
sound being emitted. Thus, the separation of physical movement from sound is able to do 
some genuine work. Further, we may also pre-empt a claim that the narrowness of the act 
element means that it (in effect) has no function. As with all other offences, we are relying 
upon the act element to provide a nexus of agency between D and the criminal event. The 
movement required to speak can perform this role if done intentionally, and if not 
intentional, for example if D is speaking in his or her sleep, it is also able to exclude D’s 
agency. Therefore, verbal offences do not represent a counter-example to the preferred 






In relation to verbal offences, we have been able to identify relevant bodily movement upon 
which to construct an act element. However, omissions liability represents both an obvious, 
and a very extensive, category of offences that do not require bodily movement at all.395 
This category includes a raft of regulatory offences.396 However, even beyond this, it also 
extends to include a multitude result crimes, including murder.397 For example, if D puts his 
or her car into cruise control and locks its steering, only then realising that V (D’s enemy) is 
standing in the road ahead, D will be liable for murder if he or she does not at least attempt 
to intervene in order to prevent the car from hitting and killing V.398 Thus, D will not simply 
be liable for murder in the absence of bodily movement; he or she will be liable because of 
the absence of bodily movement. 
 
If element analysis requires that the act element should be defined solely in terms of bodily 
movement, and every criminal offence requires an acte, then D (the motionless driver) will 
not be liable. This is clearly unacceptable. It is for this reason that the act element, although 
principally defined in relation to bodily movement, must also extend to include omissions if 
it is to adequately cater for the full range of possible offences: 
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
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 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 61-62.  
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As we stated in chapter 3, omissions in this context are defined simply as a lack of bodily 
movement.399 Thus, D, in the driving example above, cannot escape liability upon the basis 
that he or she did not move his or her body whilst possessing the requisite mens rea for 
murder: the omission to move may still constitute an actione. For several action theorists 
however, again interpreting the act element as if it was an attempt to define actionp, the 
preferred definition of an omission and its inclusion within the act element are both 
perceived as unsound. Therefore, just as the critics of element analysis have employed their 
theories of actionp in an attempt to undermine the identification of bodily movement as 
actione/p, we see a similar attack in relation to omissions (a lack of bodily movement) and its 
inclusion within the act element.400 If such criticisms are successful, and if omissions cannot 
be included within the act element, then element analysis will be unable to explain this 
important area of the criminal law and must be rejected.  
 
As with the identification of bodily movement, it is also possible to draw on certain actionp 
theorists in order to gain support of our definition of an omission as the absence of bodily 
movement.401 Moore, for example, defines true omissions402 simply as ‘absent actions[p]’.
403 
However, if like Moore we are required to defend this thesis on a philosophical level, such a 
position becomes very difficult to maintain. It is not greatly troubled by the criticism that 
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when D is omitting to perform a certain bodily movement he or she may well be performing 
any number of other bodily movements: although D is moving, he or she is still omitting to 
undertake the bodily movements necessary to perform the specific movement required.404 
However, even Moore accepts that there may be some blurring of the distinction between 
actsp and omissions at a certain stage. For example, Moore believes that active resistance to 
movement can be correctly classified as an actionp: 
 
‘A resisting occurs when an agent’s body is about to be made to move by outside 
forces, but he keeps his body from moving by activating the appropriate muscles.’ *An+ 
example of standing on one’s head is a good example of resisting, where ... I would 
conclude there is an action.  
 
As long as we ‘construe “bodily movements” to include muscle-flexing’, as we should 
in these cases where we use our muscles to resist an outside force, there is nothing 
inconsistent with my theory of action in concluding that such resistings are actions, not 
omissions.405 
 
A slight blurring of the distinction between acts and omissions may not appear to be greatly 
troubling; after all, they both come within the act element and so there is no issue of 
objective separation. However, just as we found when attempting to gain philosophical 
support for the identification of bodily movement, adopting a certain theoretical stance can 
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 The criticism that by performing other movements (X) D is actingp when he or she is omitting to do a certain 
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often lead to the two vulnerabilities discussed in the previous chapter: the widening of the 
target for critics and the alienation of those that do not share the same theoretical view. 
This would certainly seem to be the case if we were to employ the Moorian theory.  
 
Although Moore’s contention that certain resisting can be actionp is presented as a minor 
issue and one that can be reconciled with the rest of his theory, it nevertheless represents a 
point of weakness that can be exploited by his critics. This is because, although the example 
of resistance is clearly distinguishable from an example where D fails to complete a legally 
required movement,406 Moore is less convincing when he attempts to distinguish it from 
refraining from movement more generally. For example, when discussing D who remains 
standing and motionless on a burning deck when everyone else has fled,407 Moore states 
that:      
 
... ‘such refraining are not actions’. Standing still may become so difficult physically 
that it is like standing on one’s head, in which case it will become a resisting and thus, 
on my account, an action; yet as [the] example of the boy frozen to the deck 
illustrates, one more usually stands still and in standing still does nothing at all.408  
 
The problems emerge for Moore when we attempt to identify the criteria he is employing to 
distinguish refraining (the motionless child) from resisting (the man standing on his head). 
First, evidenced from the first abstract quoted, Moore could be interpreted as suggesting 
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that there is an objective criterion based upon ‘outside forces’:409 resisting is actionp 
because D is using his or her muscles to resist outside forces that would otherwise result in 
movement. However, the very same outside forces (gravity) are surely working in the same 
way upon the motionless child that must also use his muscles in order to stay standing. 
Moore seems to recognise this problem in the second quoted abstract when he accepts that 
it is possible to be resisting while standing up, but distinguishes it on the basis that standing 
(unlike standing on one’s head) is not generally difficult. This is problematic. Either Moore is 
suggesting that physical difficulty is a criterion of actionp, in which case we are left to 
wonder just how much exertion is required before D begins to actp. Or, as is more likely, 
Moore is creating a subjective criterion whereby D is only actingp if, due to the difficulty of 
the non-movement, he or she has to think actively about not moving. However, even this 
more reasonable-sounding criterion would create inconsistencies with Moore’s theory of 
actionp more generally. Moore makes pains to point out, for example, in relation to bodily 
movement that D does not have to be fully conscious of that movement in order for it to be 
classified as actionp.
410 As a result, Moore’s conceptualisation of omissions not only raises 
problems of internal consistency, it also casts doubt on his description of actionp as bodily 
movement. 
 
Moore is effectively forced into this compromised position because of the similarities, in 
terms of volitions, between resisting-omissions and bodily movement within his theory of 
actionp. However, without a concept of actionp to protect (and to be drawn in by), we are 
free to reject the complex (and problematic) route taken by Moore. Instead, just as we 
distinguished actionp from actione, so we can distinguish omissionsp from our identification 
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of omissions within the criminal law as a lack of bodily movement (omissionse).
411 Indeed, 
when dealing with omissionsp and the criminal law, Moore also has to make use of a similar 
distinction. This is because, although Moore regards resisting as a form of actionp and thus 
being capable of coming within the act element, he also recognises that there are certain 
offences that are based upon true omissions (non-actionp). For example, although the 
motionless driver whose car runs down V in the example above is not resisting in the 
Moorian sense, his or her omission will still be caught within the act element.412 Therefore, 
Moore’s distinction between types of omissionsp does not appear to aid the criminal law.   
 
With a clear conflict of interests, Moore can be seen to prioritise his theory of actionp above 
the consistency and simplicity of his model of element analysis: a conflict of interests that 
we do not share, and a conclusion that we do not intend to replicate. As long as our 
definition of omissionse is capable of performing its role within the act element as the nexus 
between D and the criminal event, and can deal adequately with the current omissions 
based offences, then it is acceptable in the criminal context. It is to this issue that we must 
now turn.  
 
Omissionse as a basis for element analysis 
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In order to assess whether our preferred definition of omissionse can perform its role within 
the criminal law, we must first examine the effectiveness of omissionse in terms of 
attributing agency and responsibility. However, beyond this, if we find that omissions are 
capable of performing the role effectively, we must then explore the possibility that this 
conclusion may undermine the identification of bodily movement as the paradigm of 
actione.   
 
In order to assess the appropriateness of bodily movement as a nexus of agency and 
responsibility between D and a criminal event in chapter 4, we enquired as to the most 
causally basic thing that D can intentionally do to bring about a criminal event. This inquiry 
confirmed that bodily movement can provide a nexus, even for result crimes, within the 
criminal law. However, as we have discussed, not all criminal results are brought about 
through bodily movement. The question now is whether the same inquiry can also lead us 
to a lack of bodily movement (omissione)? 
 
The main obstacle to the identification of omissionse within this structure is the requirement 
of causality. Moore, for example, contends that a lack of movement can never cause 
anything.413 The causal requirement, however, is vital in order to establish that D is 
responsible for the criminal result in terms of agency. D’s movements, or lack of 
movements, must tie him or her to the other parts of the offence. Secondly, causation is 
also necessary for the functioning of element analysis and the ability to distinguish results 
(caused by the act element) from circumstances (not caused by the act element). 
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For Moore, a lack of bodily movement cannot be causal in the same way as bodily 
movement or even a state of affairs, because it is essentially indeterminable. For example, 
when commenting on the state of an untouched patch of grass, Moore states that: 
 
Such an absence of any change of such a state is hardly the same as the absence of 
elephants trampling the grass down; such an omission is only an absence of one way in 
which there could be a change of such a state.414 
 
Therefore, unlike the tangible inquiry into bodily movement and the static identification of 
states, omissionsp are infinitely expandable. As a result, if we conclude that my omissionp to 
help a drowning V to safety caused his or her death, we must also conclude that the 
omission of everyone else in the world from helping was equally causal. 
 
Although we must accept Moore’s reasoning, we do not have to accept his conclusion that a 
lack of movement cannot perform a causal role within the criminal law. This is because, 
whilst Moore is attempting to conceptualise all omissionsp, we are only concerned with 
those omissions that are capable of coming within the criminal law (omissionse). For 
example, the criminal law does not target people generally for not moving and allowing 
harms to come about, but rather, it will only target D who fails to perform a certain bodily 
movement that is specifically required by law.  
 
Therefore, although Moore is concerned by an indeterminate class of omissionsp, for our 
purposes, individual offences will provide a focus that makes only a single individual and a 
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single omissione relevant. For example, let us imagine that it is a criminal offence for D not 
to drive his elephant herd across a patch of grass once a day to keep it flat. Upon 
discovering that the grass has been untouched for several days, Moore would be correct to 
point out that the untouched state of the grass is maintained by an indeterminate class of 
omissions to flatten it. It is a class which covers an infinite number of people. However, with 
the criminal law providing a specific duty upon D, we have a reason to single his or her 
omission out as the only cause that is relevant. Thus, despite the indeterminate causal 
nature of omissions, we do not have to complicate our analysis by claiming that D’s 
omissionp should be reinterpreted as an actionp,
415 or construct a new class of ‘punishable 
omissions’,416 either of which would distort our overall thesis.417 Rather, through the 
identification of a legal duty, the offence definitions provide the focus upon a single 
omissione that is necessary for a causal act element. 
 
An omissione therefore, like bodily movement, represents the most causally basic thing that 
D can intentionally do to bring about a criminal result. As with bodily movement, we are not 
concerned with pre-omissione processes or motives. Thus, it does not affect our reasoning if 
D’s omissione can be classified philosophically as a refraining or a resisting. Rather, having 
established that D owes a legal duty to perform certain movements, we simply ask whether 
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D failed to move at the relevant time (the actus reus of the act element), and then, was this 
failure to move intentional (the mens rea of the act element).  
 
Undermining the identification of bodily movement    
 
We have concluded that an omissione, like bodily movement, is capable of constituting the 
act element within the structure of element analysis. However, as soon as we have reached 
this position, we must address the criticism that claims that such a conclusion undermines 
the role and importance of our original identification of bodily movement. For example, 
when discussing the example of the motionless driver, Corrado explains that D should be 
liable for the murder of V. However, when it comes to the assigning of moral blame, 
Corrado also contends that this is not affected by the question of whether and to what 
extent bodily movement was involved.418 And on this basis, if it makes no moral difference 
whether D has moved or omitted to move, then why should this question be relevant to the 
liability of D?  
 
Moore’s response to this criticism is to attempt to undermine its central premise. For 
Moore, an omission is not a causal entity and so D’s bodily movements (which are causal) 
will always carry the potential for greater moral blame than a failure to move.419 The 
problem with this position, of course, is that Moore does accept that even true omissionse 
can come within the act element. Therefore, he is forced into a contradiction, 
                                                          
418
 For discussion, see, Duff Criminal Attempts 254-255; Duff, ‘Acting, trying and criminal liability’ in Shute, 
Gardner and Horder (eds) Action and value in criminal law (Clarendon Press, 1993), 75, 83; Hornsby, ‘Action 
and aberration’ (1993) 142 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1719, 1740; Annas, ‘How basic are basic 
actions?’ (1977) 78 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 195, 204. 
419
 Moore, Act and Crime 22-34.  
147 
 
simultaneously maintaining that the act element must have a causal relationship with the 
result element and that a non-causal entity can form the act element.420  
 
In order to deal with this contradiction, Moore presents omissionse liability as a rare 
exception from a general rule: omissionse may come within the act element, but they do not 
do so on a level plain with bodily movement. He even goes so far as to question: 
 
… the possibility that perhaps Anglo-American criminal law is mistaken in those rare 
instances where it genuinely imposes omissions liability. Perhaps there ought not to be 
such crimes, recognising that presently they do exist.421     
 
In this manner Moore is able to insulate the importance of bodily movement. However, in 
doing so, he is forced to present omissionse liability as an unfortunate inconsistency. The 
problem with this is that every example of a true omissione, which is deemed sufficiently 
serious for the criminal law, becomes a counter argument to his thesis.422 
 
The line taken by Moore, however, is not the only one available to defend the identification 
of both bodily movement and a lack of movement within the act element. This is because 
the premise targeted by Moore, that the moral blame of the motionless driver is not 
contingent upon whether D moved or failed to move his or her body, does not have to be 
fully rejected (and certainly does not require us to dismiss the moral status of omissionse). 
The role of the act element is to provide a nexus in terms of agency between D and the 
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criminal event. Therefore, on one level, we must expose the premise as inaccurate: without 
fulfilling the act element there will be no nexus to tie D to the event and, therefore, D will 
lack direct moral responsibility for it. So, if it transpired that the motionless driver was only 
motionless because he or she was being physically restrained by P, D would not satisfy the 
mens rea of the act element423 and would not be criminally, or morally, responsible for V’s 
death. However, beyond this gate-keeping role in terms of moral blame, we do not have to 
reject the premise at all. The act element is simply not equipped (or designed) to assign this 
kind of moral blame unaided. Moral blame and criminal culpability are pivotal to the 
criminal law, but they apply to offences as a whole (every element combined). Therefore, 
any criticism of the act element based on its inability to establish moral blame is inaccurate, 





To be liable for a possession offence, such as the possession of a controlled drug or an illegal 
weapon, D must be in physical control of the criminal item. For example, if D is charged with 
possession of a controlled drug,424 he or she will satisfy the actus reus of the offence simply 
on the basis that it is discovered on his or her person. D does not, whilst in possession of the 
drug, also have to be performing any kind of bodily movements. Therefore, possession 
appears to provide a counter example to the contention (central to element analysis) that 
every offence requires an acte. 
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Although possession offences appear to be targeting D’s state of being in possession 
however, they may equally be interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the act 
element as defined. This is because the state of being in possession must always assume 
one of two events. D is either in possession because he or she has performed the relevant 
bodily movements necessary to gain possession, or, alternatively, if the criminal item was 
received without movement, D has omittede to fulfil the legal duty requiring him or her to 
move in such a way that would divest him or her of possession. Either way, without having 
to expand or distort the definition of the act element,425 it will always be possible to identify 
an acte.
426      
 
Husak, however, has contended that our preferred analysis of possession offences, focusing 
on D’s movement as opposed to the state of possession, is not able to cater adequately for 
every type of offence.  
 
But what about those possessory crimes that are not defined in accordance with this 
generalisation? Consider State v Cleppe, in which neither intent nor knowledge was 
held to be an element of the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Or 
Chajutin v Whitehead, in which a defendant was summarily convicted for possession of 
an altered passport he did not know to have been altered. Are we to believe that the 
act requirement is preserved here because the defendants performed the omissions of 
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failure to divest themselves of something they did not know they had? Why accept 
this strained account?427        
 
There are two ways in which we may respond to this criticism. The first, pre-empted by 
Husak, is simply to say that such cases were wrongly decided and that D should only be 
liable for such an offence if he or she was at least aware of possession. However, this 
defence is not acceptable. It is not acceptable because, as element analysis claims to 
provide a structure for all criminal law, it must be able to accommodate any current offence 
that is not objectively without reason. In relation to possession, the quoted abstract clearly 
demonstrates the problem of holding D to be in possession of something that he or she is 
unaware of. However, placed in a different context, a finding of possession in such 
circumstances may appear perfectly reasonable. For example, if V had a surprise birthday 
present slipped into his or her bag without his or her knowledge, which was subsequently 
taken by a pickpocket, we would be unlikely to question a court that found V to have been 
in possession of the present at the time it was taken.428 We are therefore presented with a 
complicated and controversial area of the law. If element analysis were to take sides within 
the debate, as this first response assumes, it would therefore create an obvious point of 
weakness.   
 
The second, and preferred response, is to draw into question whether the criticism is 
capable of undermining element analysis. The notion that D can be made liable for 
performing an omission (or anything else) unwittingly is certainly an uncomfortable one. 
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However, it appears that the problem identified by Husak that leads to what he calls a 
strained account, does not accurately reflect the target of his criticism: the Moorian version 
of element analysis. For D to be performing an omission implies that he or she is making a 
conscious decision, similar to Moore’s volition-caused-bodily movement, that he or she is 
not going to move in the manner required to divest possession. But without the knowledge 
that the item is in his or her possession, D is obviously not capable of making such a choice. 
Therefore, if Moore’s conception of omissionsp and omissionse liability (or the preferred 
definition explored in this chapter) required D to perform an omissione in order to come 
within the criminal law, then Husak’s criticism would hold. Fortunately for both Moore and 
the preferred definition of the act element, neither theory contains such a requirement.  
 
Although Moore’s analysis of omissions is different in various ways from the one preferred 
in this chapter,429 neither one requires an omissione to be the product of volition in order to 
come within the act element of the criminal law. Rather, the act element will require an 
actus reus of a lack of bodily movement, satisfied in this case by the omissione to perform 
the necessary movements required to divest possession, and a mens rea of intention 
relating to that lack of movement. The mens rea requirement of intention will be satisfied, 
not in a manner akin to volition, but simply upon the basis that D has intentionally not 
performed the movements necessary to divest possession: D was not, for example, 
restrained and therefore (against his or her will) unable to move his or her body in the 
required manner. D’s lack of knowledge concerning possession of the item will not directly 
affect the analysis of the act element; rather, it is an issue relevant to the mens rea of a 
circumstance of the offence (the fact of possession).      
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The reason that the cases raised by Husak are problematic is not because they fail to satisfy 
the requirements of the act element. Such requirements are satisfied without staining. They 
are problematic because they are punishing an omission without the requirement of fault as 
to the circumstance of possession. When discussing omissions above, we commented that 
the act element alone is not designed to provide the sole basis for moral blame; rather, its 
role is to provide a nexus between D and the criminal event. Beyond the act element, 
therefore, in order to focus blame only on those omissionse that are legally relevant, it is 
routine for omissions offences to include a circumstance element which requires D to have a 
special duty to acte before he or she can be liable for the failure to do so. For possession 
offences, this circumstance element is brought about by the fact that D is in possession of 
illegal material: thus creating a unique duty to divest that possession. However, alongside 
this type of circumstance, it is also a matter of routine for omission offences to include a 
mens rea of knowledge or intent: requiring D to know about the fact of possession before 
he or she can be punished for failing to move to divest of it. It is this requirement that is 
lacking from the Husak examples.  
 
This observation may lead us to question the viability of offences within this category. After 
all, if D does not know that he or she is in possession of illegal items, it is difficult to 
maintain that he or she warrants the censure of the criminal law for failing to divest of 
them. However, it does not lead us to question our definition of the act element or indeed 
any part of element analysis. Far from strained in fact, the structured reasoning facilitated 
by element analysis has allowed us to identify the problem of these offences in a way that 




THOUGHT AND STATUS OFFENCES 
 
There are no thought or status based offences that currently exist anywhere within the 
common law world. Therefore, although the possible creation of such offences in the future 
raises several interesting considerations and challenges for element analysis, we will not 
consider all of these possibilities in full, and our principal response can always be to 
maintain that such difficulties are purely theoretical and therefore of reduced weight.430 
However, as we have discussed above, element analysis is a structure for discussion and 
analysis and does not claim a normative role within the evaluation of the law. Therefore, it 
is important to sketch out, however briefly, the manner in which element analysis and the 
preferred definition of the act element would accommodate such offences.  
 
Thought and status offences have provided useful examples for critics of the preferred 
definition of the act element because D’s liability would not be predicated upon bodily 
movement or a specific lack of bodily movement. For example, if the status of being 
intoxicated (as opposed to the possession of illegal drugs), or the thought of intending to 
commit a crime (as opposed to doing so whilst also physically attempting it) were to 
become offences, D’s movements or lack of movements would be irrelevant. In the case of 
status offences, D would be liable because of the circumstance that he or she belongs to a 
certain class of people. With thought crime, it would be D’s ulterior intention that would be 
targeted. Therefore, having stated that element analysis requires the identification of an 
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acte within every offence, a physical nexus between D and the criminal event, the potential 
creation of thought and status offences appear to provide unhelpful counter examples.       
 
The problem with potential thought and status offences, however, is not that they would 
lack such a nexus, but rather that it would have to be conceived differently from that of 
current offences. Where we have discussed conduct based offences that do not include a 
result element, for example, we have rightly focused upon D’s bodily movements or lack of 
bodily movements because it is that specific physical activity (performed within certain 
circumstances and with certain fault) that the law is targeting. For offences that involve a 
result element, the focus is usually shifted to the harm created by that result. However, 
within the act element of these offences it is still correct to concentrate on D’s physical 
activity because, to link D to that result, it must be demonstrated that D physically caused 
the result to happen. With status and thought crime, we have the potential for offences that 
target neither specific conduct nor specific results. Therefore, although we still require a 
physical nexus between D and the criminal event,431 we have no requirement for that nexus 
to be a physical activity. Thus, the act element could be satisfied simply by the identification 
of D’s physical presence at a time when the relevant circumstance applied (illegal status) or 
when D had the relevant ulterior fault (illegal thought). D’s presence would have to provide 
the physical nexus between D and the criminal event, and therefore the basis for further 
investigation into the spatiotemporal location of the offence.432    
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The difficulties experienced by the preferred definition of the act element, when trying to 
accommodate thought and status offences, has led certain commentators to seek 
alternative definitions. Husak, for example, contends that the required identification of an 
acte should be replaced with a control requirement.
433 There must still be a nexus between 
D and the criminal event. However, that nexus will be established by the presence of D’s 
control. Such a requirement would be able to replace the preferred definition of the act 
element for current offences, focusing either on D’s control over his or her conduct or 
causal control over the result element. However, beyond this, Husak also contends that it 
will be better able to explain thought434 and status435 offences: asking to what extent D had 
control over such status and thought rather than focusing upon physical conduct. Thus, for 
Husak, the potential creation of thought and status offences requires a rethinking of the 
preferred definition of the act element as it applies to all criminal offences.436  
 
Having set out the manner in which the act element (focusing upon D’s physical presence) 
could accommodate such offences, however, we may now evaluate Husak’s control 
requirement as an alternative approach. Indeed, as soon as we turn a faintly critical eye, the 
problems associated with a control requirement become very clear. This is because, in 
contrast with bodily movement, the concept of control introduces several uncertainties into 
the law. First, it is unclear whether Husak is using control in a specialised manner. This is 
important because, for example, it is very common to refer to an individual as losing control 
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due to frustration and anger, and yet we would not want such people to avoid liability for 
offences committed when out of control in these circumstances.437 Secondly, when 
assessing the requisite control required to find D criminally liable, Husak states that a court 
must assess the reasonableness of holding D responsible,438 commenting that the level of 
this requirement will vary between offences.439 Therefore, within every offence,440 the court 
would have to make fine line judgements both regarding D’s level of control over the 
criminal event, and then what level is required for liability. Indeed, as if to concede this 
point of complexity, Husak states that: 
 
The critical test of my thesis is not whether it makes hard cases easy but whether it 
raises questions that are relevant to the problem at hand.441     
 
Even forgiving the increased complexity, however, the control approach appears to fall foul 
of the same line of reasoning employed by Husak to criticise and then ultimately dismiss the 
acte element defined in relation to bodily movement. When discussing the relationship 
between drug addiction and crime, Husak states that: 
 
I do not believe that the justifiability of punishment in these cases should depend on 
whether drug possession by addicts can be said to qualify as voluntary action. Instead, 
the justifiability of liability should turn on whether addicted defendants exercise a 
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sufficient degree of control over their use of drugs to be responsible for it. Surely 
withdrawal symptoms might be so unpleasant that an addict could not reasonably be 
expected to control his or her use of an illicit substance.442    
 
In relation to the preferred definition of the act element, Husak was critical of the supposed 
inability of actione to deal with the potential of thought and status offences, commenting 
that ‘the thought-experiment that criminal liability might be imposed despite the absence of 
an act does not appear to yield a contradiction.’443 However, if we imagine a drug addict (D) 
who commits a series of offences while suffering from even the most serious withdrawal 
symptoms, would their conviction yield such a contradiction? Not only is the answer to this 
question surely a resounding no, but unlike Husak’s preferred thought-experiment, this one 
is relevant to and present within the current law.   
 
The control approach does not appear to provide an attractive alternative to the preferred 
definition of the act element. However, it is important to note that the method of dealing 
with thought and status offences outlined at the beginning of this section, based simply 
upon physical presence, is also far from ideal. This is because, for example, unlike bodily 
movement or the omission of bodily movement, physical presence will not contain a mens 
rea requirement: presence/existence without any further contextual qualifications cannot 
be unintentional. Therefore, if Husak or others were able to demonstrate the presence of 
actual thought or status offences beyond mere thought-experiments, the preferred 
definition of the act element may well be difficult to maintain. However, whether such 
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offences are not present because they do not contain a requirement of bodily movement or 
omissionse,
444 or simply because they are seen as an affront to the rights of those to whom 
they would apply,445 their absence means that the preferred definition of the act element 
can emerge from this discussion unaffected. We may continue to define the act element 
simply in terms of bodily movement or omissionse with, as yet, no need to extend it to 
include physical presence.        
 
INVOLUNTARY ACTSE AND OVER-INCLUSIVITY 
 
As we have explored above, the primary criticism regarding the breadth of the preferred 
definition of the act element is that it is under-inclusive: because certain offences do not 
require an acte as defined, either that definition, and/or element analysis as a whole, must 
be rejected. So far, we have been able to rebut this criticism by explaining the manner in 
which the preferred definition of the act element is able to perform its role in each of the 
problem cases discussed. However, anticipating such a defence, Duff has also criticised the 
breadth of the act element from the opposite direction: claiming that a definition of 
actione/p capable of covering everything relevant within the criminal law would be an empty 
requirement, such that it would even include involuntary actse that should be excluded.  
 
On the one hand, the notion of an ‘act’ could be given a reasonably determinate 
meaning: but it is then quite implausible to claim that the criminal law either is or 
should be founded on the ‘act requirement’, since there are plenty of cases in which 
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the law, justly and reasonably, imposes liability in the absence of an ‘act’ by the 
defendant. On the other hand, we might extend the notion of an ‘act’ to cover these 
cases ... but this would be to empty the ‘act requirement’ of any substantive content, 
turning it into an utterly trivial requirement.446 
 
Having maintained that the first part of this criticism does not undermine the preferred 
definition of actione, we must now examine whether this position has led us to fall foul of 
the second part. Of course, we may concede a portion of Duff’s target: unlike other 
proponents of element analysis, we do not wish to contend that the requirement of actione 
has a formal role in the substantive content of the law (in the sense that it might outlaw the 
prospect of thought crime for example).447 However, although the act element does not 
claim to control the content of the law, its role within a structure of element analysis would 
be undermined if it performed no task at all.   
 
As we have discussed in chapter 4, however, the role of the act element and the 
requirement of an actione are employed within element analysis to perform very necessary 
tasks. The most important of these is the provision of a nexus that links D to the criminal 
event, isolating his or her role in the offence by isolating his or her actionse: actionse that 
either (along with certain circumstances and fault) constitutes the offence itself, or actionse 
that provide the causal link to the result element. Where relevant actione is identified and 
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the nexus with the criminal event is established, the law has a basis upon which to assess 
D’s liability in relation to the offences circumstance and result elements.448  
 
On this basis alone we may conclude that the act element, as defined, is not trivial. 
However, although this response may be enough to undermine Duff’s criticism in general 
terms, the criticism here is not directly targeted at the positive (nexus creating) role of 
element analysis. Rather, Duff’s primary focus is upon what the act element is able to 
exclude from the criminal law. With the preferred definition of actione encompassing both 
bodily movement and a lack of bodily movement, the claim is that it will be impossible for 
the act element to perform a filtering role: all physical behaviour will be caught within the 
act element, even if it is involuntary and therefore should not attract liability.  
 
The act requirement now seems to come to this: No one can be punished unless she 
either moves or fails to move her body. That may seem to be an empty requirement 
(who could fail to satisfy it?).449 
 
Before exploring specific examples of involuntary behaviour, it is first important to provide a 
general response to this criticism. That is because, although the provision of a nexus 
between D’s acte and the criminal event has been discussed in positive terms, the fact that it 
is a requirement also means that it performs a filtering role. Although it is true to say that 
we are always either moving our bodies or omitting to move our bodies, the act element is 
only interested in actse and omissionse that are either directly proscribed by law, or have 
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caused results that are proscribed by law. For example, just because D is moving his or her 
body at the time when V is killed does not mean that D’s movement will satisfy the act 
element within the context of element analysis. D’s movement must either have caused V’s 
death, or, alternatively, D’s movement must have been different from movement that was 
legally required. 
 
Despite this general filtering role, however, there is a further question about whether the 
act element is also able to exclude those actse or omissionse that may cause the criminal 
results for example, but are involuntary. Exploring this question further, we will centre our 




One of the primary examples employed by Duff to expose the emptiness of the act element 
is that of a driver who unexpectedly experiences a seizure whilst at the wheel. Duff 
comments that: 
 
... the ‘act requirement’ appears very weak. A driver rendered unconscious by a fit 
which he could not have been expected to foresee seems to satisfy it: his earlier 
voluntary acts, those involved in his driving before he became unconscious, made a 
significant causal contribution to the dangerous movements of his car when he was 
unconscious.450 
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The problem with this example, however, as a criticism of the act element, is that 
application of the act element will not result in the driver being held liable for dangerous 
driving. This is because, as Duff later concedes,451 although the driver’s voluntary 
movements prior to his unconsciousness are capable of constituting actse within the 
definition of the act element, such actse are not accompanied by the mens rea necessary for 
the other elements of the offence. D will only be liable if there is concurrent fault for all 
elements of the offence at the time he or she actse.
452  
 
For Duff, however, this explanation is unsatisfactory because of its reliance on issues of 
mens rea outside the acte requirement itself. Criticising the act element, Duff states that it 
only requires: 
 
... a minimal condition of criminal liability which is likely almost always to be satisfied. 
It sets substantial limits on liability only when combined with the requirements of 
causation and fault: but ... [will] have little substantial force independently of the fault 
or mens rea requirements.453  
 
Although, as Duff comments, this summary of the act element may conflict with claims 
made by certain advocates of element analysis,454 it is perfectly consistent with the version 
explored in this thesis. The actus reus of the act element, focusing upon bodily movement 
or an omission to move, is not required to exclude people from the law. Rather, it is a focal 
point and a basis for further questions. D’s actse may always be capable of falling within the 
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actus reus of the act element, but this is simply to focus on a specific target: if that actione 
was performed without the requisite fault or without the required causal effect, D will not 
be liable. Thus, although the driving example can demonstrate that the act element does 
not perform all the tasks of the criminal law, it does not undermine any of the tasks that it is 




The second set of examples used to test the ability of the act element to exclude involuntary 
behaviour, are those relating to somnambulism and hypnosis. For Moore, such behaviours 
will not come within the criminal law (even if D causes criminal harm) because they do not 
amount to examples of willed bodily movement: D may be causing his or her body to move 
but he or she does not have conscious control over those movements.456 Despite the initial 
appeal of this approach, or at least this conclusion, however, Moore struggles to discuss 
other examples in a consistent manner. Thus, when concluding that brain washed 
individuals will come within his definition of actione/p and therefore within the criminal law, 
Moore states that this time D’s movement is volitional (with only his or her beliefs and 
desires affected).457 The problem with this conclusion is that, in relation to somnambulism 
and hypnosis, Moore found that D’s volitions were invalid: volitions, as Moore defines them, 
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are the decisions that result from the conscious choice between conflicting intentions, and 
thus, where D is prevented from making that active choice, volitions are unable to perform 
their ‘resolving function’.458  
 
We are therefore left with an apparent contradiction. If volitions are identified only where D 
plays an active role in resolving conflicting intentions, then surely the need to resolve 
conflicting intentions is equally absent from a brainwashed individual who has had his or her 
desires conditioned. With other action theorists contending that movement whilst in a 
somnambulist or hypnotic state could amount to actione/p,
459 we are therefore left with 
controversy that would do damage if imported into the criminal law.460  
 
As Moore struggles to avoid contradiction, so we may be reminded of the benefit of 
separating the conception of actionp from the definition of the act element. Unlike Moore, 
we do not have to make fine distinctions on the basis of volitions. Rather, we simply ask 
whether D has performed the relevant actus reus of the act element, which is likely to be 
satisfied, and then we move to the mens rea of the act element. There will remain a 
legitimate debate within the mens rea of the act element as to whether D was actinge 
intentionally when hypnotised or brainwashed. Such debate will not be resolved by 
structuring it within element analysis. However, structuring it in this way will focus the 
debate (for example, it prevents its expansion into the physical dimensions of D’s 
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movement), and equally importantly, it will also ensure the debate remains neutral between 
the different theories of actionp.
461 Again, the preferred definition of the actus reus of the 




Combined with our discussion in chapter 4, we may now confirm the identification of D’s 
bodily movement (or lack of movement) as the preferred definition of the act element. 
Providing an objective basis from which to separate the elements of an offence, it is a 
conclusion that is essential to the maintained viability of element analysis.   
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CHAPTER 6  
BODILY MOVEMENT AND THE SEPARATION OF 
ELEMENTS  
 
Within chapters 4 and 5, we have concluded that the preferred definition of the act element 
is able to provide an objective basis for liability across the criminal law. Within this analysis 
we have also highlighted the important role of the act element within the separation of 
offence elements more generally. In this chapter, this important function of the act 
element, and criticisms of it, will provide our focus. First we explore internal separation of 
the act element between actus reus and mens rea, and then the role of the act element in 
identifying the circumstance and result elements.  
 
SEPARATING THE ACTUS REUS AND THE MENS REA OF THE ACT ELEMENT  
 
The central focus of Part II of this thesis has been an examination of the preferred definition 
of the actus reus of the act element:  
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 
Within this analysis, we have also touched upon the mens rea requirements of the act 
element. However, our discussion of mens rea (in this context) has taken place merely as a 
supplement to the central thesis: demonstrating that all physical actione can be intended 
167 
 
and that involuntary movement, although capable of satisfying the actus reus of the act 
element, will not satisfy the mens rea requirements. In this manner, as we will explore in 
more detail in chapter 8,462 the analytical separation of the actus reus and mens rea of the 
act element has allowed us to focus debate and criticism in order to aid our discussion.463     
 
Separating the actus reus and the mens rea of the act element however, is more 
controversial than a simple analytical choice, a controversy that has derived in part from 
action theory. For many commentators, an actione/p can only be understood if it is done 
intentionally and thus a separation of the physical and mental aspects of the acte/p does not 
make sense: if D has actede/p then both aspects are satisfied and, if either is not, D has not 
actede/p.
464 Moore defines actione/p as bodily movement caused by volition.
465 Therefore, 
even when discussing the criminal law, Moore’s definition of the act element (unlike the 
circumstance and result elements) fuses actus reus and mens rea.      
 
... notice that the intention required to act at all – the intention to move one’s limbs – 
is not the same in its object as the intention described by the mens rea requirement. 
The latter intention has as its object complex act descriptions like ‘killing’, ‘disfiguring’ 
or ‘recording a confidential communication’; it does not have basic act descriptions 
like ‘moving my fingers’ as its object. We should thus describe the difference between 
the mental states prohibited by the actus reus requirement and the mental states 
prohibited by the mens rea requirement as at least a difference in the objects of the 
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respective mental states: bodily-movement descriptions are the objects of mental-
states part of the actus reus requirement, whereas complex act descriptions are the 
objects of the mental-states of the mens rea requirement.466 
 
Moore is critical of the separation, employed within our preferred version of element 
analysis because he perceives a difference between the fault relating to basic actionp (bodily 
movement) and the fault relating to complex actionp (full offence). However, such a simple 
division is not reflected in any version of element analysis, even the one Moore himself is 
advocating. Moore provides examples of complex actione descriptions including ‘killing’, 
‘disfiguring’ and ‘recording a confidential communication’ in order to distinguish the specific 
fault requirements of the act element. But even when applying the mens rea requirements 
of the circumstance and result elements, such generally worded fault would be insufficient: 
as with the act element, we must look within the complex description in order to answer 
specific questions. For example, if D performed an intentional killing, we would separate the 
elements of the mens rea of murder in the following manner: 
 
 Act element: Did D intend the movements that caused the death? 
 Circumstance element: Did D know he or she was killing a person as opposed to 
another animal? 
 Result element: Did D intend to cause death? 
 
Each of these questions, including the one relating to the act element, is aided by the 
complex description of D’s mens rea: intentional killing. However, specific answers are 
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needed to each of these questions in order to satisfy the mens rea requirements of murder. 
This is not a single separation between the act element on the one hand and the other 
elements on the other hand, but a separation of each of the three elements. Thus, the fact 
that the mens rea of the act element is asking a question that is unique from the other 
elements is no more of a distinguishing factor than the unique questions asked by either of 
the other elements.467  
 
In this manner, although Moore’s version of element analysis would not separate the actus 
reus and mens rea requirements of the act element, because Moore does not provide a 
compelling reason why such a separation should not take place, it does not undermine our 
analytical choice to do so. Further, although the separation is unlikely to gain Moore’s 
support,468 it is not incompatible with his theory. As Moore briefly reflects before moving on 
to criticise the division:  
 
[The] supposed mens rea requirement [for the act element] is just another way of 
stating the voluntary act requirement. Intentionally in [this] sense is a criterion of 
action itself, as Donald Davidson and, more recently, Jenifer Hornsby have shown.469  
 
Although we are not defining the act element as just another way of stating the voluntary 
acte/p requirement, it is nevertheless important that it should not be contradictory to this 
approach. Thus, it is open for Moore et al to maintain that D has not actedp unless he or she 
satisfies both the actus reus and the mens rea of the act element. However, within the 
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criminal law and the application of element analysis, we are still free to make the 
distinction.   
 
Equally concerning to those theorists who reject the distinction are those who would 
separate the actus reus and mens rea of the act element, but would do so in a different 
manner from that discussed. Corrado, for example, contends that although we should 
distinguish the mens rea of the act element (intention to move one’s body), from the actus 
reus of the act element, the actus reus should still be defined to contain a non-physical 
dimension: voluntariness. For D to satisfy the actus reus of the act element, D must have 
moved his or her body with ‘the ability to choose to do otherwise’.470 However, both 
Corrado’s support for a voluntariness requirement, and his choice to classify it as part of the 
actus reus, do not stand up to scrutiny.   
 
Having concluded that it is useful to separate the mens rea and the actus reus of the act 
element, there is a burden on Corrado to explain why this separation is not done 
straightforwardly between the physical and mental aspects: why this element should be 
inconsistent with the circumstance and result elements.471 Corrado’s response is 
unsatisfactory. In order to support the inclusion of a voluntariness requirement at all, 
Corrado provides an unconvincing ‘movie scenario’472 in which D is programmed to kill and 
does so intentionally but without the voluntary ability to choose otherwise. He also 
discusses, more realistically (but also more controversially), the possibility that drug and 
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gambling addicts may also lack the free choice of whether to commit certain crimes, 
although, again, they would certainly be acting intentionally.473 However, despite the 
provision of some interesting points in relation the debate about voluntariness within the 
act element, Corrado does not provide an adequate reason for why (if it is included) it 
should not be included within the mens rea of the act element. After all, when concluding 
that volitions or intention should not form part of the actus reus of the act element, Corrado 
states that: 
 
We could understand [the actus reus] as a strong requirement, so that it includes 
volitional action. It is significant, however, that we need not, and that by doing so we 
duplicate a condition already secured by mens rea. What I draw from that is that there 
is no separate requirement of a volitional act.474   
 
Employing this line of reasoning, surely it is open to us to retain our current method of 
separation (maintaining consistency with the other elements and greater simplicity), and yet 
avoid contradiction with Corrado’s preference for a voluntariness requirement.475 If a 
voluntariness requirement is found desirable, then, in line with other mental aspects of the 
act element (intention or volition), it should form part of the mens rea. After all, if we did 
wish to excuse the criminal conduct of a drug addict on the basis of the voluntariness 
requirement for example, it is surely more accurate to do so on the basis that D lacked fault 
for his or her actionse/p, rather than claiming that D did not acte at all.     
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Therefore, although the separation of the actus reus and the mens rea of the act element 
remains a controversial choice, it does not seem to attract sufficient criticism to undermine 
our use of it. Indeed, the separation is not uncommon among criminal theorists. For 
example, both Ashworth and Hornsby have, on separate occasions, commented upon the 
analytical benefits.476 Even Duff has followed a similar line: 
 
In paradigm cases of action there is no separation between the subjective [mens rea] 
and objective [bodily movement] (although they can be distinguished for analytical 
purposes).477 
 
It is therefore important to remember that, although care has been taken not to contradict 
the reasoned analysis of action theorists, neither element analysis nor the act element is 
attempting to provide a theory of actionp. Rather, we are attempting to define the building 
blocks with which the criminal law has been constructed: a process which, as we will discuss 
further in the chapters within Part III, is aided by the uniform separation of actus reus and 
mens rea for each of the elements of an offence.    
 
THE ROLE OF THE ACT ELEMENT IN DISTINGUISHING CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
RESULTS 
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The act element has been the focus of the chapters in this Part, and the focus of debate 
generally concerning element analysis, partly because it claims to provide the objective 
basis upon which each of the other elements can be identified.478 Therefore, before we are 
able to fully endorse it, we must now explore whether the preferred definition of the act 
element is capable of performing this role.     
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the acte necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the acte necessary for the offence. 
 
The most common way of attempting to undermine the role of the act element and the 
objective separation of elements, as we have explored, is to claim that actione cannot be 
defined narrowly to include only bodily movement or a lack of bodily movement: if an acte 
includes more, then it begins to overlap (indeterminately) with the other elements. 
However, although this is the most common route, there has also been criticism claiming 
that even if the act element can be defined in this way, it will not facilitate a clear 
demarcation between circumstances and results. It is this second line of criticism that will 
be explored in this section. 
 
Duff exposes the perceived inability of the act element (defined in relation to bodily 
movement) to aid the separation of circumstances and results, not in order to demonstrate 
that his definition of actione is capable of facilitating such a separation, but to contend that 
such an inability means that element analysis must be rejected. We have already discussed 
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variously the importance of the ability to distinguish circumstances and results, especially in 
relation to the inchoate offences, in order to allow different fault standards to be applied to 
different elements of an offence. Reflecting upon this, Duff states: 
 
The real problem in the case of ‘reckless attempts’, for instance, concerns not the 
identity of the ‘act’, but the distinction between circumstances and *results+: a 
distinction which this account [of actione] does not help us to draw.
479   
 
Focusing discussion on the real problem, Duff questions the ability of any version of element 
analysis accurately and objectively to isolate the result element of an offence. For example, 
for the offence of ‘abduction of an unmarried girl under the age sixteen from her parent or 
guardian’,480 is the result of D’s actione ‘simply that “something is taken” ... or is it that ... “a 
girl (or an unmarried girl) is taken”; or “an unmarried girl is taken out of the possession of a 
parent”; or what?’481 Likewise for the offence of rape, is the result element (if there is 
one482) to be identified as ‘“non-consensual sexual intercourse”, or simply “sexual 
intercourse”?’483 For homicide, ‘“death”, or “human death”?’484 Such questions are not 
pivotal to these offences in their substantive forms. However, if such offences become the 
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focus of an inchoate offence drafted to require different fault standards for each 
element,485 they become absolutely essential.        
 
On one level, of course, if we apply the preferred version of element analysis and its 
definition of the result element consistently,486 the answer to each of these questions 
should be relatively clear and objectively discoverable. To identify the result element of an 
offence, we simply ask what part of the offence definition must be caused by D’s acte in 
order for D to be liable for the offence. If part of the offence must be present, but it does 
not have to be changed or caused by D’s acte, then it should be identified as part of the 
circumstance element. Thus, for the abduction offence, the only part of the offence 
definition that must be caused by D’s acte, buried within the term abduction, is what Duff 
calls the ‘taking’.487 For rape, it is the penetration. For murder, it is the death. However, for 
each of these examples, such a minimal interpretation of the result element appears 
problematic. How can D intend to take or penetrate or cause death in isolation? Surely for 
the result element to intelligible, employing the abduction offence for example, D must 
intend that what he or she is taking is a girl, or at least that it is a person.    
 
The unintuitive nature of the minimally defined result element has therefore, in several 
cases, led the proponents of element analysis to look for an alternative way of defining 
results. This essentially involves bolstering the result element with a minimum content from 
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the circumstance element, either in the absence of a formal test488 or, more ambitiously, 
through one.  
 
Williams, for example, has suggested a test in which the circumstances of an offence that 
are ‘customarily’489 regarded as part of the act element, should now (due to a narrow 
interpretation of actione) be reclassified as part of the result element.
490 For example, for 
the offence of ‘assaulting a constable in the execution of his duty’, D’s act element may 
(customarily) be identified as assaulting a policeman. However, if the act element is defined 
strictly to include only bodily movement, it will exclude the fact that V is a policeman. Such a 
fact would usually be regarded as a circumstance. However, as it also formed part of the 
customary acte/p description, under William’s test, it will now form part of the result 
element.491     
 
Another proponent of element analysis to have extended the result element beyond the 
preferred definition is Moore. For Moore, the preferred definition should be supplemented 
by a moral criterion.   
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We need to ask of each act-type prohibited by a criminal code what, if anything 
(beyond the [preferred definition]), must motivate an actor to render that actor most 
culpable in his doing of the overall act prohibited by the statute. It is this moral 
criterion that allows us to include ‘person’ in the event-type ‘death of a person’ as a 
[result] element.492 
 
Therefore, a court will have to decide in relation to each case which parts of the 
circumstance element are morally essential to the result element and adjust the formal 
separation of elements appropriately.    
 
The problem for both Williams and Moore, however, is that neither approach is successful 
in extending the result element without also conceding the ability to separate elements 
objectively. Although Williams could not see ‘any possibility of the circumstance-[result] 
distinction involving difficulty’493 under his suggested rule, it was rightly rejected by Moore 
as insufficiently precise because it is unable to state consistently which aspects of an offence 
are customarily regarded as part of the act element.494 Since the narrow definition of actione 
is designed to avoid reliance on the subjective nature of actp descriptions, it would be highly 
unsatisfactory if we returned to such a concept when undertaking the similarly important 
task of isolating results. Equally, with Moore’s moral criterion, we have the same problem. If 
moral weighting influences the separation of elements, and judges as subjective actors 
disagree about the moral weighting of certain aspects of an offence, so they will separate 
elements inconsistently. Employing the offence of rape for example, even if we concede 
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Moore’s point that the fact V is a human should be included within the result element, the 
extent to which the sex of V matters will be much more controversial.495 With such 
controversy inevitably leading to inconsistency.     
 
It may also be questioned what benefits to the criminal law are offered by an extended 
definition of the result element. Moore is concerned that certain circumstantial aspects of 
an offence should require D’s intention.496 For example, that what is intentionally killed is a 
human for murder, or what is intentionally abducted is a female person for the abduction 
offence discussed above. However, this does not require circumstances to be reclassified as 
part of the result element; it simply requires those specific circumstances to require a fault 
of intention. Indeed, even within the more general complaint that the preferred definition 
of the result element seems unintuitively narrow, we must remember that we are dealing 
with an analytical separation designed for the purposes of the criminal law. For example, 
although the result element of murder is identified narrowly as death, that does not 
undermine the requirements of the full offence that (en masse) require the death to be the 
death of a person caused by D etc. As long as it makes sense to say D intended to cause 
death, to focus questions of mens rea on each element separately as well as collectively, 
then the separation is tenable.  
 
As Smith has commented, although it is often tempting to keep adding to an element of the 
offence to make it appear more concrete as a separate entity, to do so will undermine the 
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objective separation of elements and thus element analysis as a whole.497 A narrow 
definition may seem unintuitive at times, but as long as we can apply fault to it, and as long 
as the offence takes shape when each of its elements are combined, then such a definition 
is acceptable within the criminal law. On this basis, we are able to maintain the preferred 




The definition of the act element is objectively discoverable within every criminal offence 
and is also capable of facilitating the objective distinction between circumstances and 
results. It is therefore capable of rebutting the philosophical criticism that has been used in 
an attempt to undermine it specifically and element analysis more generally. Importantly in 
relation to the first half of this chapter, it is also able to facilitate this separation without 
conceding (or threatening) the more general separation of actus reus and mens rea.   
 
  
                                                          
497




THE UNINTUITIVE NATURE OF BODILY MOVEMENT   
 
Unlike within chapters 4 to 6, the criticisms of element analysis that will be explored in this 
chapter do not claim that the preferred definition of the act element is untenable. Rather, 
they maintain that despite the potential for element analysis to operate objectively, due to 
the unintuitive nature of that operation, an alternative approach should be found.  
 
Although it is important to canvass these arguments, we will not examine them to the same 
degree as we have the criticisms in the previous chapters of this Part. This is because, as 
Moore correctly states: 
 
It is quite open to the moral or legal theorist to propose such a hidden 
systematisation, even if the concepts and principles employed in doing so are quite 
alien to ordinary ways of thinking and speaking.498    
 
In the same manner that we now realise that ordinary statements about the morning and 
evening star (pre-Babylonian astronomy) were incorrect,499 so ordinary language should not 
undermine the preferred version of element analysis unless it is supported by evidence of 
substantive problems within its operation.  
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THE ACT AND RESULT ELEMENTS ARE TOO NARROW 
 
In the preceding chapters of Part II we have already examined criticisms of the preferred 
version of element analysis based upon the contention that the act and result elements are 
defined too narrowly. However, in each case, the focus of these criticisms was the viability 
of element analysis: claiming either that such a narrow definition was philosophically 
unacceptable,500 or that the definitions were too narrow to apply questions about mens rea. 
As a result, our discussion and rebuttal of those criticisms also focused on the question of 
viability. However, even if those rebuttals are accepted, the same criticisms can be recycled 
in this section. Although they may not undermine the viability of element analysis as an 
objective tool of for structuring discussion and reform, they may cast doubt on its general 
appeal. 
 
The act element  
 
The central criticism of the act element in this area is that, by defining actione in terms of 
bodily movement, we are removing the necessary detail from D’s offence. In order to 
explain the criticism, Duff uses the analogy of painting. He states that although it may be 
possible to define painting, like actionp, in terms of the bodily movements required, such a 
course should be resisted. 
 
                                                          
500




[An account of bodily movements] would not, however, be an account of what 
paintings are as artistic products, which is what we are talking about when we talk 
about paintings; and not all paint marks, nor even all deliberately made paint marks, 
are paintings.501  
 
Thus, although our definition of actione might perform its role within element analysis, it 
should be rejected because the cost of objectivity has been the essence of the original 
target itself: our objective definition of actione is no longer reflective of actionp.
502  
 
However, Duff’s logic does not appear to hold. First, we are not concerned that the 
preferred definition of actione does not reflect a single philosophy of actionp. To reflect a 
single theory, as discussed above in chapter 4,503 is to lead to unacceptable vulnerability 
within element analysis. It is therefore enough that the preferred definition does not 
contradict any one theory of actionp. Secondly, reflecting Moore’s defence to a similar 
criticism, the act element does not claim to provide a full account of actionp or a criminal 
offence, any more than bodily movements claim to provide a full account of painting. As 
long as the act element performs its specific tasks adequately,504 and the amalgam of each 
element is able to describe the full offence,505 then the narrowness of the act element is 
perfectly acceptable. Thus, although our definition of actione might be unintuitivly narrow 
according to Duff’s theory of actionp, because we are only concerned with the criminal law, 
the criticism appears to be undermined.       
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For Duff, however, the unintuitive nature of the preferred definition of the act element (as it 
relates to actionp) is capable of undermining its use within the criminal law. This is because, 
although it may be possible to interpret the act element consistently and objectively, 
commentators and courts have consistently lent back upon ordinary usage when discussing 
actse/p even within a criminal law context.  
 
Duff first draws attention to inconsistency within the advocates of element analysis. In each 
case, having stated that the act element should be defined narrowly to include only bodily 
movement, they then make reference to act elements including the ‘possession of stolen 
goods’, ‘bringing goods into the country without paying duty’, ‘the simple act of speaking’ 
and ‘driving’,506 each of which goes well beyond bodily movement. The argument here is 
that, if the proponents of element analysis cannot even interpret the act element 
consistently, then it is not capable of providing an objective structure for analysis and 
reform within the criminal law. However, such criticism may well be overstated. First, it is 
important to establish that an occasional loose example does not undermine a valid theory, 
especially one that is still relatively novel within academic discussion: it simply demonstrates 
that we must be more careful not to fall into the same trap. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the specific examples highlighted by Duff have resulted from a very narrow and 
unforgiving reading on his part. Thus, in each case, he is able to demonstrate loose 
expression, but he does not demonstrate a single example where that loose expression has 
affected the reasoning and the conclusion of an author when discussing a particular 
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example. Unless the occasional slip can be demonstrated to have affected the reasoning of a 
certain case, then it cannot cause injustice and the criticism becomes very weak.  
 
Where Duff has attempted to demonstrate the potential for injustice is through the 
inconsistent application of the act element within the courts. As Duff highlights, the practice 
of the courts generally is not to look for the existence of bodily movements first and then to 
construct liability upon this basis, but to look for the complex act description relevant for 
each offence. For example, 
 
In asking whether a defendant whose gun went off and killed the attendant of a petrol 
station he was robbing could be convicted of murder ... the court looked, not for a 
voluntary bodily movement, but at acts such as ‘discharging ... a loaded firearm’, or 
‘press*ing+ the trigger of a loaded and cocked rifle.507     
 
However, again, Duff’s conclusion that such an approach undermines the future use of 
element analysis is unconvincing. First, as we discussed in chapter 3,508 the use of element 
analysis in the status quo is far from universal, both in general (different offences) and 
specific (within individual offences) terms. Therefore, even if Duff is able to demonstrate 
inconsistency within the courts, this does not preclude the possibility of element analysis 
and the preferred definition of the act element establishing themselves in the future.509 
Secondly, the examples Duff provides to demonstrate that the courts do not discuss bodily 
movement all involve factual scenarios in which it is quite clear that D has performed an 
                                                          
507
 Duff, Criminal Attempts 251.  
508
 See pp52-72. 
509
 Indeed, a likely explanation for judicial problems in this area is the lack of clear guidance.  
185 
 
intentional bodily movement. Indeed, Duff readily concedes that where there is some doubt 
over whether D’s conduct was intentional, the courts language will often change to discuss 
bodily movement.510 Thus, although Duff chooses to interpret the language of the court to 
indicate that bodily movement is not consistently relevant, there is an alternative 
interpretation that although intentional bodily movement is always relevant, courts will not 
generally discuss it unless it emerges as a point of contention. In either case, bearing in mind 
the current uncertainty about the status of element analysis discussed in chapter 3, the 
criticism does not appear to be sufficient to create serious problems for our preferred 
analysis.    
 
The result element 
 
Although we concluded that a narrow interpretation of the act element was required for the 
objective functioning of element analysis, there is a level of controversy created about how 
this affects the makeup of the result element. For example, the offence of rape511 is often 
employed as a paradigm example of an offence that does not include a result element, the 
actus reus being separated in the following manner:512 
 
 Act element: Penal penetration of the vagina, anus or mouth. 
 Circumstance element: The absence of consent. 
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However, if the act element is defined narrowly to include only bodily movement and the 
result element is identified as anything caused by that movement that is relevant to the 
offence, then the actus reus breakdown changes to include a result element. This is because 
D’s body does not do a penetration, but rather, its movement causes penetration to occur. 
 
 Act element: The requisite bodily movements. 
 Circumstance element: The fact that what was penetrated constitutes the vagina, 
anus or mouth of V. And the absence of consent.  
 Result element: Penetration.   
 
For theorists like Moore that interpret the act element narrowly to include only bodily 
movement, this interpretation is fully acceptable.513 However, it is likely to seem unintuitive 
to many other commentators.514 This again may be seen as a stumbling block for the general 
acceptance of element analysis, but one that cannot be avoided in order to maintain the 
objectivity of the elements. 
 
THE CIRCUMSTANCE ELEMENT IS TOO WIDE 
 
Due to the narrow interpretations of the act and result elements, the circumstance element 
may appear unintuitivly wide. This is because the circumstance element will not simply 
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include facts surrounding D’s actione (including issues of consent and the validity of relevant 
licences for example), but will also include the facts surrounding the result element as well 
(including the part of V’s body that D may have struck or damaged for example).515 The 
concern here, as discussed in chapter 1,516 is that certain commentators have attempted to 
make these divisions within the circumstance element formal ones without identifying an 
objective means of separating them.517 However, as such a separation does not appear to 
provide any tangible benefits to the criminal law, a sufficient response is simply to reject it.   
 
ELEMENT ANALYSIS SUBVERTS THE WILL OF PARLIAMENT 
 
The final consideration in this area is that, due to the supposedly unintuitive nature of our 
preferred version of element analysis, it has the potential to subvert the expressed will of 
Parliament. Although we discussed the democratic advantages of element analysis in 
chapter 2,518 allowing Parliament to reclaim from the courts the focus to legislate on the 
intricacies of the criminal law, it is important to remember that existing offences have not 
been created with element analysis (let alone our preferred version of element analysis) in 
mind. Therefore, if the preferred version of element analysis is used to apply inchoate 
offences such a assisting and encouraging crime,519 where the manner in which elements 
are separated has a material effect upon the mens rea requirements of D, we may be 
                                                          
515
 For discussion see Moore, Act and Crime 196-198.  
516
 See pp15-16. 
517
 See Smith, ‘Two problems in criminal attempts’ (1956) 70 Harvard Law Review, 422. 
518
 See pp23-26. 
519
 The Serious Crime Act 2007, Part 2.  
188 
 
producing consequences that were not expected by the legislature and possibly not 
desired.520  
 
This potential weakness of our version of element analysis operates on two distinct levels. 
The first relates to the use of element analysis as all. If an offence was not conceived and 
drafted with element analysis in mind, then however objective its separation is, that 
separation will not necessarily have been pre-empted by Parliament and it may operate in a 
manner they would not approve. The second area of weakness relates to our choice to 
adapt the current version of element analysis that has been advocated by the Law 
Commission. The Law Commission’s recommendations in relation to the reform of inchoate 
liability, and Parliaments’ construction of the Serious Crime Act, both reflect the Law 
Commissions version of element analysis. Therefore, any change to the method of 
separation at this point will affect the way that legislation operates in practice: potentially in 
a manner that is deemed unacceptable. 
 
Offences drafted without element analysis in mind 
 
One potential resolution to this problem is to adopt the stance taken within the US Model 
Penal Code: 
 
§2.02(4): Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements. When 
law defining an offence prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the 
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commission of an offence, without distinguishing among the material elements 
thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offence, unless 
the contrary purpose plainly appears. 
 
The result of this provision is that if the offence appears to resist separation, then offence 
analysis (as opposed to element analysis) should be employed. Thus, the will of Parliament 
is thought to be protected. Although the adoption of such an approach has found some 
notable support in this jurisdiction however, both from academics521 and even within the 
1989 Draft Criminal Code,522 it entails several problems. The most important of these is 
simply the uncertainty of the court’s approach: whereas one court might decide that an 
offence is capable of separation, another court might come to the opposite conclusion. 
Where the substance of the offence is dependent upon this decision, as it could be when 
applying inchoate offences, such uncertainty is unacceptable.523 Further, the support this 
approach has gained has been partly based upon the absence of an objective method of 
separating elements within element analysis. With this now in place, we are not balancing 
one type of uncertainty against another. Rather, we are balancing uncertainty verses 
objectivity. We must surely favour the latter. 
 
The criticism that element analysis subverts the will of Parliament is also often overstated. 
This is because, although certain inchoate offences employ element analysis to require a 
particular mens rea in relation to certain elements of the principal offence, these 
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prescriptive requirements (currently) only apply to the act and result elements.524 
Therefore, as both of these elements are defined narrowly under our preferred definition of 
element analysis, and the mens rea of the circumstance element is allowed to reflect that of 
the principal offence, any subversion is kept to a minimum. Indeed, even where the 
preferred definition gives rise to an unexpected result element,525 this will almost always 
have come from what might (under an alternative model) have been labelled the act 
element rather than the circumstance element. Beyond this, although there may be cases in 
which our version of element analysis leads to unexpected consequences, at least it is being 
done in an open way which allows Parliament to take remedial action as necessary: by, for 
example, redrafting the principal offence. Under the status quo, as we discussed in chapter 
3 in relation to the case of Khan,526 we have a situation in which element analysis is 
employed haphazardly, and when it is applied, it is not applied in an objective manner. 
Therefore, Parliament has no control over its operation.      
 
The criticism clearly has the ability to detract from the democratic ideals of element 
analysis. However, it is doubted that it does so to a sufficient extent to undermine its use. 
What it does is raise the question about whether element analysis can be introduced 
without some form of criminal code. Within a criminal code, the introduction of element 
analysis would be buttressed by its democratic source and so any unexpected 
consequences, relating to offences drafted without the new structure in mind, could be 
seen in that light. The very important issue of how the preferred version of element analysis 
might be introduced into the criminal law will be discussed in chapter 14.     
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Adapting the Law Commission’s version of element analysis 
 
One of the central criticisms of the new offences of assisting and encouraging crime, as 
defined within the Serious Crime Act, is that the offence definitions initially spread the net 
of criminality too widely; relying on specific defences to avoid over-criminalisation.527 With 
this in mind, a narrowing of the act element, the only element within these offences that 
consistently requires a mens rea of intention or belief, will only go further to exacerbate this 
issue. As aspects of what the Law Commission would have defined as the act element move 
to become part of the circumstance element for example, so the fault attached to them may 
be reduced to as low as subjective recklessness.528    
 
Unfortunately, although this an issue with which we may partially sympathise, it is a 
problem that is easy to exaggerate. First, the same wide ranging defences that are 
surrounding the current offences will continue to operate such, for example, that D will not 
be convicted of assisting or encouraging an offence if his or her behaviour could be 
considered reasonable in all the circumstance.529 Secondly, through the replacement of a 
subjective method of separation with one that operates objectively, Parliament will be in a 
vastly superior position to amend either the inchoate offences or specific offences in order 
to achieve the desired policy.  
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Despite the varying impacts of the criticisms outlined above, the preferred definition of the 
act element remains intact. It is with hope and expectation, of course, that as the definitions 
of the various elements become more settled over time (ideally in line with those advocated 





CONSTRUCTING A USABLE MODEL OF ELEMENT 
ANALYSIS 
 
Within Part II we identified and evaluated an objective definition of the actus reus of the act 
element.  
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 
The identification of an act element will be necessary for every offence. However, although 
this is a minimal requirement, Duff counters that: 
 
... this minimalist interpretation of the ‘act requirement’ will go through only if the 
interpretation itself embodies a tenable definition of an ‘act’; only if the philosophical 
account of ‘basic actions’ as bodily movements on which it relies is itself tenable.530   
 
Duff’s objection here is the central fallacy that Part II has attempted to expose and reject. 
Duff is correct that the definition of the act element must arise from something, it cannot 
simply be plucked from the air, but this does not require it to be tied to a single theory of 
actionp. We have presented the preferred definition of the act element as the basis, not for 
agency in general, but for criminal agency. Isolating the requirements of the criminal law, 
we have been able to justify our preferred definition on the grounds that bodily movement 
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is the most causally basic thing that can be done intentionally. Such a definition and a basis 
allows the act element to perform its role effectively within the criminal law, to provide the 
nexus between D and the criminal event and to provide a basis for the objective 
identification of circumstances and results, and yet the act element also remains neutral 
within the wider theories of actionp. 
 
We have not heralded the preferred definition of the act element as the magic formula 
presented as the (overambitious) goal at the end of chapter 2. Particularly when discussing 
some of the more unintuitive areas within the definitions, the task of objective separation is 
not an easy one.  
 
However, having presented an objective method of separating the elements of an offence, 
we are able to move into the next stage of the thesis. Within Part III, moving beyond issues 
of objectivity, we will now explore the second major criticism of element analysis first 
identified in chapter 2: simplicity and usability.  
 
This second criticism makes a less tangible claim than the first, but a claim that is equally 
damaging to both of the potential benefits of element analysis. The criticism here is that, 
whether or not element analysis can achieve objectivity, it must still be rejected because it 
introduces unnecessary or disproportionate complexity into the criminal law. This second 
criticism is capable of undermining element analysis as a vehicle for academic discussion 
because if it is introducing unnecessary complexity, it will distract and obscure the issues 
that it is being used to explore. Further, it is also important to remember that academic 
discussion should be as accessible as possible to the professionals within the court and 
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Parliamentary systems to whom academics are often targeting their work. As Smith has 
previously reflected on this issue: 
 
The criminal law is ... supposed to have some connection with life, and to be more 
than an exercise in abstract diàlectics.531     
 
Unnecessary complexity is also capable of undermining element analysis as a structure for 
law reform because, when dealing with already very complex offences, further complexity 
can result in mistakes: mistakes within the drafting of the law, and mistakes within the court 
system.  
 
The basis of Part III is therefore that, although element analysis is capable of operating 
objectively (avoiding the first criticism), neither potential benefit of element analysis can be 
realised unless it is able to operate straightforwardly within the criminal law. We will 
therefore explore the use of element analysis within its various guises in order to discover 
first, what the most straightforward method of element analysis involves, and secondly, 
whether any complexity inherent within this process is disproportionate to the potential 
benefits that element analysis can provide. Our discussion will be divided into six areas: 
choate offences, bespoke inchoate offences, general inchoate offences, ulterior 
clarifications, secondary liability and defences. 
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SEPARATING THE ELEMENTS OF CHOATE OFFENCES 
 
Separating the elements of a choate offence should involve the most straightforward 
application of element analysis. Unlike inchoate offences, where D’s mens rea extends 
beyond his or her conduct,532 choate offences require nothing beyond the fault and conduct 
requirements of D’s act, circumstance and result. Despite this however, traditionally at 
least, this form of the complexity criticism has tended to dominate the debate. 
 
It is important not to be misled however. Although several commentators have focused on 
complexity in relation to the use of element analysis in this area, much of that criticism 
amounts to a repetition of the subjectivity criticism explored in the chapters within Part II. 
For example, when the Law Commission rejected the use of element analysis in 1980 for 
being ‘unduly complex’533, they did so because in the absence of an objective method for 
separating and identifying the elements of an offence, it would be very difficult to apply 
element analysis to all but a few paradigm offences.534    
 
It is therefore hoped that the work of the previous chapters, the identification and defence 
of an objective method of element analysis, can be employed again in order to answer this 
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part of the complexity criticism. The preferred method can be set out in the following 
manner: 
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
 
Simply stating the preferred method, however, is insufficient for present purposes. This is 
because, although we have explored the objectivity of the method, we have not gone far 
enough beyond this in order to ascertain how effectively it is able to work in practice. 
Therefore, although we may have already undermined part of the complexity criticism pre-
emptively, it remains necessary to set out a step-by-step guide to the method’s application; 
it remains necessary to question whether this method also introduces undue complexity. 
 
HOW SEPARATION WORKS IN PRACTICE 
 
We will now analyse the process behind the separation of elements. In order to do so, it is 
useful to employ the example of criminal damage535 discussed in previous chapters. Having 
set out the process, we will then move on to apply the same method to some of the 
offences that have been highlighted by critics of element analysis as being particularly 
problematic. 
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Example 1: D intentionally throws a stone at V’s window. The stone breaks the 
window. 
 
The act element   
 
As the in-depth analysis within the chapters in Part II demonstrate, the task of identifying 
the act element of an offence has become interwoven with a highly complex philosophical 
debate. Indeed, it has partly been the concern to avoid (at least outwardly) the rigours of 
this debate that has led to the act element remaining undefined, even within several 
jurisdictions that have formally employed element analysis.536 However, having 
demonstrated in the chapters within Part II that the definition of the actus reus of the act 
element is able to avoid reliance upon this philosophical debate, our preferred definition is 
effectively liberated from its detail.537  
 
 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 
As a result, the act required of D in example 1 becomes relatively straightforward to 
identify: the bodily movement targeted by the offence is that performed by D when 
throwing the stone. 
 
Example 1 Act Element 
                                                          
536
 See the discussion that led the Australian Model Penal Code to omit their definition of an ‘act’ from the 
final Code draft. Australian Model Criminal Code (commentary) s202. See also, Chapter 4, pp88-89.    
537
 For the problems experienced by lawyers and judges without this manner of liberation, see Roberts, 
‘Publication Review - Act and Crime: the philosophy of action and its implications for criminal law’ (1994) 
Criminal Law Review, 393, 394.  
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Actus Reus The movement of D’s arm 
Mens Rea Intention 
 
These are the first two conditions of D’s liability for criminal damage. A court must ascertain 
first, whether D did move his or her body (in this case arm) in the manner required to cause 
damage to V’s property, and secondly, whether this movement was intentional. 
 
Although the exact requirements of the actus reus of the act element will vary greatly 
between offences, they can be broadly divided into two categories. The first category of 
offences, typified by criminal damage and traditionally referred to as ‘result crimes’,538 
target any movement or omission by D that has caused the particular criminal result. Thus, 
although in example 1 we are focusing on the movement of D’s arm, had D caused the 
damage to V’s property in a manner other than through the throwing of a stone, then the 
requirements of the act element would have to be recast to focus on that movement or 
omission. By contrast, the second category of offences, traditionally referred to as ‘conduct 
crimes’,539 will tend to be more precise in their identification of the movement required for 
the offence.540 For example, the actus reus of rape specifies the penile penetration of the 
vagina, anus or mouth.541 Therefore, the actus reus of the act element cannot simply be any 
act or omission that caused the penetration, but rather, any movement or omission of the 
                                                          
538
 See, Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 46.   
539
 See, Ibid, 46 and 47.  
540
 This is because, for conduct crimes, the focus of the offence (D’s culpability) tends to be on D’s conduct 
rather than the result of that conduct. For discussion, see, Williams, ‘The problem of reckless attempts’ (1983) 
Criminal Law Review, 365, 366-368.  
However, if the version of element analysis preferred within this thesis is accepted, this line of reasoning may 
no longer apply: with the act element reduced to simple bodily movement, much more of the offence will be 
effectively shifted to the result element.    
541
 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s1.  
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penis that caused the penetration. This relatively simple observation represents the only 
area of complication within the identification of the act element.      
 
Before we move on, however, it is necessary to explain our division of the act element into 
actus reus and mens rea. As we discussed in chapter 6,542 although the separate 
examination of actus reus and mens rea is standard to the analysis of circumstances and 
results, the act element is not commonly divided in this manner by the proponents of 
element analysis. In fact, the majority of commentators maintain that the act element 
resists such a division and can only be understood as an amalgam of the two.543 However, 
we concluded in chapter 6 that not only is such a separation theoretically acceptable, but 
that there may also be several practical benefits.544   
 
The practical benefits gained from discussing actus reus and mens rea separately in relation 
to the act element will be highlighted in various chapters within Part III. In particular, it is a 
division that aids the analysis of inchoate offences.545 However, even when dealing solely 
with choate offences like criminal damage, it is still possible to discern a number of 
advantages.  
 
Chiefly, these advantages relate to the importance of consistency. First, if it is accepted later 
that the division of the act element is necessary in order to make sense of inchoate liability, 
it is obviously preferable that the act element should always be analysed in the same way 
                                                          
542
 See pp166-172. 
543
 See, for example, Moore, Placing Blame: A general theory of the criminal law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 315-
318.  
544
 See pp166-172. 
545
 See Chapter 10. 
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(consistency between inchoate and choate offences). It would certainly be undesirable to 
vary the analytical structuring used to examine the same choate offence depending upon 
whether it is the principal offence within an inchoate charge, or whether it is charged alone 
as a full offence.546  
 
Secondly, there are also benefits to having the act element treated in the same way as the 
circumstance and result elements (consistency between elements). Without such 
consistency, even our most basic building blocks of actus reus and mens rea begin to look 
under threat and commentators are forced to defend ever more complex positions.  A 
useful example of this can be seen in a recent debate between Michael Moore and Jeremy 
Hall. Hall, highlighting the fusion of conduct and fault within the act element, has claimed 
that the distinction between actus reus and mens rea more generally is unsustainable: how 
can the actus reus of the act element include an element of fault that, ‘by definition, must 
be excluded’?547 Moore, defending the inconsistency, has attempted to distinguish the act 
element from the rest of an offence on the basis of its unique focus on bodily movement 
alone. 
 
We should thus describe the difference between the mental states prohibited by the 
actus reus requirement and the mental states prohibited by the mens rea requirement 
as at least a difference in the objects of the respective mental states: bodily-
movement descriptions are the objects of the mental-states part of the actus reus 
                                                          
546
 It is accepted, of course, that the strength of this first point is entirely dependent upon the contention that 
this division is necessary in order to effectively analyse inchoate offences.   
547
 Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law (Cavendish, 2005) 227.  
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requirement, whereas complex act descriptions are the objects of the mental states of 
the mens rea requirement.548  
 
Moore’s position in this extract is not objectively false as a possible structure for the 
understanding of fault requirements. However, by forcing commentators to distinguish 
between species of fault that attach either to the actus reus or the mens rea, it is both 
subtle and highly complex. Beyond this, it may also be unnecessarily complex. We may be 
sympathetic to Moore in his attempt to defend the useful analytical separation of the actus 
reus and mens rea from Hall. Moore’s method of doing so however, the defence of 
inconsistency and the creation of complex new distinctions in fault, does not warrant a 
similar response. He justifies the inconsistency on the basis that the act element is unique in 
its focus on bodily movement. However, the circumstance element and the result element, 
with their own distinct focuses, are unique in exactly the same way.549 Therefore, if it is 
acceptable to separate the actus reus and the mens rea aspects of these elements, even 
when the language of the offence in question may appear to resist such a separation, surely 
it is equally acceptable to separate (at least analytically) the actus reus and the mens rea of 
the act element as well.  
 
If Moore’s position was the only one available to maintain the general actus reus/mens rea 
distinction, then we would have to balance its added complexity against the harm that 
would be caused by conceding the distinction altogether. However, if we do not have to 
merge conduct and fault considerations within an analysis of the act element, and if by not 
                                                          
548
 Moore, Act and Crime: The philosophy of action and its implications for criminal law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1993) 173. 
549
 See discussion of fault terms in Chapter 11.  
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merging we can avoid blurring the general distinction between actus reus and mens rea, 
then Moore’s position becomes very unattractive. Certainly, for our preferred separation to 
be undermined, we will require evidence of substantive harm or philosophical impossibility, 
neither of which can be located.550 With this in mind, the choice within this thesis to 
separate the discussion of actus reus and mens rea of the act element appears to serve the 
legitimate interests of consistency and simplicity without any major concessions.    
 
The result element 
 
Once an objective definition of the act element has been established, the circumstance and 
result elements become relatively straightforward to identify and individuate. This is 
because, as the circumstance and result elements are defined in reference to the act 
element, any subjectivity within the latter will be quickly transferred into the identification 
of each of the elements. However, having defined the act element objectively, such 
objectivity and clarity can be maintained.  
 
For the result element, we are looking to identify which parts of the offence must be 
causally linked to the act element.  
 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
 
It is important to note within this definition, that the result element does not include all 
things that are caused by D’s acte, but rather all things caused by D’s acte that are relevant 
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 See discussion in Chapter 6, pp166-172.  
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for the offence. For example, when D in example 1 throws the stone at V’s window, his or 
her bodily movements may cause the motion of the stone, the air to move around the arm 
and the movement of the stone, the damage to the window, the glass of the window to fall, 
the upset to V and his or her family et cetera ad infinitum. However, when we analyse the 
consequences of D’s acte in reference to the result element of criminal damage, the only 
relevant part to the definition of that offence is the causing of damage: this is the only part 
of the offence that D’s acte must cause.  
 
Having identified damage as the actus reus of the result element, we then question whether 
the offence requires any fault to be attached. In this case, the offence requires D to either 
intend or be reckless as to whether that damage occurs.551   
 
 
The actus reus and mens rea requirements of the result element represent the next two 
questions within our criminal damage example: did the movement of D’s arm cause 
damage, and was D at least reckless as to whether that damage would be caused?  
 
 
                                                          
551
 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1(1).  
Example 1 Act Element Result Element 
Actus Reus The movement of D’s arm Damage 
Mens Rea Intention Recklessness 
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The circumstance element 
 
Like the result element, the identification of the circumstance element also relies upon an 
objectively defined act element. Once this is achieved, as it was through the chapters in Part 
II, the circumstance element is quite straightforwardly identified as the surrounding facts 
that have not been caused by D’s acte.    
 
  Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence.552 
 
As with the result element, it is again important to note that the circumstance element only 
includes circumstances that are necessary for the offence. Thus, although at the time of D’s 
acte, it may have been true, for example, that it was raining, that D had a law degree and 
that D’s friend X was washing his car, none of these circumstances form part of the 
circumstance element of criminal damage.553 Rather, the circumstances required to make D 
liable for the offence are that the damage was caused to ‘property’ and that that property 
did not belong to D.   
 
Having identified the relevant circumstance element, however, the mens rea to be attached 
is a little more difficult. With the statutory definition of criminal damage failing to make 
clear reference to fault in this area, we must look beyond it to case law in order to fill in the 
                                                          
552
 In certain cases circumstances can also be located temporally with the result element. However, this does 
not affect our general reasoning or the construction of element analysis.  
553
 This is true even if the particular fact may have had an influence on the result element. For example, even if 
the stone would not have hit V’s window were it not for a strong wind, that wind will still not come within the 
circumstance element. It is nowhere stated in law that wind is required for the offence of criminal damage. 
Therefore, as long as D has foreseen the possibility of damage and that damage has come about (the result 
element), it is not necessary to question D’s fault in relation to the factors that brought it about. We would 
not, for example, want to require D to believe in gravity in order to be liable. Yet, if we were to be led down 
this path, it may be where we end up.    
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blank. In this vein, the leading case of Smith554 suggests that the minimum fault required 




With the addition of the circumstance element, we now have the final two questions that 
are relevant to our analysis of this kind of choate offence. For D to satisfy the circumstance 
element within example 1, we must first question whether the damaged window (capable 
of being property) belonged to D, and secondly, whether D was reckless as to whether it did 
not belong to him or her? 
 
Unlike the result element, however, the circumstance element also extends to include facts 
that will rarely be an issue within a case. In our analysis of the circumstance element of 
example 1 for example, we focused on the fact that D damaged property and that that 
property did not belong to D. However, for D to be liable for criminal damage, it is also 
necessary, for example, for D to be human, for D to be over the age of criminal 
responsibility, for D not to have permission from the owner of the window and so on. Each 
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 [1974] Q.B. 354, [1974] 1 All. E.R. 632.  
555
 [1974] 1 All. E.R. 632 at 636.  
Example 1 Act Element Circumstance element Result Element 
Actus Reus The movement 
of D’s arm 
The damage was caused to property 
(the window)  
That property did not belong to D 
Damage 
Mens Rea Intention Recklessness for both Recklessness 
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of these considerations are also facts (at the time of the acte) that are necessary for the 
offence: they are also circumstances capable of coming within the circumstance element. 
This is not to contend that all relevant circumstances should be explicitly discussed within 
every case, such a policy would be unnecessarily cumbersome and inefficient. It is important 
simply to recognise that in relation to such issues, when they become relevant to a case, 
their analysis should fall within the circumstance element.    
 
SEPARATING THE ELEMENTS OF PROBLEMATIC OFFENCES 
 
Although we have focused almost solely on the example of criminal damage above, the 
method of separation that has been employed should be able to apply with equal success to 
any criminal offence.556 This claim of universality however, universality across an ever 
increasing and varied body of offences, inevitably places the proponent of any method of 
element analysis at a disadvantage. Whereas the proponent must demonstrate that the 
method of separation is capable of applying to all offences, the critic need only find a single 
offence for which it does not work in order to prevail.557      
 
The sheer quantity of criminal offences in England and Wales558 makes a demonstration in 
each case impractical. However, in order to give our preferred method the best possible 
test, we can focus on those offences highlighted by critics as being either impossible or very 
                                                          
556
 It must be able to apply to any offence because of the use of element analysis to structure the general 
inchoate offences: offences that apply across the criminal law.   
557
 Indeed, it was the fear that the Law Commission’s method of element analysis could not apply universally 
that originally prompted them to reject the technique in 1980.  Law Commission, Attempts and Impossibility in 
Relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement (Law Com No 102, 1980) [2.12].    
558
 Estimated at over 8000 offences in total (not including by-laws): Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law 
(12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 9. 
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difficult to separate. Below, we explore examples of two such offences: causing death by 
dangerous driving559 and abduction of an unmarried girl from her parents or guardian.560 In 
each case, we will test not only whether the preferred method makes separation 
achievable, but also whether it is able to do so in a reasonably straightforward and logical 
manner.           
 
Causing death by dangerous driving 
 
A person who causes the death of another person by driving a mechanically propelled 
vehicle dangerously on a road or other public place is guilty of an offence.561 
 










                                                          
559
 Contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s1.  
560
 The Sexual Offences Act 1956, s20 (repealed by the Sexual Offences Act 2003 c42 sch7 para1). Although the 
offence was abolished in 2004, its provisions are mirrored to a large extent by the Child Abduction Act 1984, 
s1-3. 
561




There are several areas within which a driving offence such as this one might be considered 
problematic. For example, although the offence is one of strict liability, it must be 
remembered that the act element still requires D to intend his or her bodily movement. 
Beyond this, as has been highlighted by Smith and Hogan,562 there are a couple of important 
causal relationships that must not be misrepresented: between D and the dangerous 
movement of the car, and between D and the death of V. This is because, although 
movement of the car that is caused by D is relevant to the offence, movement caused by 
events like an unforeseeable break failure or a shunt from another car is not. By defining the 
act element narrowly to include only the voluntary movement of D’s body, this distinction is 
clearly secured.    
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 Smith and Hogan, Criminal law (5th Ed, Butterworths, London 1983) 39 and 40. 
Example 2 Act Element Circumstance element Result Element 
Actus Reus The 
movement of 
D’s body  
Fact of vehicle status 
Fact it is on a ‘road’ or ‘public 
place’ 
Fact that the car movement caused 
by D’s body movement is 
considered ‘dangerous’ 
Fact that it is a ‘person’ (V)  that is 
killed  
Movement (of the 
car) 
Death 
Mens Rea Intention No fault for all No fault for both 
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It should be reiterated that the requirement of dangerousness will always constitute a 
circumstances element under our preferred model of element analysis. As discussed in 
chapter 3, although the Law Commission have expressed support for discretion regarding 
the placement of these kinds of requirements,563 they have failed to demonstrate how such 
discretion will benefit the law in this area. Rather, it is contended that such discretion would 
simply amount to an added and unnecessary complicating factor.564  
 
Abduction of an unmarried girl under the age sixteen from her parent or 
guardian 
 
It is an offence for a person acting without lawful authority or excuse to take an 
unmarried girl under the age of sixteen out of the possession of her parent or guardian 
against his will. 565 
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 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009) [2.19-2.27].  
564
 See discussion in Chapter 3, pp70-72. 
565




The abduction offence, set out in by example 3, has already been discussed at several points 
in the previous chapters. This is because the offence has assumed a central role within the 
criticism of element analysis, with even proponents of the method disagreeing 
fundamentally about how the elements of the offence should be separated.566  
 
Despite the controversy, however, the preferred model of element analysis is able to dissect 
the elements of the offence quite straightforwardly. ‘Taking of possession’ is the only result 
element of the offence because it is the only component that has been caused by D’s act. 
The other factors necessary for the offence are classified as circumstances because, 
although required within the offence definition, they are not causally connected to the act 
element.           
 
 
                                                          
566
 See discussion in Chapter 3, pp56-58. See also, Buxton, ‘Circumstances, consequences and attempted rape’ 
(1984) Criminal Law Review, 25.   
Example 3 Act Element Circumstance Element Result Element 
Actus Reus The movement 
of D’s body 
while taking V 
Fact of no lawful authority 
Fact of the girl being unmarried, 
in possession of her parents or 
guardian and being under sixteen  
The taking of 
possession by D 





For each offence explored, the preferred method of element analysis is able to dissect the 
elements in a relatively logical and straightforward manner. However, before moving on it is 
important to recognise the limitations, as well as the advantages, of the technique. 
Separating the elements of an offence can have a clear benefit to the understanding and 
consistent application of the law. However, no method of element analysis claims to answer 
specific complexities that exist within each element. For example, although we 
demonstrated in chapter 5 that element analysis is able to deal with offences that can be 
committed by an omission,567 it cannot tell us which omissions should come within this 
category. It can tell us that a ‘lack of legal authority’ is a circumstance element within 
example 3 above, but it cannot tell us what authority is sufficient if there is a dispute. Thus, 
although the analytical function of element analysis may improve the focus of the court and 
the academic alike, it will not (and does not attempt to) provide answers to substantive and 
often complex questions of content.    
  
                                                          
567




SEPARATING THE ELEMENTS OF BESPOKE INCHOATE 
OFFENCES 
 
Before moving on to explore the general inchoate offences of conspiracy, attempt and 
assisting and encouraging in chapter 10, it is first important to address the further category 
of bespoke inchoate offences. Bespoke inchoate offences are special part offences that have 
been drafted in such a way as to include an inchoate element: to include a requirement of 
ulterior fault that does not correspond to any part of the actus reus of the offence itself. 
Thus, D’s liability will depend not only on the completion of certain acts, circumstances and 
results (each potentially requiring a level of fault), but it will also depend on D possessing a 
further element of mens rea that is independent of these.568    
 
There are two species of bespoke inchoate offences. The first, including offences such as 
burglary569 and grooming,570 involve D acting in a certain proscribed manner with the 
intention571 to complete a substantive offence.572 For example, the offence of burglary 
requires D to enter a dwelling with intent to steal, inflict grievous bodily harm or commit 
criminal damage.573 D will only be liable if he or she both completes the proscribed conduct 
(with the requisite fault), and holds the necessary intention to commit the further offence. 
                                                          
568
 For a discussion of these offences, including a defence of their role within the criminal law, see Horder, 
‘Crimes of ulterior intent’ in Simester and Smith (eds), Harm and Culpability (Clarendon Press 1996) 153.   
569
 The Theft Act 1968, s9(1)(a).  
570
 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, s15(1).  
571
 Here, intention could apply to only certain elements of the principal offence.  
572
 For a comprehensive list of the offences that come within this category, see Law Commission, Conspiracy 
and Attempts: A Consultation Paper (Consultation Paper No 183, 2008) Appendix C.  
573
 The Theft Act 1968, s9.  
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This species of bespoke inchoate offence operates (and is therefore appropriately analysed) 
in the same manner as the general inchoate offences. Our exploration will therefore be 
deferred to the discussion of ‘general inchoate offences’ in chapter 10. 
 
The second species of bespoke inchoate offences, however, does not fit into the same mold. 
For this group, which includes offences such as theft574 and certain criminal damage 
offences,575 although D’s liability requires that he or she hold a certain ulterior fault, this 
fault will not amount to an intention to bring about a future substantive offence. For 
example, the offence of theft requires D to take unlawful possession of something with the 
intention of permanently depriving its legal owner.576 D will only be liable if he or she both 
completes the proscribed conduct (with the requisite fault), and holds the necessary ulterior 
fault (regarding the permanent deprivation). Although permanent deprivation does not 
amount to an independent substantive offence, it is a necessary component of the offence 
of theft.      
 
Conforming to a rigid structure of acts, circumstances and results therefore becomes very 
problematic in relation to this species of offence. D’s ulterior fault requirement not only fails 
to correspond to an actus reus requirement, but it also struggles to fit into any of our 




                                                          
574
 The Theft Act 1963, s1(1).  
575
 For example, committing criminal damage being reckless as to whether life is endangered thereby. The 
Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1(2).   
576
 The Theft Act 1963, s1(1). 
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 Act element: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
 Circumstance element: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
 Result element: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
 
Perhaps its closest relative within the above structure is the circumstance element. We 
could say, for example, that D’s ‘intention to permanently deprive’ is a surrounding fact that 
must exist at the time D completes the act element. Indeed, although the proponents of 
element analysis have been generally silent in relation to this kind of example, there may be 
some indication that the Law Commission would take this line. In the Conspiracy and 
Attempts report,577 for example, the Commission explain that when an assault is not 
‘because of its nature’ sexual, it may nevertheless be deemed a sexual assault if the 
circumstances are such as to make it sexual.578 Following this logic, if an assault is deemed 
to be a sexual assault on the basis of D’s sexual motive (ulterior intent),579 then this intent 
must be a circumstance element.         
 
The problem with this approach, however, is that it allows an aspect of D’s fault to come 
within the actus reus of the offence definition. If D’s intention to permanently deprive or D’s 
sexual motivation becomes part of the actus reus of the circumstance element, then the 
distinction between actus reus and mens rea (a foundation of the preferred approach to 
element analysis) is undermined. The preferred approach to element analysis is no longer a 
straightforward and dependable model to be applied to any offence within the criminal law. 
Rather, as Sullivan points out, ‘although invariably adequate, *the model+ on occasion may 
                                                          
577
 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009). 
578
 Ibid, [2.22-2.24].  
579
 See, for example, the case of Court *1988+ 2 ALL E.R. 221 in which D’s sexual motive was held to be decisive 
evidence that his assault upon a young girl could constitute a sexual assault.  
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underplay a significant aspect of what may be termed the internal aspect of criminal 
liability.’580   
 
With a multitude of such offences currently within the criminal law,581 the proponent of 
element analysis seems to be left with an unpalatable choice: accept that D’s fault can form 
part of the actus reus or abandon element analysis as a whole. However, such a choice is 
predicated upon a misconception. This species of offences are not standard choate offences 
that fit wholly within the three offence elements, but inchoate offences for which the 
offence definitions necessarily include requirements ulterior to that model. Moving further 
away from the current models of element analysis therefore, our preferred model of 
element analysis would include a fourth element: 
 
 Ulterior fault element: Fault required by the offence that does not correspond to 
an element of the actus reus.  
 
Once we have distinguished an element of ulterior fault, we are able to avoid compromising 
the definitions of the other offence elements, and the analysis of this species of offence 
becomes considerably easier.  
 
In order to illustrate this, we explore three offences that have been previously highlighted 
as problematic: theft, indecent assault (sexual assault) and criminal damage reckless as to 
the endangerment of life. 
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 Sullivan, ‘Bad thoughts and bad acts’ (1990) Criminal Law Review, 559, 559.  
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 Mc Sherry, ‘Expanding the boundaries of inchoate crimes: The growing reliance on preparatory offences’ in 
Mc Sherry, Norrie and Bronitt (eds) Regulating Deviance – The redirection of criminalisation and the futures of 






A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to  
another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it... 582 
 
Example 1: D finds an unattended wallet in the street. He decides to take the wallet 
home and keep the contents. 
 
Example 1 Act Element Circumstance 
Element 
Result Element Ulterior Fault 
Element 
Actus Reus D’s bodily 
movement 
Fact that 
property did not 
belong to D 
D’s possession 
or control of the 
property 
Mens Rea Intention Knowledge Intention D’s dishonesty 




For Sullivan, example 1 represents a clear demonstration of fault considerations playing a 
part within the actus reus of an offence. 
 
                                                          
582
 Contrary to the Theft Act 1963, s1(1). 
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If D’s intention is to hand in the wallet at the nearest police station no appropriation of 
property would in the meaning of the law of theft has occurred. If D intends to keep it 
for himself we have the actus reus of theft.583    
 
However, if we employ the preferred method of element analysis, as set out above, no such 
mingling of actus reus and mens rea will occur. The physical part of the offence, focusing on 
D’s acquisition of the property, can be analysed without any reference to D’s intentions 
(ulterior or otherwise). Then, having established D’s mens rea in relation to the elements of 
the actus reus, we can separately question D’s ulterior ambitions.  
 
INDECENT ASSAULT (SEXUAL ASSAULT) 
 
It is an offence ... for a person to make an indecent assault on a woman.584 
 
Example 2: D (a grown man) slaps V (a young girl) on the bottom whilst she is in his 
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 Sullivan, ‘Bad thoughts and bad acts’ (1990) Criminal Law Review, 559, 560.  
584
 The Sexual Offences Act 1956, s14(1). This offence has since been replaced by the offence of sexual assault, 




Sullivan has also highlighted indecent assault (now sexual assault585) as an example of fault 
considerations playing a part within the actus reus of an offence. Discussing the case of 
Court586 (example 2), Sullivan explains that although certain assaults are clearly sexual, this 
is an example in which a potentially innocent (or at least non-sexual) act becomes an 
indecent assault because of D’s sexual motive, a motive that Sullivan would categorise as 
part of the circumstance element of the offence.587 However, as demonstrated above, we 
are again able to avoid Sullivan’s conclusion by correctly categorising D’s sexual motivation 
                                                          
585
 Sullivan’s contentions (and the responses to them) are equally applicable to the new offence of sexual 
assault.  
586
 Court [1988] 2 ALL E.R. 221. 
587
 Sullivan, ‘Bad thoughts and bad acts’ (1990) Criminal Law Review, 559, 559-560.  
Example 2 Act Element Circumstance 
Element 







Fact that the contact 
could be deemed 
‘indecent’ 




Mens Rea Intention Recklessness for 
both 
Intention Where D’s act may 
be innocent, D 





as an ulterior fault requirement. D’s sexual motive is not an external world fact to be 
discovered, but rather, it is the product of D’s mind.   
 
An interesting facet of this offence, as opposed to theft, is the conditional nature of the 
ulterior fault element. As Lord Ackner makes clear in the case of Court, if D’s actions had 
been indecent or sexual in an obvious manner then D’s motivations would be ‘irrelevant’.588 
However, where there is some ambiguity as to whether his actions are indecent or not (as 
with the smacking of a child), it becomes necessary to demonstrate the additional element 
of ulterior fault.589  
 
The ulterior fault element plays a similar conditional role in other offences too, for example 
the possession of an offensive weapon in a public place.590 Where the weapon in question is 
clearly offensive, for example a firearm, then the offence does not require an element of 
ulterior fault. However, where the weapon is not self-evidently offensive then it will be 





                                                          
588
 Court [1988] 2 ALL E.R. 221, 230.  
589
 It is important to note that the circumstance element requiring D’s actions to be at least potentially 
indecent will always be a requirement of the offence. ‘The undisclosed intention of the defendant could not 
*on its own+ make the assault an indecent one’. Court [1988] 2 ALL E.R. 221, 229 [Lord Ackner].  
590
 Contrary to the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, s1.  
591
 For example, a stone. See, Harrison v Thornton (1966) 68 Cr. App. R. 28. For discussion, see Ormerod, Smith 
and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 661-663.   
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CRIMINAL DAMAGE RECKLESS AS TO THE ENDANGERMENT OF LIFE 
 
A person who without lawful excuse destroys or damages any property, whether 
belonging to himself or another—  
(a)   intending to destroy or damage any property or being reckless as to whether any 
property would be destroyed or damaged; and  
(b)   intending by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another or being 
reckless as to whether the life of another would be thereby endangered;  
shall be guilty of an offence.592 
 
Example 3: Following a bitter divorce, D sets light to a package and posts it through 
the door of his ex-wife V. 
 








Actus Reus Bodily 
movement 
of D 
That what is 
damaged is property 
Lack of lawful excuse 
Damage  
Mens Rea Intention Knowledge or 
recklessness for both 
Intent or 
recklessness 
Intending or reckless 
as to the 
endangerment of life 
 
                                                          
592
 Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1(2). 
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The inclusion of this example is simply intended to demonstrate that the ulterior fault 
element is capable of including fault requirements other than intention. D, in example 3, will 
be liable for the offence if when setting light to V’s property he is at least reckless as to 
whether this act will endanger her life. He need not intend that it should do so. 
 
It is necessary to provide this kind of example because of the unhelpful manner in which 
certain textbooks have discussed this issue. Ormerod for example, within the latest edition 
of Smith and Hogan: Criminal Law,593 provides a general definition of mens rea as: 
 
Intention, knowledge or recklessness with respect to all the elements of the offence 
together with any ulterior intent which the definition of the crime requires.594 
(emphasis changed)      
 
He then goes on to contend, in relation to ulterior intent (ulterior fault), that: 
 
Where an ulterior intent is required, it is obvious that recklessness is not enough. On a 
charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, proof that D was 
reckless whether he caused grievous bodily harm will not suffice.595  
 
In relation to offences like wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, we can have 
no dispute: the ulterior fault required will clearly only be satisfied by intention. However, 
the fact that Ormerod uses the label ulterior intent rather than ulterior fault within his 
general definition of mens rea implies that he is not using it as a specific term for a certain 
                                                          
593
 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008).  
594
 Ibid, 126. 
595
 Ibid, 126.  
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sub-class of offences. Rather, it implies that he does not accept that an ulterior fault 
requirement can exist that is not based upon intention. 
 
The example above is therefore included for the avoidance of doubt and possible confusion. 
The ulterior fault element is capable of requiring any level of fault in relation to anything 




This species of bespoke inchoate offences is not often individuated as the source of problem 
examples for element analysis. However, failing to recognise the requirement of a fourth 
element of ulterior fault can lead to complication and (potentially) undermine the method 
altogether. It is only with the addition of the ulterior fault element that the separation of 
elements is once again a straightforward process, and a process that preserves the division 





SEPARATING THE ELEMENTS OF GENERAL INCHOATE 
OFFENCES 
 
Criticism of element analysis based on objective separation has always centred on the 
general inchoate offences596 because of their wide application across the criminal law: a 
general inchoate offence employing element analysis relies on the ability to dissect the 
elements of all offences objectively.597 However, more recent years have also demonstrated 
the emergence of the complexity criticism relating specifically to this class of offence. When 
discussing the use of element analysis for attempts, for example, the New Zealand Crimes 
Consultative Committee comments that: 
 
Our concern is that the introduction of [element analysis] might unnecessarily 
complicate the law of attempts by focusing on the distinction between the elements of 
an offence... Such a distinction is not easily explained to a jury.598    
 
There have also been similar concerns expressed in this country following the enactment of 
Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, which contains the new and reformed offences of 
assisting and encouraging crime. Ormerod, for example, contends that the express use of 
element analysis within these offences has rendered them ‘excessively’599 and ‘torturously 
                                                          
596
 Attempt, conspiracy and assisting and encouraging.  
597
 See discussion in chapter 3 generally.  
598
 Crimes Consultative Committee, Report on 1989 Crimes Bill (New Zealand, 1991) 35.  
599
 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 449. 
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complex’.600 Indeed, it is a concern that even leads him to question whether the reforms 
were necessary.601 When balancing the benefits of element analysis against the addition of 
further complexity to already highly complex inchoate offences, it is a criticism that creates 
a very real question mark over the practical usefulness of the model.    
 
As with the discussion of choate offences in chapter 8, part of this criticism can be 
undermined pre-emptively with the work done in the chapters within Part II. As we explored 
in chapter 8, the preferred model of element analysis is able to provide an objective and 
relatively straightforward method of separating the elements of even the most difficult 
choate offences.  
 
However, unlike with choate offences and even bespoke inchoate offences, the general 
inchoate offences also entail a second layer of complication for the use of element analysis. 
This is because, unlike the species of bespoke inchoate offences discussed above, the 
ulterior fault required for these offences relates to an entire substantive offence. The result 
of this is that, when discussing acts, circumstances and results, the structure of general 
inchoate offences make it very difficult to tell whether we are discussing the actual conduct 
of D, or the elements of the principal offence that has not yet completed (the ulterior fault).        
 
This difficulty has not been aided by the approach taken by the Law Commission in their 
recent publications in this area. In each case, the Commission (understandably) spend 
considerable time exploring the requirements of D in relation to each of the separate 
elements of the principal offence. However, when discussing what each inchoate offence 
                                                          
600
 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 447.  
601
 Ibid, 446-454.  
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requires D to actually do,602 the Commission have been much less willing to employ element 
analysis. For example, in relation to encouraging crime, we have a discussion of what 
amounts to possible encouragement, but this is not set in the context of offence 
elements.603 The result of this is that the two layered nature of inchoate offences is 
obscured from the reader and it becomes much easier to make mistakes when attempting 
to interpret the policy, both within the publications and (where relevant) the appended 
draft legislation.  
 
It is a problem that has even infected the language of Part two of the Serious Crime Act. For 
example, as Ormerod has highlighted in relation to the dual role of the act element: 
 
Note the trap for the unwary of confusing the use of the term ‘act’ in ... the statute. 
‘Act’ is used inconsistently and without clarification. Although from a reading of s47, it 
might appear as if D’s ‘act’ capable of assisting and encouraging might include ‘a 
failure to act; a continuation of an act that has already begun; an attempt to do an 
act...’ In fact the ‘act’ being discussed in that section is P’s. cf s65(2)(b) where ‘the act’ 
refers to D.604 (emphasis added)    
 
Despite this, the contention that the current reforms (incorporating the Commission’s 
model of element analysis) are introducing an undue level of complexity is still far from 
being established. The dual requirements within mens rea and within actus reus are, after 
all, already a feature of the general inchoate offences. Indeed, within the law of attempts at 
                                                          
602
 As opposed to trying to do (attempt), planning to do (conspiracy) or assisting or encouraging P to do 
(assisting and encouraging).  
603
 Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006) [5.36-
5.45].  
604
 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 451, fn523.  
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least, the emergence of element analysis has come about through the practical 
inventiveness of the common law.605 Therefore, although the use of element analysis may 
add a further dimension of complexity, it still seems to represent a level of complexity that 
the courts believe they are equipped to work with. In this vein, it is also reassuring that 
within the recent Law Commission consultation on the reform of attempts and 
conspiracy,606 the use of element analysis was broadly supported by judicial consultees that 
did not foresee specific problems of complexity.607  
 
However, although this indicates that the use of element analysis in this area does not 
create undue complexity, it may well be that the Commission’s model of element analysis 
does introduce a level of unnecessary complexity. It must be noted that, although the 
leading judicial consultees did not identify complexity as a major concern, various other 
consultees did.608 Therefore, the specific issues relating to complexity and the use of 
element analysis within the general inchoate offences remain an area of concern.   
 
One of the few proponents of element analysis to have both recognised the problems in this 
area and attempted to resolve them is Paul Robinson. For Robinson, the most effective way 
of dealing with inchoate offences is to introduce a further offence element: a future conduct 
or future act element.609 For choate offences, this element will simply duplicate the role of 
the standard ‘act requirement’ (act element), ensuring that D must intend the act relevant 
                                                          
605
 Khan [1990] 1 W.L.R. 813. See discussion in chapter 2, pp36-41.  
606
 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts: A Consultation Paper (Consultation Paper No 183, 2008).  
607
 See, the response of the Criminal Sub Committee of the Council of HM Circuit Judges and the response of 
the Higher Courts Judiciary.  
608
 See, for example, the responses of Professor John Spencer, Mr Justice Calvert-Smith, Peter Glazebrook, and 
Professor Antony Duff.    
609
 Robinson, ‘Should the criminal law abandon the actus reus – mens rea distinction?’ in Shute, Gardner and 
Horder (eds) Action and value in criminal law (Clarendon Press, 1993), 187 and Robinson, ‘A functional analysis 
of the criminal law’ (1994) Northwestern University Law Review, 857. 
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to the offence definition.610 However, where D is charged with an inchoate offence such as 
attempt or conspiracy, the further element will be used to distinguish the conduct and fault 
requirements of D in relation to the act element of the principle offence (whether that will 
be completed by D or a separate party) from the conduct and fault requirements of D in 
relation to the act he or she has already completed.611 By separating the two species of act 
element in this manner, each can be investigated separately by a court, minimising the 
confusion caused by any overlapping discussion of the two.612  
 
The problem with Robinson’s approach, however, is that he focuses on (and therefore seeks 
to resolve) only one aspect of the complexity criticism introduced above. Let us take the 
following example: 
 
Example 1: D encourages P to have sexual intercourse with V, intending that he 
should do so.  
 
When analysing whether D is liable for the inchoate offence of encouraging rape,613 dividing 
between the investigation of D’s fault in relation to his or her act element, and his or her 
fault in relations to P’s act element, is very useful. Particularly, as Robinson states, because 
although D can only intend or not intend his or her own action, he or she may hold any of a 
full range of potential fault requirements in relation to the actions of P.614 However, on the 
                                                          
610
 Robinson, ‘A functional analysis of the criminal law’ (1994) Northwestern University Law Review, 857, 864. 
611
 Ibid, 864. 
612
 See, Ibid, 869, for a pictorial representation of the separate offence elements.   
613
 Contrary to the Serious Crime Act 2007, s44.  
614
 As a result of this, it is therefore open to legislators to apply a different fault requirement than intention to 
the fault required by D in relation to P’s act. See, Robinson, ‘Should the criminal law abandon the actus reus – 
mens rea distinction?’ in Shute, Gardner and Horder (eds) Action and value in criminal law (Clarendon Press, 
1993), 187, 204.  
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basis that the other elements are not affected in the same way within inchoate offences, 
Robinson chooses not to divide circumstances and results in a similar manner.  
 
This is a mistake. First, it may be exposed as a mistake by employing Robinson’s own 
reasoning. For Robinson, only D’s act element should be distinguished from P’s prospective 
future act element because of the wider variety of (potential) fault requirements that can 
apply to D’s foresight of P’s act.615 This is because, although D’s act element takes place in 
the present (can only be intentional or unintentional), P’s act element is a future act that is 
yet to have taken place. The problem with this as a means of distinguishing the other 
elements is that, although fault applicable to the result element (for both) will consistently 
involve the anticipation of a future event, the circumstance element will vary in the same 
manner as the act element. Where we are discussing D’s fault in relation to his or her 
conduct we are analysing current circumstances. However, when discussing D’s fault in 
relation to a circumstance element of a principal offence (committed in this case by P), we 
are now analysing a future circumstance element.616 The result, as with the act element, is 
that the applicable fault requirements must be adapted. For example, although in a case of 
handling stolen property it is possible to know whether the property handled is stolen 
(circumstance element), without the ability to look into the future, it is logically impossible 
to know that a future handling of property will also be stolen property.  
 
                                                          
615
 Robinson also requires a separation of D’s fault in relation to his or her act element from that of P because 
of what he perceives as their separate roles within an offence: rule articulation and grading function. However, 
this is not directly relevant to the current discussion. See, Robinson, ‘A functional analysis of the criminal law’ 
(1994) Northwestern University Law Review, 857.  
616
 A point that is not recognised by Robinson. See, Ibid, 863.  
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More importantly for present purposes, Robinson’s model can also be criticised because of 
the potential confusion caused by an approach that applies inconsistently to the different 
offence elements. Any potential gains we have discussed in relation to the analysis of the 
act element are surely cancelled out by the fact that, having separated the discussion of D’s 
and P’s act element, we are now expected to re-merge the two parts of the offence for the 
analysis of the other two elements. Thus, Robinson’s analysis of example 1 is likely to look 
like this: 
 
Example 1 Act Requirement 
(Act Element of D) 
Act Element (Act Element of P) 
Actus Reus  D’s bodily 
movement 
P’s bodily movement (not yet happened) 
Mens Rea Intent D must intend or believe that P will act 
D must intend or believe that P will intend to 
act  
 
Example 1 Circumstance Element Result Element 
Actus Reus D’s act must be capable of encouraging P  
Mens Rea Intent or belief 
D must be reckless as to whether V will not 
consent to sexual intercourse with P 
D must be reckless as to whether P will not 
have a reasonable belief that V will consent 
D must be reckless 
as to whether P will 
achieve penetration 





Although Robinson marks a clear distinction between the two species of act element, it 
remains problematic. First, this is due to the inconsistency between the act element and the 
circumstance and result elements: expecting a division between D’s conduct and P’s to be 
established and then abandoned. As highlighted above, Robinson is unable to demonstrate 
why the act element should be so distinguished. Secondly, it is contended that by bundling 
the requirements of D in relation to his or her own and to P’s conduct within the 
circumstance and result elements, there is a serious risk of confusion and misapplication.   
 
Despite the advantages of Robinson’s formulation, therefore, it is rejected. An alternative 
approach must be identified. 
 
APPLYING THE PREFERRED APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF COMPLEXITY 
  
Using the work of Robinson as a lead, and following the approach taken in relation to 
bespoke inchoate offences above, the preferred approach would begin by separating the 
consideration of D’s own conduct (and the attached fault) from the consideration of D’s 
ulterior fault in relation to P and/or the principal offence. Importantly, this would not be 
isolated to the act element, but would also apply to the circumstance and result elements as 
well.  
 
The first stage of our analysis of the general inchoate offences will therefore focus on the 




Inchoate offences Act Element Circumstance Element Result Element 
Actus Reus D’s bodily 
movement 
required by the 
inchoate offence617 
The circumstances 
surrounding D’s act that are 
required by the inchoate 
offence. For example, in 
attempts, that D’s bodily 
movement constitutes an act 
‘beyond mere preparation’ 
towards the completion of 
the principal offence 
The results of D’s 
act that are 
required by the 
inchoate offence. 
For example, the 
forming of an 
‘agreement’ for 
conspiracy   
Mens Rea D’s fault in relation 
to his or her bodily 
movement 
D’s fault in relation to each 
circumstance  
D’s fault in 
relation to each 
result 
 
From this basis, having fully explored the actus reus requirements, we then move on to 
consider the fault required of D in relation to the principal offence. D’s fault relating to the 
principal offence is distinct from the first stage (offence elements) because it relates to 
mens rea that ‘extends beyond the actus reus of the offence’.618 As with the species of 
bespoke inchoate offences discussed above, we are now looking to D’s ulterior fault 
requirements which involve future conduct that has not yet come about (and need never do 
so). 
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 If the offence is committed verbally or by omission, then further circumstances and results will apply. See 
discussion in chapter 5.  
618
 Duff, Intention, agency and criminal liability (Blackwell, 1990) 39.  
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The second stage of our analysis of the general inchoate offences is to explore the ulterior 
fault element. When discussing this element in relation to bespoke inchoate offences in 
chapter 9, the fault generally related to one or two specific points.619 For general inchoate 
offences in contrast, this element encompasses all of D’s fault requirements in relation to 
the principal offence. As a result, although the ulterior fault element still only represents a 
single element of D’s liability, it is most effectively analysed when it is further dissected into 
the individual elements of the principal offence. For each part of the principal offence, 
whether to be committed by D or P, the question will be what fault is essential of D in 













                                                          
619




D’s Ulterior Fault 
element  
Act Element Circumstance 
Element 
Result Element Ulterior Fault 
Element 
D’s fault in 
relation to the 
Actus Reus of 
the principal 
offence 
D’s fault in 
relation to the 
bodily 
movements 
required by the 
principal 
offence 
D’s fault in 
relation to the 
circumstances 
required by the 
principal offence 
D’s fault in 
relation to the 
results (if any) 
required by the 
principal 
offence 
D’s fault in 
relation to the 
Mens Rea of 
the principal 
offence 
D’s fault in 
relation to the 
fault required 
within the act 
element of the 
principal 
offence 
D’s fault in 




element (if any) 
of the principal 
offence 
D’s fault in 
relation to the 
fault required 
within the result 
element (if any) 
of the principal 
offence 
D’s fault in 







It should be remembered that as long as D’s mens rea relating to his or her conduct is not 
confused with D’s mens rea relating to the conduct and fault of the principal offence, other 
forms of this analysis are capable of reaching the same conclusions. The chart based 
structuring of offences discussed generally within Part III is not essential to the objective 
separation of elements. If it was, it would have come within the chapters in Part II. Rather, it 
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is believed that the preferred model presents highly complex offences in their most 
straightforward and practical dissection. 
 
The quantity of boxes in the charts above, each representing a separate requirement of the 
offence, may seem daunting and complex at first glance. However, the preferred model (as 
discussed) provides an objective and relatively straightforward method of separating the 
elements of all offences: a task that is not likely to trouble the judiciary. And having 
separated the elements, although there are a lot of questions to ask a jury, the questions 
within each box should now be considerably easier for a judge to articulate and a jury 
member to understand.        
 
Before we go on to analyse each of the general inchoate offences in turn, even at this stage, 
the potential benefits of the preferred model of element analysis are already apparent. If 
these complex offences can be separated within the structure outlined above, and if such a 
structure can simplify and standardise the individual stages of analysis, then they can have a 
positive and clarificatory role within the court system. What was once approached as a 
complex whole, is now assesses one step (box in the chart) at a time.    








APPLYING THE PREFERRED APPROACH TO THE GENERAL INCHOATE OFFENCES 
 
In this section we move on to apply the preferred method of element analysis to the three 
central general inchoate offences: assisting and encouraging, conspiracy and attempts. 
Apart from the offence of assisting and encouraging, which will be based on Part Two of the 
Serious Crime Act 2007, we will use the offence definitions recommended by the Law 
Commission in their recent report Conspiracy and Attempts.620 Although the same exercise 
could be employed to analyse the current law in relation to attempts and conspiracy, the 
Commission’s recommended definitions are preferred partly because of their express use of 
element analysis,621 and partly to avoid controversial elements within the interpretation of 
the current law.622 We are nevertheless focusing on the Serious Crime Act in relation to 
assisting and encouraging. This is because, having preceded the Commission’s work on the 
other two offences, the treatment given by Parliament of the Commission’s 
recommendations on assisting and encouraging has been expressly taken into consideration 
by the Commission within their formulation of conspiracy and attempts. Therefore, when 
looking for patterns and consistency across the general inchoate offences, this represents 
the most appropriate combination of sources.      
 
As we explore each of the general inchoate offences, we will be focusing upon two issues. 
First, in relation to the structural use of the preferred method, we will ask whether the 
                                                          
620
 Law Com No 318 (2009).  
621
 Having contended in chapter 3 that the current model of element analysis is unable to adequately facilitate 
the Law Commission’s recommendations in this area, part of this exercise is to discover whether the preferred 
model of element analysis is able to perform the role in its place.  
622
 The aim of this section is to demonstrate the ability of the preferred method of element analysis to 
separate the elements of complex offences in a straightforward manner. To the extent that that will involve 
debate between competing case law as to what the policy is, although useful once the method is established, 
will simply prove distracting at this point.  
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offence is sufficiently straightforward to be of practical use. Secondly, in relation to use of 
the preferred method as an analytical tool, we will be asking whether the technique allows 
us to pick up on details or problems within the offence definition that might otherwise have 
been missed.   
 
Assisting and encouraging 
 
The new offences of assisting and encouraging crime represent a major challenge in terms 
of simplification. This is because, despite having originated in a recent Law Commission 
report that explicitly employed element analysis,623 they have still been subjected to a fierce 
level of criticism for overcomplicating the law.624 In this way, however, they also represent 
an ideal example for comparing the Commission’s version of element analysis with the one 
preferred within this thesis.   
 
Part Two of the Serious Crime Act sets out the definitions of three separate offences: 
 
1. Intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence (section 44); 
2. Encouraging or assisting an offence believing it will be committed (section 45); 
and 
3. Encouraging or assisting offences believing one or more will be committed 
(section 46). 
 
                                                          
623
 Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006). 
624
 See, for example, Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 
which labels the provisions ‘torturously complex’ at page 447. See also the discussion above at the beginning 
of the General Inchoate Offences section, pp220-227.  
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For the sake of this demonstration, we will focus solely on the first of these offences: 
intentionally encouraging or assisting an offence. However, employing the same method, 
either of the other two offences could be set out in exactly the same manner. 
 
The first stage is to expose the actus reus and mens rea requirements that relate to D’s 
completed conduct:   
 
Intentionally encouraging 
or assisting an offence 
Act Element  Circumstance Element Result 
Element 
Actus Reus D’s bodily 
movement  
D’s act is capable of encouraging or 
assisting the commission of an 
offence 
None 
Mens Rea *None* *None* None 
 





















D’s fault in 
relation to the 






the act of P 
(Where required) 
Reckless as to 





Reckless as to 
whether P will 
act with these 
results 
D’s fault in 
relation to the 









If D were to 
have done 
the act, he or 
she would 





P will have the 
requisite fault  
or 
If D were to have 
done the act, he 
or she would have 





whether P will 
have the 
requisite fault  
or 
If D were to 
have done the 
act, he or she 






whether P will 
have the 
requisite fault  
or 
If D were to 
have done the 
act, he or she 




Following the guidance of the preferred model of element analysis, the separation of the 
various offence elements is done quite straightforwardly. The advantage to this approach is 
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that, having separated the offence into its constituent parts, it should also be easier to use 
both within the court environment and academically.   
 
Having explained that one of the roles of the preferred method of element analysis involves 
the exposing of legislative gaps, it should be noted that we have starred the (apparent) 
absence of any fault requirement in relation to D’s act element and circumstance element. 
This is because, although no fault requirement is provided within the Serious Crime Act, it is 
contended that this absence is the result of oversight rather than design. For the act 
element, such an oversight is understandable: our choice to deal separately with the mens 
rea of the act element is not universal and so, when the statute refers to an ‘act’, it may well 
be interpreted to include an implicit dimension of fault.625 However, the absence of a fault 
requirement in relation to D’s circumstance element, in contrast, is much more problematic. 
 
The problem with not requiring D to have any fault in relation to the circumstance element 
of his or her conduct is that it has the potential to widen the scope of the offence beyond 
the limits that Parliament (and the Law Commission before them) seems to have intended. 
Let us take the first example employed by the Commission in their report Inchoate Liability 
for Assisting and Encouraging Crime:626 
 
                                                          
625
 See, Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009) [8.110]. To avoid unhelpful 
repetition of this point, we will interpret the act elements of conspiracy, attempt and complicity as if they 
include a requirement of intention whether or not this is explicit from the Commission material.   
626
 Law Com No 300 (2006) [1.3]. We have adapted the example from a believing offence to an intending 
offence for consistency with the current discussion. This change does not, however, affect the point being 
made.   
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Example 2: D, in return for payment, lends a van to P intending that P will use the 
van in order to commit a robbery. The police arrest P in connection with another 
matter before P can even attempt to commit the robbery. 
 
The Commission use this example to express their belief that D should be criminalised for 
assisting P to commit robbery.627 D’s act of lending the van has clearly assisted P, and most 
people would agree that such an act (combined with the intention that the offence be 
committed) should suffice for liability. However, consider this variation of the facts: 
 
Example 3: D, who usually keeps his van in a locked garage, leaves it outside his 
house so that he can take it to P early in the morning. D intends to offer the van to P 
to be used in a robbery. P, who happens to be driving past in the night, decides to 
take D’s van without asking so that he can use it to rob V. The police arrest P in 
connection with another matter before P can even attempt to commit the robbery. 
  
In example 3, D has done an act (leaving the car out) that is capable of assisting P to commit 
robbery. Further, at the time the act was undertaken, D intended that P should commit 
robbery. However, D’s act does not seem as intuitively criminal as it did in example 2: 
although D intended to assist P to commit robbery, he did not intend that it was that 
particular act (leaving the van out) that would provide the assistance.  
 
Without the requirement of at least recklessness in relation to the circumstance element,628 
requiring D to recognise the risk that his or her act is capable of assisting or encouraging the 
                                                          
627
 Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006) [1.3-1.4].  
628
 It may be that a requirement of knowledge would be more appropriate.   
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principal offence, we have a risk that the point of D’s criminality will move unacceptably far 
from the point of harm. For example, D will commit the offence as soon as he or she writes 
a letter of encouragement if it is possible that the letter could reach P before D intends. 
Equally, D will commit the offence as soon as he or she buys equipment with the intention 
of lending it for the purposes of crime. In each case, although D has to complete further acts 
in order to assist or encourage in the manner he or she has intended, the law will be able to 
find an offence.        
 
Another area of interest, exposed by the use of element analysis, involves the actus reus (as 
opposed to the mens rea discussed above) of the circumstance element. Within the Law 
Commission’s draft Bill, this element required that D’s act should be ‘capable of encouraging 
or assisting the doing of a criminal act in relation to a principal offence.’629 For the Serious 
Crime Act, this was (arguably) broadened slightly to a requirement that D’s act should be 
‘capable of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence.’630 However, in neither 
case is the formulation sufficient to encompass each of the problem cases that the 
Commission wished to target.  
 
Consider the following example:631   
 
Example 4: D surreptitiously ‘laces’ P’s drink with alcohol. He does so intending that 
P should later commit the offence of driving with excess alcohol. P, however, notices 
what D is doing and takes a taxi home. 
                                                          
629
 Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006) Cl 1(1)(a).  
630
 Serious Crime Act 2007, s44(1)(a). (emphasis added)  
631
 Adapted from Example 5H within the Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging 




In example 4, D’s act of lacing P’s drink does not assist or encourage P to complete the act 
element of driving with excess alcohol:632 the bodily movement required to drive. Rather, it 
provides the circumstance (excess alcohol) necessary for the principal offence to be 
committed. Therefore, if the circumstance element of assisting crime is interpreted as the 
Commission recommends, a standard reading of the clause would exonerate D from the 
offence.  
 
In order to avoid this unattractive conclusion, the Commission are forced to create a major 
exception to their general policy, stating that in these ‘rare’ occasions ‘“criminal act” will 
need to be interpreted to mean a composite act comprising a combination of conduct and 
circumstance elements.’633 However, this approach is problematic. It is unfortunate that 
having set out an already complex policy, we are now told (and in the Report alone634) that 
sometimes this policy will have to be interpreted to mean something entirely different. An 
exception that we could perhaps accept, were it not also the case that this rare exception is 
so difficult to identify. In relation to the drink spiking example where P does not go on to 
complete the principal offence, we are told that: 
 
[t]he essence of the wrongdoing targeted by the offence of driving with excess alcohol 
is not the driving but driving in excess of the prescribed limit. In [the example] it is that 
                                                          
632
 Contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1988, s5(1).  
633
 Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006) [5.26]. 
634
 Without guidance within the legislation, it is difficult to predict whether the courts will apply the exception 
in the manner envisaged by the Commission.  
244 
 
circumstance that D is intending to bring about. D’s conduct is highly culpable and, in 
principle, he or she ought to be criminally liable.635 
 
Therefore, the Commission seem to be indicating that although D’s assisting and 
encouraging will usually have to focus on the act element of the principal offence alone, this 
is because most offences (for example, murder and criminal damage) are built upon a 
culpable act element. However, in exceptional cases such as the one above, where P’s 
wrongdoing can only be understood as a composite of act (driving) and circumstance (being 
over the prescribed limit), the assisting or encouraging of either element will suffice for this 
part of D’s actus reus. 
 
The problem with the Commission’s method of separation, however, is that it risks allowing 
many more offences (including fault based offences) within this exceptional category than 
would be intended. The Commission are likely to accept the inclusion of most driving and 
other regulatory style offences. However, many core criminal offences also include 
potentially innocent act elements. For example, sexual penetration within the offence of 
rape is not a prima facie wrong; it’s wrong is constituted by the circumstance of V’s lack of 
consent.636 Likewise, the act element of theft (D’s taking of property) is only wrong because 
that property does not belong to D. In fact, it is even possible to contend that murder does 
not necessarily contain a prima facie wrong within the act element. The act of shooting 
(which can constitute the act element of murder), for example, is not necessarily harmful 
and may be a perfectly acceptable hobby. Thus, if D intentionally shoots and kills V, it is not 
                                                          
635
 Law Commission, Inchoate Liability for Assisting and Encouraging Crime (Law Com No 300, 2006) [5.26].  
636
 For an alternative view, see Herring and Dempsey, 'Why Sexual Penetration Requires Justification' (2007) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 467. 
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the act of shooting alone that establishes the wrong, it is the act of shooting a human being 
(circumstance element). Therefore, the Commission’s previously rare example now 
becomes very common indeed, potentially including every offence with a circumstance 
element. D will come within the inchoate offences whenever he or she completes an act 
capable of assisting or encouraging the act or circumstance elements of any principal 
offence – a result vastly beyond the Commission’s intentions.   
 
It is interesting to note that this problem has not been translated into the Law Commission’s 
recommendations concerning complicity.637 In this more recent Report, instead of 
maintaining the pretence that D’s actions assist or encourage P in the drink spiking example, 
the Commission recommend the creation of a separate offence of causing a no-fault 
offence.638 Indeed, they go so far as to say that ‘it is inappropriate to describe D’s conduct in 
causing P to commit a no-fault offence as encouraging or assisting P to commit the 
offence.’639 As the problems set out above demonstrate, they are quite right in this 
comment. However, in making it, the Commission are undermining their policy on inchoate 
assisting and encouraging and the Serious Crime Act; if it is inappropriate to label D’s actions 
as assisting or encouraging then there can be no application of those inchoate offences.  
 
Following this somewhat complicated plot, we are left with two possible conclusions 
(neither one desirable). Either there is inchoate liability for the drink spiker under the 
Serious Crime Act, but this is achieved at the expense of the coherence of those offences, or 
                                                          
637
 Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007). The recommendations in this report have 
not yet been taken forward by the Government.  
638
 Ibid, Part 4 and cl 5 of the draft Bill appended.  
639
 Ibid, [4.29]. 
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there is no inchoate liability, and we must wait to see if the principal offence is committed 
before penalising D.640 
 
Whether or not these two observations are accepted in full, they clearly demonstrate the 
utility of element analysis as an analytical tool. In both cases, the separation and individual 
analysis of offence elements has exposed potential problems, problems that have the 




For the offence of conspiracy (and attempt in the next section) we move from an analysis of 
the current law to the reforms recommended by the Law Commission.641 Like the offences 
of assisting and encouraging, these (recommended) offences also explicitly rely on the use 
of element analysis.   
 
The Commission’s recommendations for a reformed offence of conspiracy have received a 
generally positive reaction from academic commentators.642 However, it may still be the 
case that the use of the preferred method of element analysis can provide further benefits 
and insights. First, as above, we will set out the offence of conspiracy using the preferred 
method in order to expose clearly its constituent parts. Secondly, we will explore whether 
                                                          
640
 For further discussion of this point, see Child, ‘The differences between attempted complicity and inchoate 
assisting and encouraging – a reply to Professor Bohlander’ Criminal Law Review (2010) Forthcoming.  
641
 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009). 
642
 See the consultees responses within Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009). 
See also, Editorial, ‘Revising conspiracy’ Criminal Law Review 2 (2008) 89.  
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Circumstance Element Result 
Element 
Actus Reus D’s Bodily 
movement 
1) That the agreement is to commit the 
principal offence 
2) That P also satisfies the ulterior fault 
requirements of D 
Agreement 






































Same mens rea as required 
by principal offence 
Or 
Where less than 
recklessness is required by 
principal offence, 
subjective recklessness 
must be demonstrated 
(Where required) 
Intention for the 
act to bring 
about the 
necessary results 













Intention that P will have 
the requisite fault in 
relation to the relevant 
circumstances 
(Where required) 
Intention that P 
will have the 








P will have the 
requisite 
ulterior fault  
 
As with our discussion of assisting and encouraging above, it is useful to begin our analysis 
by focusing on potential gaps that have been exposed by the preferred model. In relation 
conspiracy, as the chart demonstrates, we have not starred any boxes to indicate that there 
has been an omission made. However, with regard to the clarity of the Commission’s 
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recommendations, it should be noted that the report provides no express comment at all in 
regard to D’s mens rea requirements relating first, to his or her actus reus, and secondly, to 
D’s mens rea requirements relating to the mens rea of P.643 
 
In relation to the first of these, the mens rea relating to D’s actus reus, it is likely (as 
reflected within the chart) that the omission indicates that no fault is required. Thus, 
although D must form an agreement with P to commit the principal offence, a charge of 
conspiracy does not require D to recognise that this is what amounts from his or her actions. 
However, if this is the case, surely the policy would be made clearer to everyone if reference 
was made to this within the report, if not within the appended draft Bill. 
 
For the second, the mens rea relating to the mens rea of P, the absence of discussion is 
perhaps even more surprising. Despite the express treatment of these elements in relation 
to assisting and encouraging,644 for conspiracy we must rely upon the vagaries of Section 
1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977, which states that: 
 
... if a person agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall 
be pursued which, if the agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, 
either 
(a)will necessarily amount to or involve the commission of any offence or offences by 
one or more of the parties to the agreement, or 
(b)would do so but for the existence of facts which render the commission of the 
offence or any of the offences impossible, 
                                                          
643
 The only exception to this is a brief comment regarding D’s mens rea requirements in relation to the 
ulterior fault of P. This will be discussed below, p246.  
644
 The Serious Crime Act 2007, s47(5)(a).  
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he is guilty of conspiracy to commit the offence or offences in question.   
 
Left intact by the Commission’s recommendations,645 the italicised parts of this subsection 
indicate that the fault requirements of P that are necessary for the principal offence will 
have to form part of D’s intention. However, again, surely for the sake of clarity such 
requirements warrant (at least) an express mention within the Commission’s report.  
 
The only exception to this absence of discussion is the issue of D’s fault in relation to a 
potential ulterior fault requirement within P’s offence. However, rather than clarifying the 
policy in this area, the Commission appear to mischaracterise the role of this element and 
(potentially) mislead their reader. Referring to offences that require the perpetrator to have 
acted ‘dishonestly’ or ‘corruptly’, the Commission states that:  
 
Our recommendations do not affect the need to prove that D possessed the [ulterior] 
fault element, when that is part of the offence. This is because, under the existing law, 
it is only when the agreement, if carried out in accordance with the conspirators’ 
intentions, amounts to or involves a criminal offence that the conspirators can be 
found guilty. It will only amount to such an offence, when it includes a [ulterior] fault 
element, if it is proved that the conspirators possessed that element.646 
 
The problem with this analysis, as the chart setting out the preferred method clearly 
demonstrates, is that a charge of conspiracy will never require D or P to be acting 
dishonestly or corruptly when forming an agreement to commit an offence. Rather, where 
                                                          
645
 The only changes recommended by the Commission to this subsection relate to non-pertinent matters of 
terminology. 
646
 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009) [2.166].  
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such ulterior fault is required for a principal offence, the issue for conspiracy is what fault 
we require of D in relation to the presence of that ulterior fault at the time the principal 
offence is committed. Therefore, although we may, employing Section 1(1) of the Criminal 
Law Act, conclude that what is required is that D must intend that P should act with the 
required ulterior fault, the Commission’s analysis has the potential to mislead. 
 
In this manner, the advantages of the preferred method of element analysis and the chart 
based method of its construction are readily apparent. Highlighting a lack of clarity within 
areas of the Commission’s recommendations, the preferred method is able to set out the 
offence of conspiracy in a clear and practically useful manner. Again, the quantity of boxes 
and the form of the chart based system may appear daunting, but as long as the content of 
each box is understood, then it can provide a straightforward aid for a court or 




As with the offences of assisting and encouraging and the offence of conspiracy, the law of 
attempt has also proven to be a complex and challenging area of law. Particularly in relation 
to the requirements of mens rea, Ormerod has commented for example, that: 
 
... the precise nature of the relevant mens rea is far from easy to specify.647 
 
                                                          
647
 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 383.  
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Within the Law Commission report Conspiracy and Attempts,648 the Commission’s central 
task was therefore to provide much needed clarification. Abandoning their previous 
recommendations,649 the Commission does so by explicitly incorporating element analysis in 
order to distinguish the fault requirements of D in relation to the circumstance element of 
the principal offence. 
 
Setting out the Law Commission’s recommendations in the form of the preferred method of 
element analysis allows this policy to be viewed clearly.    
 
Attempt Act Element Circumstance Element Result Element 
Actus Reus D’s bodily 
movement 
That D’s act goes beyond mere 
preparation towards the 
commission of the principal 
offence 
None  
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 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009).  
649
 Law Commission, Attempt and Impossibility in Relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement (Law Com No 












D’s fault in 
relation to the 












Same mens rea as required 
by principal offence 
Or 
Where less than recklessness 
is required by principal 
offence, subjective 










D’s fault in 
relation to the 
Mens Rea of 
principal 
offence 
None None None *None* 
 
Having set out the Law Commission’s policy for attempt using the preferred method, it is 
immediately apparent (in a way it may not be from the Commission’s report650) how 
differently the law of attempts is structured from the other general inchoate offences. 
 
Principally, this difference relates to the lack of ulterior fault requirements with respect to 
the mens rea of the principal offence. This is because, unlike the offences of assisting and 
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 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009).  
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encouraging and the offence of conspiracy, the law of attempt only involves a single party. 
When D foresees a future offence to be committed by P, it is necessary to consider whether 
he or she requires fault in relation to both P’s future acts and as to whether those acts will 
be completed with the fault required by the principal offence. However, where D is 
foreseeing an offence that he or she is in the process of attempting to complete, the 
requirement to intend future acts and results (for example) makes any requirement to 
foresee that they will be intentionally completed irrelevant: if D is intending an act then he 
or she is intending to complete the act intentionally. This is a logical position. However, the 
problem here in terms of clarity is that this position is not articulated at any point in either 
the Commission’s report or the appended draft Bill. Therefore, in the absence of the 
preferred method to draw out the question directly, it is possible that this difference would 
either remain hidden and/or cause unnecessary confusion. 
 
The only (potential) exception to this lack of fault requirements relates to the ulterior fault 
needed by D in relation to an ulterior fault requirement within the principal offence. This 
element has been starred within the chart above because, although the Commission do not 
expressly provide for a fault requirement (they do not discuss the issue at all), it is 
contended this is an oversight rather than a policy choice. If D attempts an offence with an 
ulterior fault requirement, for example the intention to permanently deprive in theft, a 
conviction would be inappropriate unless D held that intention651 at the point of the 
attempt. 
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As with the case of conspiracy, it is possible to interpret the unamended sections of the 
relevant statute to require intention. Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 states 
that: 
 
If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act 
which is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty 
of attempting to commit the offence.    
 
Focusing on the italicised prerequisite of intention, it is possible to conclude that this 
requires D to intend every element of the principal offence (including the ulterior fault 
element) that is not specifically dealt with elsewhere. However, although this would seem 
to relieve our immediate concerns, it would also require D to intend that he or she will have 
each of the fault requirements necessary for the principal offence: a requirement within the 
law of attempts that we have just described as unnecessary and potentially confusing.  
 
As before, the point being made is not that the law is unworkable, or will be unworkable 
under the Commission’s recommendations. It is simply that, if the offence of attempt is to 
be fully clarified, the preferred model of element analysis presents the most comprehensive 
approach. With the role of each element clearly separated, even a highly complex offence 
can be set out in a straightforward and easily comprehensible manner.    
 
Before moving on, it remains necessary to make a brief comment relating to the separation 
of D’s actus reus into offence elements. As we noted in relation to the other general 
inchoate offences above, it is again the case that the Law Commission fails to distinguish the 
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elements of D’s actus reus (as opposed to the actus reus of the principal offence): a task 
that is presumably vital to the operation of double inchoate liability.652 However, it should 
be noted that where such a separation has been mooted among academics, it has not 
always led to the separation set out in the chart above.  
 
Moore, for example, contends that the requirement that D’s conduct is ‘more than merely 
preparatory to the commission of the offence’ (or a substantial step towards it) should be 
considered as a result element of D’s offence as opposed to a circumstance element.653 
Discussing an example where Fromme (D) attempts to shoot President Ford (V), Moore 
states that: 
 
... Fromme’s movement must have caused a further state ... in order to be an attempt. 
The state is one of dangerous proximity to (or substantial step towards) Ford’s death. 
Ford ... must have been caused to have a ‘near-death-experience’ by Fromme’s 
moving before that moving can be called an attempt. True, Ford’s state of being near 
death is not an event, like a trigger moving; it is a relational state, but it is no less an 
effect for that.654   
 
There is obviously some merit to this argument. If ‘more than merely preparatory’ is a state 
that is caused to exist by D’s act element then it is logical to characterise it as a result 
element. However, such an interpretation would be highly problematic. This is because, in 
reality, the conception of the state in this context is hollow. What we are dealing with is not 
                                                          
652
 In the context of double or infinite liability, D’s future inchoate offence (like any other principal offence) will 
have to be separated into elements in order to ascertain what fault is required. 
653
 Moore, Act and Crime (1993) 213-225.  
654
 Moore, Act and Crime (1993) 219.  
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a set moment in time where a particular relational state is created, but rather an objective 
description of an ongoing process. The conception of what amounts to ‘more than merely 
preparatory’ is a pre-existing fact within society that is applied within the offence of attempt 
in order to appraise D’s actions. As such, it is better perceived as a circumstance element of 




Although the inchoate offences will remain a highly complex area of law, it seems that the 
preferred method of element analysis represents the best vehicle through which to 
incorporate the Law Commission’s recommendations and move forward with the law. 
Despite the sophistication of the Commission’s approach, without the overview created by 
the preferred method, certain elements remain uncommented-upon and others unclear. 
However, having set out the overview, the questions within each element are clarified. It is 
then for the commentator to focus on each in turn in order to construct a logical and 
comprehensive offence definition. It is then for the court to lead a jury though each element 
in order to reach an appropriate verdict without having to comprehend the vagaries of full 
complex offences.655 And it is then that the academic community can focus their comment 
                                                          
655
 The New Zealand Crimes Consultative Committee rejected the use of element analysis in 1991 partly 
because of the perceived difficulty of explaining it to a jury. Crimes Consultative Committee, Report on 1989 
Crimes Bill (New Zealand, 1991) 35.  
However, as long as the questions within each of the elements remain straightforward, it does not seem that 
this point holds. It would be unnecessary, for example, for the jury to understand the complex debates 
surrounding the conception of element analysis. The only part that would need to be explained would be that 
certain things are required for D to be liable, and that therefore the jury will be expected to examine each one 
in turn.    
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on individual elements or comparisons of elements in order to facilitate a detailed 
critique.656 
  
                                                          
656
 With the Law Commission stressing their desire to provide consistency between the (often overlapping) 
general inchoate offences, the ability to compare the individual elements of each offence may well prove to be 






Within the previous chapter’s discussion of general inchoate liability, the role of the ulterior 
fault element (introduced in chapter 9) was able to be fully explored. In light of this 
exploration, we are now in a position to highlight two further benefits of the preferred 
model of element analysis. Arising from the context of the general inchoate offences, but 
with potential application far beyond them, these benefits relate to fault terminology and 
law reform respectively.  
 
Clarifying role and fault terminology 
 
In the absence of a criminal code, the fault terminology within the English criminal law has 
remained uncodified. However, where efforts have been made to ensure consistency 
through common definitions, we will invariably witness the use of element analysis.657 There 
are two principal reasons for this. First, certain fault terms, for example ‘knowledge’, cannot 
apply to every offence element. D can know of the existence of a certain circumstance for 
example, but he or she cannot know that a certain result will come about in the future.658 
Secondly, it is not uncommon for the same fault term to operate differently depending upon 
which offence element it is applied to. Where this is the case, the explicit use of element 
                                                          
657
 See the draft Criminal Codes in 1985 and 1989. For a discussion of the problems caused by a lack of 
codification in this area, see, Law Commission, Report on the Mental Element in Crime (Law Com No 89, 1978).  
658
 Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 116-117.  
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analysis is able to avoid confusion by setting out the varying definitions clearly. For example, 
within the Australian Model Criminal Code,659 ‘intention’ is defined in the following terms: 
 
(1) A person has intention with respect to [the act element] if he or she means to 
engage in that [act].  
(2)  A person has intention with respect to a circumstance if he or she believes it exists 
or will exist.  
(3) A person has intention with respect to a result if he or she means to bring it about 
or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.660 
 
As we can see, there is a considerable difference between each of the three definitions.  
 
As a result of these advantages, the role of element analysis has become almost uniform in 
areas where the fault terms are being discussed. In those jurisdictions like Australia that 
have produced criminal codes, this has come about through the formal definitions of fault 
terms in relation to each of the offence elements.661 However, even within this jurisdiction, 
we can see the use of element analysis to define fault terminology within leading criminal 
law textbooks.662 Beyond this, whenever the Law Commission has attempted to initiate the 
codification of the fault terms they too have consistently663 employed element analysis in 
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 Australian Model Criminal Code (1992).  
660
 Australian Model Criminal Code (1992) Div 5.2. 
661
 See, for example, the Australian Model Criminal Code (1992) Div 5 and the US MPC (1962) §2.02(2).   
662
 See, for example, Ormerod, Smith and Hogan: Criminal law (12th Ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) 
97-123 and Simester and Sullivan, Criminal law: Theory and Doctrine (3
rd
 Ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2007) 119-
158.  
663
 For a discussion of the Commission’s generally more inconsistent support for element analysis in other 
contexts, see chapter 3, pp52-72. 
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order to do so.664 The use of element analysis attempts to draw the complexities of the fault 
terms to the surface, aiming at, as Gainer states,  
 
  ... simplifying the law with regard to mental elements, while substantially increasing 
the level of sophistication.665 
 
Problems emerge with the use of element analysis, however, where commentators have 
attempted to employ it in this context without accepting its use more generally. For 
example, at various stages the Law Commission have rejected the use of element analysis 
within the reform of general inchoate offences because of (what they believed was) an 
inability to separate the elements of all offences objectively.666 However, even during these 
periods, the Commission still continued to employ element analysis when defining the fault 
terms.667 When the fault terms were not defined in such a way as to vary their meaning 
between elements, such an approach may seem ill-advised,668 but it is not necessarily 
contradictory.669 When fault terms are defined differently depending upon which element 
they are applying to, however, the position is rather different.   
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 See, Law Commission, The Mental Element in Crime (Consultation No 31, 1970), Law Commission, Report on 
the Mental Element in Crime (Law Com No 89, 1978) and Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and 
Wales (2 vols) (Law Com No 177, 1989) cl 8.  
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 Gainer, ‘The culpability provisions of the MPC’ (1987) 19 Rutgers Law Journal 575, 588.  
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 See discussion in chapter 3, pp52-72. 
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 See, for example, Law Commission, Report on the Mental Element in Crime (Law Com No 89, 1978) and Law 
Commission, Attempt and Impossibility in Relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement (Law Com No 102, 
1980).  
668
 It is ill-advised because, if one cannot distinguish the elements of an offence, how can it be useful to define 
the fault terms in relation to elements that will never be of relevance?   
669
 This is the position in, for example, in Law Commission, Report on the Mental Element in Crime (Law Com 
No 89, 1978). In this Report, having defined the fault terms in relation to the various offence elements, the 
Commission state that recklessness as to circumstances and recklessness as to results should be defined in the 
same way because of the difficulty of separating the two elements in practice [61].  
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The most prominent example of this contradiction can be found in relation to the definition 
of intention. For those that reject the use of element analysis within the reform of the 
general inchoate offences, the most popular alternative has been to require D to intend 
every element of the principal offence. As Smith has pointed out,670 however, if offences like 
attempt were to require D to intend every element of the principal offence, it would be very 
difficult to demonstrate that D intended the circumstance element. For example, if D set out 
to receive goods that he or she knew or believed were stolen, it is very unlikely that D would 
be unduly disappointed if he or she were to discover that the goods were not in fact 
stolen.671 Therefore, the temptation is to interpret intention as to circumstances widely to 
include knowledge as well as purpose. However, if this definition is in variance to the 
definition of intention as to results, then this will re-open the requirement of distinguishing 
between the circumstance element and the result element of the principal offence.672    
 
In the Law Commission’s 1980 report on attempts,673 the report that led to the 1981 
Criminal Attempts Act, the Commission fall victim to the contradiction. Having expressly 
rejected the use of element analysis,674 the Commission state that attempts liability should 
require D to intend every element of the principal offence in order (partly) to avoid having 
to separate its elements. However, the Commission then go on to define intention as to 
circumstances to include “knowledge of the factual circumstances”675 whilst stating in 
relation to results, that “there is no room for the broader concept of intent which... we 
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 Smith, ‘Rape – R v Pigg’ (1982) Criminal Law Review 446. 
671
 The motivation behind D’s choice to handle the goods is likely to relate to payment or profit rather than a 
desire to break the law. 
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 Smith, ‘Rape – R v Pigg’ (1982) Criminal Law Review 446, 449.  
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 Law Commission, Attempt and Impossibility in Relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement (Law Com No 
102, 1980). 
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 Ibid, [2.12].  
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describe as having no substantial doubt as to the results of the conduct.”676 In this manner, 
the Commission at once confirm their rejection of element analysis and (through its use to 
define the fault terms) make its use essential in order to operate their desired policy.  
 
The preferred method of element analysis, by separating and clarifying the role of the 
ulterior fault element, can also provide benefits in this area. This is because, even where 
element analysis has been used to help define the fault terms, commentators rarely seem to 
consider the general inchoate offences and ulterior fault in general. The problem with this is 
that, if only choate offences are considered, a narrower range of fault terms will potentially 
apply to each offence element. For example, within the US Model Penal Code, only 
‘purposely’677 and ‘knowingly’678 are defined in relation to the act element, with the fault 
terms ‘recklessly’679 and ‘negligently’680 defined solely in relation to circumstances and 
results.681 And for Simons, even this seems excessive. Preferring that the act element should 
only have relevance in relation to ‘voluntariness’ and not apply to the other fault terms, 
Simons contends that:  
 
... it is normally unduly confusing, and not analytically helpful, to retain this 
category.682       
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 Law Commission, Attempt and Impossibility in Relation to Attempt, Conspiracy and Incitement (Law Com No 
102, 1980), [2.17].  
677
 US MPC §2.02(2)(a)(i). 
678
 US MPC §2.02(2)(b)(i).  
679
 US MPC §2.02(2)(c). 
680
 US MPC §2.02(2)(d). 
681
 For a useful chart setting out the various fault definitions in the MPC, see, Robinson and Grall, ‘Element 
analysis in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and beyond’ (1983) 35 Stanford Law Review, 681, 697.  
682
 Simons, ‘Should the Model Penal Code’s mens rea provisions be amended?’ (2003) 1 Ohio Journal of 
Criminal Law, 179, 183.  
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Such a position is perfectly reasonable if we only consider D’s fault in relation to an act that 
he or she has already completed: D must always move his or her body 
intentionally/voluntarily in order to come within the criminal law.683 However, where D is 
foreseeing a future event and the future bodily movement of (potentially) another 
individual, it is quite possible to apply the other fault terms. For example, the offence of 
conspiracy could be redefined to convict D that agrees with P to commit a future offence, 
reckless as to whether P will go on to commit the act element of that offence.684 A failure to 
define the fault terms with the possibility of ulterior fault in mind is, therefore, a failure that 
either unnecessarily limits the legislature or unnecessarily complicates the law.685       
 
An example of how this approach can add further complexity to the law can be found within 
the Law Commission’s recent report on Intoxication.686 In this report, the Commission 
define the fault applicable to the act element in terms of ‘volition’,687 a term that ties them 
to the narrow approach to fault cautioned above.688 The Commission seems to prefer the 
term volition because, having stated that voluntary intoxication can only replace a state of 
                                                          
683
 Several commentators agree with Simons on this point. See, for example, Robinson and Grall, ‘Element 
analysis in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and beyond’ (1983) 35 Stanford Law Review, 681, 723 and 
Smith, ‘Two problems in criminal attempts’ (1956) 70 Harvard Law Review, 422, 426.  
684
 Although such a policy has not been suggested within the field of general inchoate offences currently under 
discussion, recklessness as to the act element of the principal offence currently suffices for joint criminal 
venture liability. See Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007).   
685
 For discussion of this point in relation to the US MPC, see Robinson, ‘A functional analysis of the criminal 
law’ (1994) Northwestern University Law Review, 857, 865 and Robinson, ‘Should the criminal law abandon the 
actus reus – mens rea distinction?’ in Shute, Gardner and Horder (eds) Action and value in criminal law 
(Clarendon Press, 1993), 187, 205.  
686
 Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Law Com No 314, 2009).  
687
 Ibid, [1.11] fn16.  
688
 D can move his or her body through volition, but D cannot relate to a future action (of either him or herself 
or another) in volitional terms.  
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fault which is lesser or equivalent to recklessness,689 they then go on to establish that it can 
replace a volitional action.690  
 
There are two major problems with this, neither of which are expressly dealt with within the 
report. First, although the Commission have avoided the term intention in relation to the act 
element, it is difficult to see how a state of volition is any more likely come below a standard 
of recklessness. The second problem is that even if we accept that volition can rate 
alongside recklessness, D cannot relate to a future action (within the general inchoate 
offences) in volitional terms. Rather, in this context at least, surely the Commission should 
recognise a requirement of intention: a requirement that (if their policy is to be consistent) 
should be added to the list of integral elements which cannot be replaced by voluntary 
intoxication. Having expressly stated that the current list of integral elements is 
exhaustive691 however, the Commission’s recommendations (in this regard) provide a 
further layer complexity and inconsistency, a layer that could have been removed by the 
express consideration of future (ulterior) act elements.692  
 
Clarifying role and legislating every element  
 
The second area in which the express and separate consideration of ulterior fault may be of 
assistance is within the process of legislating for the general inchoate offences. Although a 
relatively basic point, it is nevertheless true to say that the construction of general inchoate 
                                                          
689
 Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability (Law Com No 314, 2009) [3.32-3.41].  
690
 Ibid, [3.46] fn53.  
691
 Ibid, [3.48].  
692
 For a discussion of these issues, and other problems raised by the report, see Child, ‘Drink, drugs and law 
reform: A review of Law Commission Report No.314’ 7 (2009) Criminal Law Review 488.   
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offences is highly complex. As a result, even when expert bodies like the Law Commission 
are involved, it can be easy to leave an element (particularly within the mens rea) 
undefined.693 For example, as discussed above, although the use of element analysis within 
the recent Law Commission publications on the general inchoate offences has the potential 
to lead to much clearer offence definitions, there remains some doubt as to the fault 
requirements of D in relation to his or her own conduct as well as aspects of the ulterior 
fault.694 By separating the consideration of ulterior fault in the manner set out in the charts 
above, it is contended that such omissions (however slight) can be avoided: every box 
within the chart is relevant to D’s potential liability and so we require a statement of policy 
to be inserted within each one.  
 
Element analysis is therefore a useful tool through which to expose legislative gaps within 
the law. As discussed in chapter 2, this has the potential to improve the democratic control 
of Parliament: if gaps are exposed at a legislative phase then they can also be corrected at 
that stage rather than within the courts. However, it is important to note that the preferred 
method does not necessitate a greater Parliamentary role within the finer points of the law. 
Having exposed a gap, Parliament may well choose to either leave the issue to the discretion 
of the common law, or to fill the gap with such open textured language that in practice 
leaves much to the common law. Therefore, the advantage here is not necessarily based on 
Parliamentary input, so much as general clarity. If more gaps within the law are clearly 
defined, then the questions of whether and how they should be dealt with also become 
much more straightforward.  
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 Undefined elements are also common within choate offences as well. See, Robinson and Grall, ‘Element 
analysis in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and beyond’ (1983) 35 Stanford Law Review, 681, 699-700.  
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The express use of element analysis within the latest Law Commission publications on the 
general inchoate offences (and Part Two of the Serious Crime Act 2007) almost inevitable 
dominate ones attention in this area. However, the brief discussions of fault and legislating 
above is intended to demonstrate that, even without the recent policies of the Commission, 
the use of the preferred method of element analysis should still play a leading role within 
the simplification and clarification of the law. For example, even if we decided for certain 
general inchoate offences that D should require the same level of fault in relation to every 
element of the offence, it will remain necessary to employ element analysis in order to 
inquire whether that fault term will apply in the same manner to each element. Likewise, if 
we wish to legislate effectively, element analysis presents an opportunity to lay out complex 





SEPARATING THE ELEMENTS OF SECONDARY LIABILITY 
OFFENCES 
 
The debate surrounding the potential usefulness of element analysis has traditionally 
focused, almost exclusively, on inchoate offences (and the general inchoate offences in 
particular). Indeed, despite the fact that the law of secondary liability also operates 
generally across the criminal law, it has largely remained absent from discussion.695 
However, in the recent Law Commission report on secondary liability,696 the Commission 
has both expressly incorporated the use of element analysis within their discussion of 
complicity, and relied upon it to structure their recommended reforms. Although these 
recommendations have not yet been accepted or acted upon by the Government, they 
provide a useful indication of how element analysis may be able to facilitate a greater level 
of clarity and fairness. Therefore, the chart based dissection of secondary liability (below) 
will focus on the recommendations of the Commission as opposed to the current law.     
 
In relation to the aims of Part III, focusing on the straightforwardness and usability of the 
technique, the use of element analysis within the law of secondary liability represents an 
ultimate challenge. This is because, not only does the structure of secondary liability include 
fault requirements relating to a principal offence (replicating the challenges identified 
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 For an interesting, though brief, exception to this lack of debate, see Robinson and Grall, ‘Element analysis 
in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and beyond’ (1983) 35 Stanford Law Review, 681, 732-744, 
analysing the potential role of element analysis within the US MPC complicity provisions.  
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 Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007).  
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within the structuring of general inchoate offences in chapter 10), but it also includes the 
requirement that that principal offence should be completed before the secondary party 
becomes liable. As Smith has commented: 
 
Anyone with even the most glancing and superficial acquaintance with English criminal 
law will have been struck by the sheer complexity of the rules relating to complicity.697  
 
Setting out these rules within the charts below, we aim to demonstrate not only that the 
preferred method of element analysis will not add to this complexity, but rather that it has 
the potential to make a significant contribution in terms of simplification.  
 
The Law Commission has recommended the creation of four separate offences to replace 
the current common law rules:698 
 
1. Assisting and encouraging an offence (clause 1); 
2. Participating in a joint criminal venture (clause 2); 
3. Using an innocent agent (clause 4); and 
4. Causing a no-fault offence (clause 5).  
  
In order to demonstrate how the preferred method of element analysis can be employed, 
we will focus on the main complicity offence (clause 1). Clause 1 criminalises D that assists 
or encourages P to commit a principal offence where P goes on to commit that offence.  
 
                                                          
697
 Smith K.J.M, ‘The Law Commission Consultation Paper on complicity: Part 1: A blueprint for rationalism’ 
(1994) Criminal Law Review, 239.  
698
 Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007) Appendix A, Participating in Crime Bill.  
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Complicity  Act Element Circumstance Element Result Element 
Actus Reus D’s bodily 
movement 
D’s act must be capable of 
assisting or encouraging the 
act element of the principal 
offence 
D’s act must have assisted or 
encouraged P to complete 
the act element of the 
principal offence699 
















Ulterior Fault P’s Act P’s Circumstance P’s Result Element P’s Ulterior Fault 
                                                          
699
 Although actual assistance or encouragement will remain a requirement of complicity, it will be assumed 
unless there is evidence to the contrary. Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007) 
[3.24].   
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Element Element Element Element 
D’s fault in 
relation to 
the Actus 









Belief that if the 
act is done, it will 




Belief that if the 
act is done it will 
be done with the 
relevant results  
D’s fault in 
relation to 
the Mens 












Belief that P will 
have the requisite 
fault  
Or 
If D were to have 
done the act, he or 
she would have 
had the requisite 
fault 
(Where required) 
Belief that P will 
have the requisite 
fault 
Or 
If D were to have 
done the act, he or 
she would have 
had the requisite 
fault 
(Where required) 
Belief that P will 
have the fault 
required 
Or 
If D were to have 
done the act, he or 
she would have 
had the requisite 
fault 
 
Beyond the rules relating to D, complicity liability requires that we must also demonstrate 


































THE BENEFITS OF THE PREFERRED MODEL  
 
The main benefit of using element analysis as a structure for complicity is that it has allowed 
the Commission a greater variety of options for reform. We have already explored how 
these new options have been utilised in relation to the general inchoate offences, with the 
Commission choosing to differentiate the ulterior fault requirements of D in relation to the 
different elements of the principal offence.700 Likewise, the Commission’s complicity 
recommendations also rely upon a similar distinction. Under the current law, D requires the 
ulterior fault of knowledge in relation to P’s future offence.701 However, as the above chart 
sets out, the Commission’s recommendations distinguish between the act element of P’s 
principal offence (that D must intend) and the other elements (that D must believe will 
                                                          
700
 For example, for attempt and conspiracy, D is required to intend the act and result elements of the future 
offence, but he or she need only be reckless as to the circumstance element if that level of fault is also 
sufficient under the definition of the principal offence.  
701
 Johnson v Youden [1950] 1 K.B. 544.  
273 
 
come about). It is the use of element analysis, as opposed of offence analysis, which makes 
this distinction possible.  
 
The other major benefit of element analysis, and the preferred method of element analysis 
in particular, is the clarity that it brings to our understanding of the offence. This may seem 
like an odd statement. After all, if one looks at the complicity offence above, spread across 
three charts, it would be reasonable to be struck by an apparent complexity. However, the 
question is not whether complicity is made simple by element analysis, but rather whether 
the offence is made more straightforward than is currently the case. 
 
Element analysis is able to separate and individuate the (many) requirements of complicity. 
However, although this set of requirements may seem complex, it should be remembered 
that the use of element analysis has not created them. To those that do not examine the 
offence of complicity closely, the broad brush strokes of the common law and offence 
analysis may beguile the reader from the true extent of its intricate nature. However, to 
those that explore the offence, those same broad strokes prove to be a frustration, 
undermining attempts to ensure certainty and consistency. As the charts above 
demonstrate, if we were to ask the simple offence analysis question of ‘what is the mens 
rea of complicity?’, any single answer is likely to be either ‘hopelessly inadequate’702, or to 
be so complex and qualified as to lack any useful sense. 
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 This is Robinson’s description of the current definition of complicity (not employing element analysis) 
contained in the US MPC, §2.06(3). Robinson rightly observes that element analysis not only holds the key to 
exposing this inadequacy, but also to go much of the way towards remedying it. Robinson and Grall, ‘Element 
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Rather than questioning the quality of the response however, the use of element analysis 
shows us that the problem lies with the question. Instead of asking what the mens rea of 
complicity is in general terms, we should instead identify the various elements that are 
required in order to satisfy that mens rea. As long as each of these individual requirements 
(questions) are sufficiently straightforward to understand and apply, and as long as the sum 
of these individual requirements constitutes the mens rea of the offence without further 
work, then the task of those understanding and applying the law will be significantly 
simplified. Indeed, it is an approach that is employed by the Law Commission very 
effectively in their report: although they separate their discussion of complicity broadly into 
actus reus and mens rea, they then further sub-divide that discussion in line with an 
element analysis approach.703   
 
In this manner, the Law Commission’s use of element analysis adds much needed clarity to 
their discussion of complicity. However, as was the case with our discussion of the general 
inchoate offences above, the preferred method of element analysis (as opposed to that 
employed by the Commission) is still able to expose problems with the Commission’s 
approach.  
 
First, we can again expose a lack of detail in relation to mens rea. Although the various 
elements of D’s ulterior fault requirements are clearly set out in the report, the mens rea 
relating to D’s acts of assisting or encouraging are barely mentioned. The result of this is 
that it does not appear that D must have any mens rea with regard to the assisting or 
                                                          
703
 Significantly, this approach is employed both within the discussion of their recommendations (Part 3), and 
within their discussion of the current law (Part 2 and Appendix B). The use of element analysis within the latter 
further demonstrates its usefulness as an analytical tool independent of its potential as a model for law 
reform. Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007).  
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encouraging effects of his or her conduct.704 But surely this is not right. The Commission are 
not advocates of thought crime, where D is liable simply because he or she intends a crime 
to be committed. However, if the only (non-ulterior) mens rea required by D is that he or 
she intends to do the act of assisting or encouraging, without any appreciation of the fact 
that it will assist or encourage P, then their recommendations would not fall far short of a 
purely thought based offence. This is particularly true if one considers the Commission’s 
broad interpretation of the range of acts that constitute assisting or encouraging.705 In this 
vein, it is much more likely that the Commission would prefer D to be at least reckless as to 
whether his or her conduct might assist or encourage P, thereby removing the inadvertent 
assister or encourager from liability. However, it is only through the use of the preferred 
method of element analysis that this potential problem is exposed, and it is only through its 
further use (specifying the exact mens rea requirements in this area) that it can be resolved 
with any degree of clarity. 
 
The second problem with the Commission’s approach is very different from the first, but 
potentially just as serious. This problem relates to the Commission’s drafting of their clause 
2 offence, joint criminal venture. Having discussed this offence in the report with a similar 
level of detail to clause 1 (assisting and encouraging), the Commission’s appended draft Bill 
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 See the starred boxes in the chart.  
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 See, Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007) [3.9-3.41].  
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(1) This section applies where two or more persons participate in a joint criminal 
venture.  
(2) If one of them (P) commits an offence, another participant (D) is also guilty of 
the offence if P’s criminal act falls within the scope of the venture. 
(3) The existence or scope of a joint criminal venture may be inferred from the 
conduct of the participants (whether or not there is an express agreement). 
(4) D does not escape liability under this section for an offence committed by P at 
a time when D is a participant in the venture merely because D is at that time. 
(a) absent, 
(b) against the venture’s being carried out, or 
(c) indifferent as to whether it is carried out.706 
 
Thus, clause 2 tells us that D may be liable if he or she participates in a joint criminal venture 
with P and P goes on to commit an offence that comes within the scope of that venture. But 
what does this mean? Having employed element analysis to evaluate the current law and 
then to construct their recommended offence, the drafting of this clause represents a 
significant shift in priorities. Rather than setting out the detail of their recommendations in 
the draft Bill, the Commission opted for an open textured statement of the law that relies 
on the courts to read in the necessary detail. 
 
The problem with this open textured approach is that it risks undermining any of the good 
use that the Commission had previously made of element analysis. The central advantage of 
element analysis is that it is able to clearly set out the detail of complex offences, both to 
the public and to the courts charged with applying the law. However, the drafting of clause 
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 Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007), Appendix A, cl 2.  
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2 is at best imprecise, and at worst misleading. Sullivan, for example, who fundamentally 
disagrees with the Law Commission’s approach in this area, has already highlighted the 
vagaries of clause 2 as an opportunity for the judiciary to interpret future legislation in a 
manner inconsistent with the Law Commission’s approach.707 Thus, although the detailed 
discussion within the report makes the Commission’s desired approach very clear, the draft 
clause does not protect that detail from (inadvertent or, in Sullivan’s case, wilful) 
misinterpretation. So, why did the Commission chose this approach to the drafting of clause 
2? 
 
The answer to this question seems to be solely concerned with addressing the complexity 
criticism. As the Commission tells us in their explanatory notes to the draft Bill, the origins of 
this clause came from a competition between two rival drafts, one setting out the full detail 
of the offence and the other (the one currently under discussion) drafted more simply and 
relying on the court for interpretation.708 With the Commission’s Advisory Group 
demonstrating a ‘clear preference for the more open textured Bill’709, it was this that was 
preferred.  
 
It is a preference that should be regretted. The idea that the simple language of clause 2 
represents the answer to the complexity criticism is far from evident. It is true that any 
complexity will be hidden from the face of the legislation, but since the Commission still 
wishes the legislation to be interpreted in line with the report, that complexity must re-
emerge for the offence to function.  
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 Law Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007), [A14-A31]. 
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With this in mind, we can legitimately question who is benefitting from the Commission’s 
simply worded Bill? For legal professionals and the judiciary, it is possible that the simplicity 
of clause 2 will actually make this area more complex. With so much of the vital offence 
definition outside of the legislation, a heavy reliance will inevitably be placed on the 
contents of the report. However, with a report lacking any of the binding effects of primary 
legislation, the potential for inconsistency of use and interpretation will inevitably be 
increased. The authors of the Commission’s report may criticise Sullivan’s contentions about 
the possible reinterpretation of clause 2, after all, it is the job of the court to examine the 
context of open textured legislation rather than to view it in a vacuum.710 However, even a 
glimpse at the recent history of criminal attempts, for example, can show us that the courts 
will not always follow this mould.711 Therefore, as the number relevant sources increase 
(potentially including inconsistent case law) so the definition of the offence becomes harder 
to identify. Even in relation to the non-expert, it is doubted that the simply wording of 
clause 2 provides any real benefit. It is simple, but it lacks the information required to guide 
behaviour. What is a joint criminal venture? Does it require both parties to agree to commit 
an offence? Does it require them to intend that the other should commit the offence? 
 
The idea that the complexity criticism can be undermined by the beguiling language of this 
kind of legislation must be misguided. It is for this reason that chapters within Part III have 
                                                          
710
 See, Horder and Hughes, ‘Joint criminal ventures and murder: The prospects of law reform’ (2009) 20 Kings 
Law Journal, 379, 389. Professor Jeremy Horder and Mr David Hughes were Commissioner and Team Leader 
respectively for the Law Commission on the complicity project.   
711
 Despite the Law Commission report leading to the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 clearly stating a policy in 
which D is required to intend every element of the principal offence, recent cases have utilised the open 
texture of the legislation to allow for liability where D merely foresees the circumstance element. See 
discussion in chapter 3 generally.    
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looked beyond the use of simple language. As we identified in the discussion of general 
inchoate offences,712 it seems that much of the complexity criticism is based upon the 
Commission’s conflating of mens rea relating to D’s actus reus and D’s ulterior mens rea. By 
clearly separating ulterior mens rea into a new element, the preferred method of element 
analysis may still appear complex at first glance, but upon closer inspection represents the 
most straightforward and practical option.  
 
A PROBLEM UNIQUE TO COMPLICITY 
 
Complicity offences are unique within the criminal law. In a similar manner to the general 
inchoate offences, complicity requires D to have a certain ulterior mens rea in relation to 
the various elements of P’s principal offence.713 However, in addition to this ulterior mens 
rea, complicity also includes the requirement that the principal offence should have actually 
been completed. The problem with this additional requirement is that it includes a further 
qualification that is very difficult to place within an element analysis structure: the principal 
offence committed by P must be sufficiently similar to that anticipated by D to justify his or 
her liability as a secondary party.714 
 
The first problem with this qualification, as indicated, is its placement within the separation 
of elements. As the external comparison between D’s ulterior mens rea and a separate 
event (the principal offence), we are clearly not dealing with a mens rea requirement. 
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 See Chapter 10. 
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 See chart above.  
714
 Although this qualification is generally only discussed in the context of joint criminal ventures and collateral 
offence, it is likely that it also applies across all complicity offences. For recognition of this point, see, Law 
Commission, Participating in Crime (Law Com No 305, 2007), [3.165].   
280 
 
However, looking to the elements of D’s actus reus, the qualification is neither something 
that D must physically do (act element) or cause to be done715 (result element). Therefore, 
one might conclude that it should be part of D’s circumstance element requirements. 
However, as requirements within the circumstance element must be satisfied at the same 
time the act element is performed, this will not be possible: D’s act of assistance or 
encouragement is necessarily prior to the completion of the principal offence. Therefore, 
although we can state what the qualification is, uniquely within the criminal law, we cannot 
place it within the elements of element analysis.     
 
The second problem is that, without a clear place within the structure of element analysis, 
we are left unsure how the qualification should be applied in practice. Under the current 
law, we are told that D will be liable as a secondary party as long as P’s offence is not 
‘fundamentally different’ from that anticipated by D.716 Employing offence analysis, this 
question is clearly intended to apply broadly, comparing D’s intentions with what actually 
happened. However, having separated the elements of both D’s ulterior mens rea and the 
elements of the principal offence, one may question whether the Law Commission are 
assuming a similar approach to be taken to the comparison between them. For example, 
rather than comparing the mens rea of D and the principal offence in general terms, 
perhaps the Commission would prefer us to compare each element separately, asking 
whether the act element of P’s offence is sufficiently similar to that intended by D and so 
on. 
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 As the chart indicates, the only causal requirement within complicity relates to D’s causing of the act 
element of P’s offence.   
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 Powell and Daniels, English [1999] 1 A.C. 1.  
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Regrettably, the Commission’s report and draft Bill are both silent on this issue. However, 
drawing upon the more detailed draft Bill (eventually discarded by the Commission), there is 
some indication that they would prefer an approach that examined each element 
separately.717 In this manner, if any one element of P’s principal offence were to go ‘far 
beyond’ what was intended or foreseen by D, then D will not be liable as a secondary 
party.718 The problem with this approach, however, is where a single element of P’s offence 
may be very different from what D anticipated, but the offence as a whole is still sufficiently 
similar to warrant the imposition of liability. It is a potential problem that is exacerbated by 
the preferred model of element analysis. For example, let us imagine a situation in which D 
encourages P to damage V’s new car, foreseeing that P will do so through the use of a 
hammer. If P does damage the car, but instead of the hammer he or she chooses to do so by 
kicking the car instead, we would not like to see D escape conviction for encouraging 
criminal damage. However, the act element (defined as bodily movement) anticipated by D, 
and the actual movement of P used to complete the offence, are entirely dissimilar. With 
this in mind, it seems clear that the only way to avoid unfairness is to abandon the use of 
element analysis in this area. We must still compare the ulterior mens rea of D with the 
principal offence completed by P, but this should be done in general terms. 
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 Horder and Hughes, ‘Joint criminal ventures and murder: The prospects of law reform’ (2009) 20 Kings Law 
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It is clear that the use of element analysis generally, and the use of the preferred method of 
element analysis in particular, can have a positive impact in the reform and operation of 
complicity offences.  
 
The unique problems identified above are troubling, and involve concessions to the use of 
element analysis not tolerated in any other area of the criminal law. However, their 
importance should not be exaggerated. The preferred method of element analysis is still 
able to guide us through the majority of the complexity within the offences. It is only at the 
end of this process, when we have established that D satisfies both the mens rea and the 
actus reus of the offence, that a comparison is made between P’s offence and that 
anticipated by D. It is only at this stage that we are forced from the specific inquiry of 
element analysis, and must instead look at the relationship between the ulterior mens rea 
and the reality more broadly. 
 
It is a concern that these potential problems have not been identified either by the 
Commission in their report, or by the academic community following the publication of the 
recommendations. Without explicit recognition of the unique challenges in this area, they 
would certainly have led to confusion and perhaps infected a similar uncertainty into other 
areas of the offence definition. However, having clearly identified these potential problems, 
we are not only able to isolate their effects, but also provide guidance on their 




THE ROLE OF DEFENCES 
 
The use of element analysis in order to examine the role of criminal defences is another 
area, along with secondary liability discussed in chapter 12, that has not attracted 
considerable academic attention. One of the few commentators to have done so in detail, 
however, is Robinson.  
 
For Robinson, rather than viewing defences as a distinct concern to follow on from the 
analysis of the elements of an offence, certain defences should rather be viewed as part of 
the offence itself.719 In this vein, element analysis provides a useful vehicle through which to 
demonstrate the role. On a very general level, for example, one could contend that within 
every offence there is a circumstance element to the effect that what is done is done 
without a valid defence. The advantage of this approach, particularly in relation to 
justificatory defences is that, rather than the law saying that D committed an offence and is 
then exonerated on the basis of a defence, it could say that D has not committed an offence 
at all. For Robinson, this taps into one of his major aims in terms of the codification of the 
law: rather than traditional divisions, we should instead focus on separating aspects of 
criminal law depending upon their role in rule articulation, offence liability etc. Under this 
method, certain defences will form part of (usually) the circumstance element of an offence 
and others will follow the analysis of the offence in the traditional manner.720   
 
                                                          
719
 See, Robinson, Structure and Function in Criminal Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1997) 137-142. 
720
 Ibid, 139. 
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Although Robinson’s approach is an interesting and potentially valuable one, its ambitions 
stand firmly outside of the confines of this thesis. We may point out, in support of element 
analysis, that the novelty of Robinson’s approach (to the extent that it appeals) could not be 
achieved without the express use of element analysis. However, in relation to this project, 
we must view it with a note of caution. As Smith and Hogan have pointed out: 
 
... the enumeration of the elements of an offence becomes impossibly cumbersome if 
it has to include all conceivable defences.721 
 
It is on this basis that the preferred method of element analysis, as set out in this thesis, will 
opt for the traditional approach to defences. When attempting to separate the elements of 
already very complex offences, the added dimension of defences within the offence 
elements would represent a considerable and largely unnecessary complicating factor. Of 
course, if an approach similar to that of Robinson’s one were to prove so desirable as to 
outweigh this concern, then the preferred method would allow for its incorporation. 
However, for the time being, we opt for the more straightforward approach. 
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THE FUTURE OF (AND ALTERNATIVES TO) ELEMENT 
ANALYSIS 
 
As discussed in Part III, when exploring the usability of a technique like element analysis, 
which proposes to reconceive the internal structuring of offences without amending their 
substantive content, there will always be a natural reluctance on the part of those within 
the criminal law. However, the preferred method of element analysis promises to deliver a 
host of much coveted benefits. To those working to reform the most complex offences, the 
preferred method shines a bright light into each element of the offence, demanding 
comment or explicit avoidance at each stage. For legal academics and law students, the 
preferred technique again offers comprehensibility, but also the opportunity to focus 
comment and analysis on individual areas of an offence in a clear and straightforward 
manner. And finally, for lay people both within the community and within juries, the break 
down allows otherwise complex offences to be understood in their bite sized portions. As 
Robinson has commented: 
 
Such precise and clear offence definitions provide fair notice of the scope of the 
prohibition, [potentially] eliminate the need for judicial construction that may expand 
or reduce that scope, and delineate the scope so as to limit the arbitrary 
administration and application of criminal laws.722  
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 Robinson and Grall, ‘Element analysis in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and beyond’ (1983) 35 
Stanford Law Review, 681, 703-704. 
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Having established the objectivity of the preferred method in chapters within Part II, the 
chapters within Part III have demonstrated its ability to separate the elements of a range of 
the most complex criminal offences in a straightforward and logical manner. We are 
therefore in the position to reject the second major criticism of element analysis that it is 
too complex to be practically useful. Left only with a natural reluctance to change, we may 
look to the words of Jeremy Bentham when he stated that: 
 
[A]s grammar is taught by sentences thrown on purpose out of regime, and geography 
by dissecting maps, in a like manner might the art of legislation, particularly what 
might be styled the mechanical branch of it, be taught by means of shapeless laws, to 
be taken to pieces and put together again after the manner of the model.723 
 
In this manner, we may look beyond the criminal law as a traditional relic, and perceive it 
rather as an evolving tool of society. The preferred method will not change the content of 
the law directly, but it promises benefits no less dramatic. 
 
The concern however, is that this promise of future benefits may never be realised. Despite 
undermining the two central criticisms of element analysis, we are still not yet in a place to 
recommend its use without further investigation. This is because, faced with the 
inadequacies of the current law, particularly in relation to the general inchoate offences, 
academics that do not support the use of element analysis have developed alternative 
approaches. In Part IV, we now move on to compare the use of the preferred method of 
element analysis to these alternatives. 
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THE ALTERNATIVES TO ELEMENT ANALYSIS 
 
The preceding chapters have focused on the reformulation of element analysis. Drawing 
upon its historical and international development, we have questioned whether it is 
possible to avoid the criticisms of element analysis that have threatened to undermine it, 
whilst preserving its potential benefits. Despite a number of isolated complications,724 we 
have now concluded this process with a degree of optimism. Through the chapters within 
Part II, we have demonstrated how the preferred method of element analysis is able to 
facilitate the objective separation of offence elements without increasing its vulnerability to 
criticism within action theory. And equally, in the chapters within Part III, the preferred 
method is shown not simply to have avoided the complexity criticism, but potentially to aid 
the straightforward application and analysis of complex offences. Beyond this, the potential 
benefits of element analysis in terms of increased reform options and legal analysis, 
introduced in chapter 2 and then developed further in the chapters within Part III, are 
importantly maintained.        
 
Despite these many potential benefits, however, the future challenges for the advocate of 
element analysis (even the preferred method of element analysis) remain formidable. This is 
because, although it has been shown that the two major criticisms of element analysis can 
be overcome, the future success of the technique relies (to some extent) upon its almost 
universal acceptance within the criminal law. The preferred method of element analysis 
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 See, for example, parts of the discussion about secondary liability in Chapter 12.  
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makes it possible to separate the elements of every offence, as is required for the new 
assisting and encouraging provisions and any similarly structured reforms in the future.725 
Objective separation also makes it possible for academics to individuate and discuss aspects 
of complex offences with a greater degree of precision. However, unless offences are 
designed with this separation in mind, and unless element analysis becomes a common 
language within criminal law academia, such benefits will remain qualified. After all, if new 
offences are created without any consideration of how they would be separated in the 
context of inchoate liability for example, then not only are disagreements about separation 
more likely to persist, but the aim for Parliament to be gaining greater control over the 
operation of these offences will be lost.726 Also, if academics are to employ element analysis 
usefully within their discussion of complex or any kind of offences, then it must become a 
common language. If scholars are expected to set out how element analysis works, and to 
defend their own conception of it within every paper, then it will risk becoming simply 
another complex and unnecessary point of contention. 
 
With this in mind, our current examination of element analysis can only take us so far. 
Although this thesis has constructed a model of element analysis that has the potential to 
offer a range of benefits within the law, we have only briefly considered how the model is 
likely to be taken forward.  
 
In the United States, for example, one of the few jurisdictions to have fully incorporated a 
form of element analysis, promulgation of the technique was facilitated by its acceptance 
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 This also (potentially) includes the defining of fault terms. See discussion in Chapter 11.  
726
 For a discussion of the potential democratic benefits of element analysis, see Chapter 2, pp23-26.  
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first within the Model Penal Code, and then later within individual State Codes.727 In this 
manner, element analysis could be formally and explicitly incorporated into all aspects of 
the criminal law, from the definition of fault terms to the drafting of offences. Further, 
although we may criticise aspects of the US MPC,728 the opportunity to set out the 
definitions of offence elements within the General Part is also a significant advantage both 
in terms of further dissemination and in terms of consistency in application. Therefore, the 
potential adoption of the preferred model of element analysis within a criminal code 
appears to be the best option in order to realise the techniques full range of benefits. 
However, the history of criminal law codification within England and Wales sadly makes this 
route for element analysis extremely unlikely. Following a succession of costly attempts to 
produce and implement a criminal code,729 even the Law Commission has finally (and 
formally) shifted its ambitions away from grand-scale codification.730  
 
Rather than coming through the reform or creation of a criminal code, the central driving 
force behind element analysis in this jurisdiction has been the reform of general inchoate 
offences.731 By facilitating new and attractive reform options, element analysis has begun to 
take a grip within English law. Further, as it is being used to structure general offences of 
this kind, the effects are being felt across the criminal law. Already adopted within the new 
assisting and encouraging provisions, if similar reforms are accepted in relation to attempts, 
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 For discussion, see Robinson, ‘Element analysis in defining liability: The Model Penal Code and beyond’ 
(1983) 35 Stanford Law Review, 681. 
728
 See discussion in Chapter 3, pp79-82. 
729
 The most recent attempt took place in 1989. See, Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales 
(2 vols) (Law Com No 177, 1989).   
730
 See, Law Commission, 10
th
 Program of Law Reform (Law Com No. 311, 2008) and Editorial, ‘RIP: The 
Criminal Code (1968-2008)’ (2009) Criminal Law Review, 1.  
731
 See discussion in Chapter 2, pp32-41. 
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conspiracy and complicity,732 the de facto position of element analysis is likely to be 
equivalent to that of a formal codified role. At very least, the centrality of element analysis 
within such a large part of the criminal law will lead to the sort of general awareness 
identified above as a requirement for the technique’s success: awareness within the 
legislature, the courts, and the academic community. However, despite this likely line of 
trajectory, in the absence of a criminal code to cement the technique within the criminal 
law, the progress of element analysis along this route remains somewhat precarious. 
 
Most importantly, this relates to the general criticisms of element analysis that have formed 
the basis of this thesis. However, beyond this, the preferred model is also vulnerable to rival 
techniques that may not claim to offer benefits in terms of legal analysis, but do claim to 
provide superior models for the reform of the general inchoate offences. In the absence of a 
code which has the potential to realise all of the potential benefits of element analysis at 
once, this competition has the potential to undermine element analysis in its weakest 
formative stages. 
 
The next section takes a brief look beyond the viability of element analysis to compare the 
preferred model with its main rivals for the construction of general inchoate offences.  
 
 
ALTERNATIVE MODELS TO GENERAL INCHOATE LIABILITY 
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 See Part III generally. 
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In order to begin our search for the alternatives to element analysis, we must first return to 
ground already covered. As discussed in chapter 2,733 within a succession of Law 
Commission papers aimed at reforming the mens rea requirements of inchoate liability, 
element analysis has come to represent a unique middle ground between two equally 
unattractive extremes.  
 
The first of these extremes, a technique never garnering much support,734 would require D 
to have the same mens rea as he or she would be required to have for the principal offence. 
Let us consider an example of criminal attempt: attempted criminal damage.735 
 
D picks up a stone. Just as he motions to throw the stone, X, realising that it might 
hit and damage V’s window, prevents D from doing so. 
 
Within this example, to be liable for attempted criminal damage, D would therefore have to 
possess the mens rea required for the full offence of criminal damage. The advantage of this 
approach is that it recognises the moral equivalence of D that completes the offence and D 
that, though no choice of his or her own, is prevented from completing the offence. If the 
conduct of each defendant is morally equivelant, then surely the mens rea requirments 
should be the same. 
 
                                                          
733
 See pp32-41. 
734
 For a rare exception, see Loftis, ‘Criminal law: Requiring the same intent for prosecution of criminal attempt 
and the consummated crime’ (1984) 36 University of Florida Law Review, 545.  
735
 Although we are using a criminal attempt example, it is important to remember that these alternatives 
would work in the same way across each of the general inchoate offences.   
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However, although initially attractive, this approach has the potential to be considerably 
overinclusive. Let us imagine that D above is attempting to throw the stone, not in order to 
damage V’s window, but in order gain V’s attention. If D were to forsee that the stone might 
damage V’s window, and upon throwing the stone it did in fact do so, then we can accept 
his or her liability for criminal damage: D may not be acting maliciously, but he or she did 
recklessly cause the damage.736 However, if D forees the risk of damage but damage is not 
caused, either because the stone is thrown sufficiantly lightly or even (as above) because D 
is prevented from throwing it, prosecuting D for attempting to commit criminal damage 
seems harsh and inappropriate. D may have gone beyond mere preparation towards an act 
that he or she recognised might cause damage, satisfying the mens rea of the full offence, 
but damage was not intended and damage did not result. 
 
Indeed, similarly unsatisfactory outcomes would be reached across the criminal law. For 
example, if D’s actions cause the death of V, the law of murder does not require D to have 
intended death to result.737 However, if D attacked V causing injury but not death, it would 
surely be inapropriate to lable this as ‘attempted murder’ unless death formed part of D’s 
intentions. In this manner, we recognise that the actus reus of attempts, along with the 
other general inchoate offences, are not simply the moral equilenences of their 
corresponding full offence. The absance of resulting harm is not irrelevant, but rather leads 
to a greater focus on the mind of D. If D intended to cause the harm, then the fact it did not 
result does not undermine our condemnation of his or her actions. However, if D did not 
                                                          
736
 For the mens rea of the offence of criminal damage, D need only be reckless as to the possibility of damage 
being caused by his or her actions. Criminal Damage Act 1971 s1(1). 
737
 D must have, however, at least intended to cause V grievous bodily harm (Cunningham [1982] AC 566). 
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intend the harm, as in the examples above, then although we may still disaprove of the risk 
taken, this is qualified by a shared relief that the harm did not come about. 
 
The recognition that the general inchoate offences should be grounded with a requirment 
of intention in every case therefore leads to the rejection of the first alternative. However, 
not yet accepting the use of element analysis, it is a recognition that seemed to leave only 
one other realistic option for reform. This (second) alternative, accepted for conspiracy 
within the Criminal Law Act 1977 and for attempts within the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, 
requires D to intend the completion of every part of the principal offence regardless of that 
offences’ mens rea. Thus, within the attempted criminal damage example above, although 
the offence of criminal damage does not require intention, D would not be liable for the 
attempt unless he or she knew the window belonged to another and intended to cause 
damage to it. The offence is no longer overinclusive because if D is merely trying to get V’s 
attention with the stone and not to cause damage, he or she will not be liable for attempted 
criminal damage. Equally, D will only be liable for attempted murder if he or she intends to 
cause death.  
 
However, although this option seems to avoid the problem of overinclusivity, it has 
attracted considerable criticism for going too far the other way. This criticism is most clearly 
demonstrated through the use of another attempts based example: attempted rape. 
 
D and P go out to find a woman (V) with whom to have sex with. Without caring 
whether V consents or not, but recognising the likelihood that she will not, both D 




In this example, P has committed the offence of rape.738 P commits rape because he does 
not reasonably believe, at the time of penetration, that V is consenting. However, if the law 
of attempt were to operate in line with the second alternative currently under discussion, D 
would not be liable for attempted rape. This is because, although recklessness as to consent 
is sufficient mens rea for the full offence,739 if attempts liability were to require intention as 
to every element of that offence, then clearly the requirement of intention would not be 
satisfied. D intends to sexually penetrate V, but he does not intend (as he must) for V not to 
consent. Therefore, although this option represents (to some extent740) the position of the 
current law,741 its strict application would lead to a serious problem of under-inclusivity. 
 
One of the central attractions of element analysis therefore, has been its potential to forge a 
mid-way course between these unattractive extremes. By separating the elements of a 
principal offence, the inchoate form of liability can still require intention as to certain 
elements of the offence, thereby avoiding the over-inclusiveness of the first option. 
However, by isolating other elements of the offence (for example the circumstance 
element) to allow lower standards of fault, a policy can be constructed that also avoids the 
under-inclusiveness of the second option. 
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 Contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, s1. We are assuming that V does not consent to sexual 
intercourse and that P does not have a valid defence. 
739
 In fact, the offence of rape simply requires D not to have a reasonable belief in the presence of consent. 
Sexual Offences Act 2003, s1.  
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 For a discussion of how the courts have attempted to reinterpret the law in this area to avoid problems of 
under-inclusivity, see discussion in Chapter 2, pp32-41, and Khan [1990] 1 WLR 813.  
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 The Criminal Attempts Act 1981, s1(1). 
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The critics of element analysis have therefore been placed in a rather difficult position. 
Although they have highlighted the problems with element analysis and doubted its ability 
to operate in the manner required, these two alternatives do not provide an attractive fall-
back. Therefore, in the two decades since the Law Commission first identified element 
analysis as a viable option for reform, there have been considerable efforts made to develop 
an alternative mid-way course that does not rely on the controversial technique. It is these 
alternatives that are potentially most damaging to the future of element analysis, and it is to 
these alternatives that we now turn.   
 
An alternative mid-way course 
 
In this section we explore three options that have been propounded as specific alternatives 
to the use of element analysis. These alternatives are most closely associated with Williams, 
Stannard and Duff respectively. However, before we discuss each in detail, it is important to 
first set them in the context of the thesis. This is because, although each of these academics 
has attempted to construct a model to rival the position and use of element analysis, this 
has invariably arisen from the premise that element analysis does not work.742 Working 
from this base, against a non-functioning technique, the measure for success becomes much 
easier to satisfy: the challenge is not to compete with element analysis at all, but rather to 
construct the viable (or more viable) mid-way course that element analysis has failed to 
provide.  
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 See, for example, Williams, ‘Intents in the alternative’ (1991) 50(1) Cambridge Law Journal, 120, 120-121 
and Duff, Criminal Attempts (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1996) 10-14. To some extent Stannard represents 
an exception to this, see discussion below, pp301-305.   
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However, this thesis has set out a model of element analysis that is able to answer its critics, 
and therefore to provide a viable structure for the mid-way course outlined above. With this 
in mind, our discussion of the alternatives to element analysis must be recast, and a 
considerably higher measure for success must be set. As we explore each of the alternatives 
below, we are not simply looking for a method to dissect the unattractive extremes of the 
previous discussion; we are looking for a viable method that is able to provide benefits 
greater than those offered by the preferred model of element analysis. 
 
Option 1: Alternative or conditional intention 
 
The use of alternative or conditional intention as an alternative to element analysis has 
been variously mooted by a number of academics;743 however, it is probably most closely 
associated with the work Glanville Williams.744  
 
Speaking broadly, alternative intents can be categorised into two separate classes. The first 
class involves a form of alternative intention, very common within general inchoate 
offences, which will not affect D’s potential liability. For example, if D intends to rob a bank 
if the coast is clear, then we can describe his or her intention as conditional: if the coast is 
not clear then he or she will not rob the bank. However, this is still classed as a valid form of 
intention within the criminal law. This is because, although D’s intention includes a 
condition, that condition does not undermine the criminal nature of the first part of his or 
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 Interestingly, it is the only option of the three currently under discussion that the Law Commission chose to 
explicitly address in their recent report on Conspiracy and Attempt. Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts 
(Law Com No 318, 2009) [2.99-2.128].  
744
 See, most notably, Williams, ‘Intents in the alternative’ (1991) 50(1) Cambridge Law Journal, 120. 
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her ambition. D may intend to murder V only if he or she is aggravated by V; if V inherits 
some money; if the sun is shining; if D’s football team loses, but in law, D’s intention can be 
simply and accurately described as an intention to murder V.745    
 
The second class of alternative or conditional intention, however, will undermine a finding 
of intention within the criminal law. This is where D intends X (where X has the potential to 
lead to criminal liability), but only if X does not include all aspects required to be criminal. 
For example, if D intends to chop down a tree, then this has the potential to be an intention 
to cause criminal damage.746 However, if D intends to chop down the tree only if it is 
discovered that he or she owns the tree, then the intention can only be innocent. In common 
with the first class of conditional intent we again have an intention that is qualified by an 
external event. However, unlike that first class, here the condition is sufficient to undermine 
the criminal potential of that intention.747 
 
In order to understand how Williams has employed conditional intention as an alternative 
to element analysis, it is useful to return to the prior example of attempted rape. 
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 The only time in which this form of conditional intention may provide a cause to doubt the validity of D’s 
intention is where the conditions required to bring about the offence are extremely unlikely. For example, if 
D1 and D2 conspire to kill V if they win the lottery three times in a row, although this has the potential to be a 
perfectly valid form of intention, the extreme unlikelihood of the conditions arising may lead a jury to doubt 
whether D1 and D2 ever honestly intended to fulfil their agreement. See, Alexander and Kessler, ‘Mens Rea 
and Inchoate Crimes’ (1997) 87 Journal of Criminal law and Criminology, 1138.   
746
 Contrary to the Criminal Damage Act 1971, s1. 
747
 It may be possible to re-interpret this second class of conditional intention as simply the intention to bring 
about certain but not all elements of the principal offence. For example, in the example above, D intends the 
act and result elements of criminal damage (bodily movements that cause damage), but he or she does not 
intend the circumstance element (that the property damaged must belong to another). However, this form of 
alternative analysis is not relevant to our present task.    
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D and P go out to find a woman (V) with whom to have sex with. Without caring 
whether V consents or not, but recognising the likelihood that she will not, both D 
and P attempt penetration. Only P succeeds in his attempt.    
 
Focusing on the potential liability of D for attempted rape, it is clear that within D’s broad 
intention to penetrate V, there resides an alternative or conditional event relating to the 
presence or absence of consent. Indeed, it is upon this basis that we rejected the intention 
for all formulation to criminal attempts outlined above: if D is required to intend there to be 
a lack of consent then it seems he will avoid liability. However, rather than presenting D as 
intending to have sex and being reckless as to consent, Williams employs alternative 
intention to contend that D does in fact intend both to have sex with V and to do so with an 
absence of consent. Williams does this by recasting D’s intention as an alternative intention 
to have sex with V if she does consent, or, to have sex with her if she does not. 
 
His intention may be analysed as being an intention to copulate with the woman 
nolens or to copulate with her volens – to commit rape, or to enjoy consensual sex – as 
matters may turn out. He does not care which.748  
 
In this manner, Williams has taken an example that seemed to belong to the second class of 
alternative intents (undermining criminal intention), and demonstrated how it can be placed 
into the first class (not undermining criminal intention). Like D that will only rob a bank if the 
coast is clear, D in the present example intends to commit rape if V does not consent. In 
each case D intends to commit an offence if certain circumstances arise, and in each case we 
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 Williams, ‘Intents in the alternative’ (1991) 50(1) Cambridge Law Journal, 120, 121-122.  
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can therefore conclude that D intends (rather than is simply reckless) to commit an offence. 
As a result of this, without amendment to the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, Williams is able 
to accept the requirement of attempts that D should intend the principal offence, and to 
convict D of attempted rape. Element analysis is not required.  
 
Beyond criminal attempts, Williams’ alternative can also operate across the general 
inchoate offences. For example, in the case of Saik,749 D was charged with conspiracy to 
convert the proceeds of crime750 at his bureau de change. However, despite D’s suspicions 
relating to the money’s criminal origin, because he did not know or intend it to be the 
proceeds of crime, he was eventually acquitted of conspiracy by the House of Lords. 
Employing element analysis, the Law Commission have recommended that the law of 
conspiracy should be reformed to allow for conviction in cases such as this where D is 
reckless as to the presence of a circumstance.751 However, employing Williams’ conception 
of alternative intention, it is possible to maintain that D did intend to convert the proceeds 
of crime. This is because, as D intended to convert the money whatever its origin, we can 
conclude that he intended to convert it if it was the proceeds of crime and intended to 
convert it if it was not. Indeed, Baroness Hale’s dissenting judgement in Saik would have 
followed this line exactly:  
 
If, in our example, the conspirator agrees to launder the money even if at the time he 
does so he is told that it is in fact the proceeds of crime, then he does indeed intend 
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 Saik [2007] 1 A.C. 18. 
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 Contrary to the Criminal Law Act 1977, s1(1), the relevant substantive offence being contained in the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988, s93C(2).   
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 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009) Part 2.  
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that fact to be the case when he does the deed. The fact that he is equally happy to 
convert the money even if it is not the proceeds of crime makes no difference.752 
      
In this manner, although the general inchoate offences would be formulated to require 
intention as to every element of the principal offence, Williams’ conception of alternative 
intentions transforms this into a mid-way approach. 
 
However, although Williams’ alternative analysis of intention broadens the scope of liability, 
it has been criticised for not being able to go far enough. It is able to encompass D whose 
intention includes a ‘shopping list’753 of options: D intends rape if he intends to have sex 
with V nolens or to have sex with V volens, D intends murder if he or she plants a bomb 
intending it to kill or seriously injure V,754 and so on. However, if D’s intention is not spread 
across options, but is rather perused at the known risk of an unwanted circumstance or 
result, then Williams cannot classify that unwanted aspect to be part of D’s intention. To 
employ an example used by Williams, if D throws a stone at a window intending it to break 
the window and foreseeing the unwanted possibility that it might also injure V, he or she 
will be liable for assault if V is injured.755 However, if V is not injured, D will not be liable for 
an attempted assault (under William’s conception) because ‘an attempt requires intention, 
and here [D] does not intend to assault a person, even as an alternative intention.’756 D does 
not intend alternatively to either damage the window and/or injure V, but rather, D intends 
                                                          
752
 Saik [2007] 1 A.C. 18, 57.  
753
 Williams, ‘Intents in the alternative’ (1991) 50(1) Cambridge Law Journal, 120, 124. 
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only to damage the window. D foresees the possibility of injuring V, is willing to risk that 
possibility, but hopes that it will not come about.        
 
In the context of the stone thrower, the conclusion that he or she has not committed 
attempted assault (where V is unhurt) may seem to be perfectly acceptable. However, as 
Duff has highlighted, when this same policy is applied to other examples it soon becomes 
more troubling. For example, if D attempts to have sex with V, aware of the possibility of 
non-consent, but willing to run that risk in the hope that V will consent, then surely his 
intention is similar to that of the stone thrower.757 But should he be acquitted of attempted 
rape? If V was not consenting and D achieved penetration in these circumstances, he would 
be straightforwardly guilty of rape. Therefore, it would surely be unacceptable to acquit D 
when ‘part of Williams’ aim *in constructing a mid-way course] is precisely to show how we 
can convict such a man of attempted rape.’758 
 
The problems then, for Williams and his conception of alternative intention, are twofold. 
First, if we do wish to convict D of attempted rape in the example above, then it is clear that 
Williams’ mid-way course is not suitable as an alternative to element analysis: having 
reached the limits of Williams’ conception of intention we are still unable to convict D. 
Secondly, and more interestingly from the perspective of element analysis, even if we could 
stretch the limits of alternative intention to convict D of attempted rape in the above 
example, it is unlikely that we would want to. This is because, if we convict D of attempted 
rape on the basis that he continued to act with foresight of an unwanted risk, then we must 
also convict the stone thrower and others that we agree should be acquitted.  
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This much is also observed by Duff.759 However, it is not so much the dilemma that this 
causes for Williams that is interesting, so much as the obvious solution offered by element 
analysis. When we explore examples relating to consent in attempted rape, or the origin of 
money in conspiracies to convert the proceeds of crime, we are discussing circumstance 
elements of the principal offence. Whereas, when we explore examples such as the causing 
of injury in attempted assault, we are discussing result elements. By separating these 
elements through the use of element analysis, it is possible to require a lower standard of 
mens rea for one (for example, the circumstances) and a higher for the other (for example, 
the results). In this manner, we can distinguish the examples, acquitting D of attempted 
assault in the former760 and convicting D of attempted rape in the latter.761 It is this 
flexibility, as much as anything else, which is lacking from Williams’ alternative.   
 
Providing further bolster to the criticisms levelled by Duff, the Law Commission has also 
provided specific criticisms of the Williams approach. Employing a more practical analysis, 
the Commission has pointed out that even in the scenario where D intends to act whether 
or not a certain criminal aspect were to arise (Williams’ alternative intention), it would be 
very easy for D to claim the opposite in the event of criminal proceedings.762 For example, 
commenting specifically upon the conspiracy case of Saik, the Commission observes that 
this approach: 
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   … involves the jury speculating in a hypothetical way about what D would or would 
not have agreed to if he or she had known the truth at the time of the agreement. 
Answers to hypothetical questions may be particularly hard for the prosecution to 
persuade the jury to accept beyond reasonable doubt. It would be very easy for D to 
claim in almost any case of the sort under discussion that, “if I had known illegality of 
this kind was to be involved *without any doubt+, I would not have gone ahead.” 
 
Therefore, as well as failing to include certain defendants within the definitions of our 
general inchoate offences, Williams’ alternative also makes it more difficult to convict those 
that are included. 
 
Williams’ conception of alternative intention therefore succeeds in its attempt to construct 
a mid-way course that does not rely on element analysis, and is (arguably) preferable to the 
extremes of the previous approaches. However, in the light of its many critics, and more 
importantly, in the light of a functioning version of element analysis, it must be rejected.763     
 
 
Option 2: Missing elements 
 
The second alternative to element analysis is a novel technique developed by John Stannard 
in his article ‘Making up for the missing element – a sideways look at attempts.’764 Stannard 
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agrees that attempts liability intuitively requires intention on the part of D. However, in line 
with the Law Commission, Stannard only believes that intention should be required for 
certain elements of the principal offence. Where he diverts from the Commission, is that 
rather than employing element analysis to separate the elements requiring intention, 
Stannard contends that intention should only be required for those elements of the actus 
reus that are not satisfied/completed by D within the attempt. When an element of the 
actus reus of the principal offence is satisfied, D’s fault need only reach the standard 
required by the principal offence. For example, if D attempts to sexually penetrate V 
without V’s consent, then the only missing element of the actus reus of rape is the lack of 
penetration. Therefore, while this missing element must be intended for D to be liable for 
the attempt (the penetration), there is no requirement of intending or knowing about V’s 
non-consent. As V does not consent in fact (actus reus) then the only mens rea required of D 
in relation to this part of the actus reus is that required by the principal offence – the lack of 
a reasonable belief in consent.765  
 
In this manner, Stannard creates an intuitively plausible and relatively straightforward 
option to compete with element analysis. As much of the mens rea requirements are able to 
mirror those of the principal offence, we avoid the under-inclusiveness that would acquit D 
in the previous example of attempted rape if he did not know of V’s non consent. However, 
if D intentionally harms V in a manner that obviously risks but does not cause death, or if D 
intentionally throws a stone that risks but does not damage V’s window, we are not forced 
to hold D liable for attempted murder and attempted criminal damage in every case. Rather, 
as death and damage are missing elements of the respective principal offences, we only 
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hold D liable if he or she intended to bring them about. Therefore, in a rather 
straightforward manner, arguably simpler than element analysis, this approach seems to 
lead to the ‘correct’ results.766      
 
Despite the initial appeal of Stannard’s alternative, however, a series of problems with the 
technique soon undermine its ability to compete with a functioning version of element 
analysis. In order to demonstrate these problems we will first set out three of the major 
criticisms. These three are particularly interesting because, although they do not all 
originate from Duff, it is possible to identify a clear progression within Duff’s theory of 
attempts that may well have stemmed from the desire to answer these criticisms. Further 
criticisms of Stannard’s alternative, which are not addressed sufficiently in Duff’s work, will 
be explored in the section on Duff’s theory below. 
 
The first criticism of Stannard’s alternative is that it leads to over-inclusiveness in relation to 
certain offences, such as those of strict liability. For example, if D has his or her drink spiked 
with alcohol by P and then drives in excess of the alcohol limit, he or she will commit an 
offence despite a lack of knowledge or even recklessness in relation to the presence of that 
alcohol.767 Although D is not exactly at fault, his or her liability is justified by the potential 
danger caused by D to other road users. However, if D were to be stopped by a third party 
just before driving, and warned of what P had done, it would surely be inappropriate to 
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convict D of attempting to drive over the prescribed limit.768 Yet, as the only missing 
element of the principal offence is the driving, this will be the only element that will require 
D’s intention. D did intend to drive, and although he or she was not aware of the alcohol at 
the point of the attempt, as this element of the actus reus was satisfied, no knowledge will 
be required for conviction.     
 
The following two criticisms have both been specifically levelled by Duff. The first of these 
exposes a further area in which Stannard’s alternative appears to be over-inclusive in its 
reach. This is where, rather than the missing element being a result of D’s conduct (as is 
more usual with attempts), the missing element is a circumstance. The problem arises 
where D is reckless as to the present result and intends the absent circumstance.769 To 
employ Duff’s most common example: 
 
D borrows his neighbours drill to complete a DIY task because he fears that the job 
might damage the drill and does not want to risk his own. However, although the 
drill is damaged, it transpires that D had accidentally used his own (identical) drill by 
mistake.            
 
According to Stannard’s alternative, D in this example has attempted to commit criminal 
damage despite neither damaging his neighbours’ property nor intending to do so. This is 
because, although intention is required for the missing element (the ownership of the drill 
in use), the resulting damage is not missing and is therefore able to reflect the lower fault 
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requirements of the principal offence. Yet, once more, convicting D of attempt in this case 
appears to be highly inappropriate. As already highlighted, D did not intend to damage his 
neighbour’s property; he does not damage it and does not even (in fact) risk doing so.  
 
The final criticism of Stannard’s technique to be explored in this section begins as a 
potential riposte to the last one discussed. This is because, as Duff notes, it may be possible 
for Stannard to avoid the previous criticism by claiming that the missing element in the 
criminal damage example was not the presence of another’s property, but damage to 
another’s property. D intended the drill to belong to another (his or her neighbour), but he 
or she did not intend to damage property belonging to another, and therefore will not be 
liable for attempt.770 However, no sooner is the criticism deflected before Stannard is 
snared by its method of avoidance. If we are maintaining that another’s property is not an 
element of criminal damage, but that damage to another’s property is, on what basis are we 
doing so? Part of the justification for Stannard’s technique, as an alternative to element 
analysis, is the premise that we cannot objectively separate the elements of an offence. If 
we are now told that we must do so, but we are not told how, any initial appeal is likely to 
fade very quickly.    
 
It is again clear that, although Stannard has successfully constructed a midway course, it 
does not represent a viable alternative to the preferred method of element analysis. This is 
because the technique is either over-inclusive in a variety of cases or, if we are to avoid 
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some of these cases, then it requires the same objective separation that it claims element 
analysis cannot achieve.  
 
Option 3: Objectivist approach 
 
The final option to be discussed in this chapter has been developed in an objectivist model 
by Anthony Duff.771 Often using Stannard’s alternative as a way into the discussion of his 
own,772 Duff’s model for the mens rea of attempts seeks to harness the intuitive appeal of 
Stannard’s alternative, whilst being conscious to avoid its frailties. 
 
As will be remembered from the discussion above, Stannard’s model begins with the actus 
reus of D’s attempted offence and then moves on to the mens rea. Having exposed the gaps 
in the actus reus, Stannard requires that D should have intended for them to come about in 
order to be liable for the attempt. Within Duff’s alternative, this relationship is reversed. 
Beginning with D’s mens rea, we must first discover what D was intending (trying773) to bring 
about. From here, looking to the actus reus of the offence, we ask if D had been successful 
in his or her ambitions, would he or she have necessarily774 satisfied the actus reus and 
mens rea requirements of the principal offence. If he or she would have necessarily 
completed the principal offence, then he or she will be liable for the attempt. In this 
manner, D’s intentions are effectively able to reconstruct absent parts of the actus reus. 
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In asking whether the agent would commit the complete offence if she succeeded in 
doing what she is trying to do, we must thus assume the existence of any facts which 
are part of what she is trying to do … : but we take the other facts … to be as they 
actually are.775 
 
As with Stannard, Duff is therefore able to present a ‘neat’776 and intuitive alternative to 
element analysis.777 Where D, in our previous example, attempts to have sex with V without 
V’s consent, he will rightly be convicted of attempted rape. D intends to sexually penetrate 
V, and although he does not intend the lack of consent, as V does not consent in fact, D’s 
recklessness is sufficient. This is because, as recklessness is sufficient fault for this part of 
the principal offence,778 if D had achieved his intention (to sexually penetrate V) he would 
have necessarily committed rape. On the other hand, Duff would not convict the reckless 
stone thrower of attempting to commit criminal damage if his intention was simply to 
attract V’s attention. Here, D’s intention is to throw the stone in the recognition that it will 
hit V’s window, however, he or she does not intend for that window to be damaged. 
Although recklessness as to damage would be sufficient for the principal offence, as the 
window is not in fact damaged, it will not be sufficient for the attempt. It is possible that D 
could have achieved his or her intention (throwing the stone at V’s window) without 
necessarily committing the principal offence, and therefore he or she will rightly avoid 
conviction.          
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With Duff’s alternative model of attempts adopting much of the same logic employed by 
Stannard, his response to the criticisms of Stannard’s model above become very important. 
However, as will be discussed below, although Duff appears to dismiss the application of 
these criticisms to his own theory quite quickly,779 it is difficult to see how his approach is 
any better equipped than Stannard’s to avoid their effects. Indeed, in certain cases Duff’s 
approach may be even more vulnerable. 
 
The first criticism outlined above relates to the potential for over-inclusiveness in relation to 
certain offences, such as no-fault offences. This criticism will apply equally to Duff’s 
alternative. To employ the example above, if D has his or her drink spiked with alcohol by P 
and then drives in excess of the alcohol limit, he or she will commit an offence despite a lack 
of knowledge or even recklessness in relation to the presence of that alcohol.780 If he or she 
is stopped however, just before beginning to drive, it would seem inappropriate to convict 
him or her of attempting to drive over the prescribed limit. However, as was the case with 
Stannard’s alternative, Duff is also forced to find liability. D intends to drive, and if he or she 
were to achieve that aim then he or she would necessarily complete the principal offence: D 
is over the prescribed limit in fact and the principal offence does not require fault in relation 
to this fact. It is interesting to note that Duff has acknowledged that these cases are 
problematic, and has even suggested that the application of the law of attempts should be 
tailored to avoid them; but he does not tell us how this could be done.781   
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More interesting still, is Duff’s response to the second criticism explored above in relation to 
Stannard. A criticism employed by Duff in multiple sources to undermine Stannard’s 
approach as a viable alternative to his own.782  
 
This criticism, it will be remembered, relates to the potential liability of D that knowingly 
risks the damaging of his or her neighbours drill. The drill is damaged, but D realises that 
(inadvertently) he had used his own drill by mistake. Under Stannard’s approach, as Duff 
highlights, we must convict D of attempting to commit criminal damage even though his 
neighbours drill was not damaged, and D did not intend to damage it.783 The task for Duff, 
then, is to demonstrate how his own alternative is able to acquit D in similar facts. He does 
this by focusing on the nature of D’s intention:    
 
I intend to use my neighbour’s property, and to take the risk of damaging it; but it is 
quite conceivable that I should carry out that intention (using her drill to complete my 
DIY task) without damaging another’s property.784  
 
Therefore, because it is possible for D to achieve his intention without necessarily 
completing the principal offence (without damaging V’s property) D will avoid liability.  
 
The problem with Duff’s explanation, however, is that it only seems to take account of the 
first stage of his alternative approach. As we outlined above, Duff’s alternative begins by 
accepting (as if it were fact) what D is intending, but then goes on in its second stage to take 
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other facts as they ‘actually are.’785 Therefore, having established D’s intention that the drill 
belonged to V, surely we must accept the objective fact that damage was caused, and that D 
possessed the requisite mens rea in relation to that damage. If D achieved his intention and 
the drill did belong to V, then bearing in mind those surrounding facts, D would necessarily 
have committed criminal damage. D must, therefore, be liable for attempt under Duff’s 
approach.  
 
It is open to Duff to contend that certain facts (such as the breaking of the drill) should not 
be taken into account. However, this must be clearly and objectively reasoned. For example, 
if we accept Duff’s response to the DIY example in isolation, that D is not liable because his 
intentions alone do not necessitate liability, this has the potential to lead Duff into even 
greater problems. Returning to our example of attempted rape above, here Duff accepts 
that D’s only intention is to have sexual intercourse with V. This intention, of course, does 
not necessitate criminal liability; if V consents to the intercourse. However, once the 
objective fact of V’s non-consent is included in our assessment, along with D’s recklessness 
as to that lack of consent, we recognise that D’s intention (sexual penetration), if carried 
out, will necessarily result in rape. Therefore, as both stages of Duff’s alternative are 
required to convict D of attempted rape in this type of example, it is very difficult to see 
how Duff can reasonably avoid the application of both parts in every case.786 
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Although this problem is not acknowledged by Duff directly, it has emerged in his work in 
relation to another (similar) example.  
 
D shoots at, and tries to kill, what he believes is a non-human animal. Upon missing 
the shot, D realises that (as he had feared) the animal was in fact a human.787  
 
When Duff first analyses this example in an article in 1991, he acknowledges that it exposes 
a ‘counter-intuitive implication’788 of his approach. This is because D’s intention involves 
trying to kill that thing, believing it to be non-human, but reckless as to the possibility that it 
is human. Therefore, if D had succeeded in his or her intention to kill, bearing in mind that 
the thing was human, and bearing in mind D’s recklessness, he or she would necessarily 
have committed involuntary manslaughter. However, not only does convicting D of 
attempted involuntary manslaughter seem like an overextension of liability, but the offence 
itself represents a contradiction in terms.789  
 
When Duff eventually re-visits the example of attempted involuntary manslaughter in later 
articles,790 and in his monograph Criminal Attempts,791 he does so using slightly adapted 
facts.  
 
D shoots at what he believes to be a trespasser (V), intending to scare them, but 
realising that it might hit and kill them. The shot kills V. However, it turns out that V 
is a dog.  
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In relation to this example, Duff acknowledges that one might interpret his theory to convict 
D of attempted involuntary manslaughter: D intends that V should be human and causes 
death with the requisite fault. However, as before, Duff maintains that as D could have 
achieved his intention (to shoot at and scare V) without causing death, D would not be 
convicted under his alternative. The problem with this, again, is that it ignores the second 
part of Duff’s approach that requires us to take account of objective facts outside of D’s 
intentions. As death was caused (in fact), then surely the acceptance of D’s intention that V 
should be human will lead to liability under this approach. 
 
The result of this is that, despite using these examples to undermine Stannard’s alternative, 
Duff is unable to deflect them from his own. In the example where D intentionally kills what 
he believes to be a non-human animal, no defence is offered: we are left with a counter-
intuitive example and an offence (attempted involuntary manslaughter) that is logically 
impossible. In relation to the other two examples, where D’s intention relates to a 
circumstance element rather than a result,792 we are given a defence. However, this defence 
does not hold up to analysis, and if it were fully accepted, would lead to the acquittal of 
defendants that Duff specifically wishes to convict.793      
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Moving on from the criticisms previously explored in relation to Stannard, there remains a 
number of criticisms that are relevant to both alternatives that have not yet been discussed. 
For present purposes, we will look at two of these. First, we will explore the ability of the 
two alternatives to operate outside of attempts in relation to the other general inchoate 
offences. Secondly, we will briefly discuss an area in which Duff particularly believes that his 
theory holds a key advantage over element analysis: impossible attempts. 
 
It will not always be possible, or even desirable, for an entirely consistent approach to 
operate across the mens rea of each of the general inchoate offences. However, as the Law 
Commission has recently observed: 
 
The closeness of the relationship between the different forms of wrongdoing in the 
‘general part’ of the criminal law means that it is important that, in so far as is 
possible, there is a consistent approach to the key elements of their ingredients.794  
 
Indeed, in a report written by JC Smith for the Preparatory Offences Group, a group formed 
to develop an approach to general inchoate offences for the 1989 Draft Criminal Code, 
Smith opens with a similar remark. Referring specifically to the mens rea requirements of 
each of the offences, Smith states that: 
 
I assume that there is no need to argue that the same solution should apply to each of 
the three [general inchoate] offences.795    
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The logic behind this desire for consistency stems chiefly from the similar culpability 
demonstrated in the actus reus of each offence. For assisting and encouraging and 
conspiracy, this culpability stems from combining (or potential combining) of the criminal 
intentions of multiple agents. For attempt, although D is acting alone, equal culpability is 
apparent because of his or her temporal proximity to the completion of the principal 
offence. However, beyond this, there is also the issue of simplicity. Each of the general 
inchoate offences represents a complex challenge for the courts, and so if the same model 
for mens rea can be reemployed across each offence, this will hold considerable appeal. 
 
In our discussion of the preferred model of element analysis in chapter 10, we have 
demonstrated that it is able to operate with equal effectiveness across each of the general 
inchoate offences. However, within our analysis of both Duff’s and Stannard’s alternatives 
above, we have not yet commented upon their use outside of criminal attempts. In view of 
a viable model of element analysis, the inability of these approaches to operate outside of 
attempts liability would represent a considerable weakness. Indeed, it is a weakness 
partially recognised by Duff in his consultation response to the Law Commission’s paper on 
Conspiracy and Attempts when he comments that his ‘specification applies most simply and 
neatly to attempts.’796      
 
Duff does, however, contend that his approach (and presumably that of Stannard’s) could 
operate more generally. In relation to conspiracy, for example, we could again look to the 
intentions of the conspirators to ask whether, if they achieved their intentions, would they 
necessarily have committed a principal offence? The problem with this, however, is that 
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unless D intends every part of the principal offence, it will be very difficult to apply the 
second part of Duff’s approach. This is because, if we are dealing with a conspiracy where 
D1 agrees with D2 to have sex with V for example, reckless as to non-consent, we cannot 
know definitively whether the circumstance of the actus reus (the non-consent) will be 
present in the future event or not.797 Therefore, despite D being arguably deserving of 
punishment, he will avoid liability. 
 
For Duff, this result is acceptable. The scope of liability may be a little narrow, but if D has 
even an alternative intention to rape V then he will still be liable for the conspiracy. Duff’s 
approach runs into problems, however, when he goes on in an attempt to distinguish this 
example from another where he would like to see a conviction for conspiracy:  
 
D1 and D2 would probably still be guilty of conspiracy to commit criminal damage if 
the property they agree to destroy does belong to another person, and they are 
reckless as to that possibility (in the absence, we might add, of any reason to think that 
the owner will transfer the property to one of them before the planned destruction); 
but recklessness as to whether V will consent to intercourse would not by itself make 
them guilty of conspiracy to commit rape if it is not yet determinate whether V will 
consent or not.798  
 
The obvious problem with this distinction is that in neither case do we know definitively 
whether the necessary circumstance (the ownership of the property and the lack of consent 
respectively) will be present or not. In both cases, there are factual scenarios which would 
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lead us to think it very likely indeed that the circumstance will arise, but the idea that 
examples of this type can be distinguished on the basis of their subject matter is highly 
problematic. It would be obviously unacceptable, for example, for a court to conclude that 
we cannot tell whether a victim will consent to an unsolicited sexual approach from a 
number of defendants unconcerned about consent, and yet we can be certain that property 
will not be purchased by the defendants unless we have a good reason to think otherwise. 
As Duff accepts, in the context of conspiracy to rape, that it is inappropriate to attempt to 
predict the presence of future facts, so we must apply this logic to all other offences. 
However, with its correct application, it is clear that Duff’s (and Stannard’s) alternatives 
produce an unacceptably narrow form of liability. 
 
In fact, taking this point to its natural conclusion, it may also be used as a criticism of Duff’s 
and Stannard’s approaches to certain criminal attempts. Where D is prevented from 
completing conduct that is necessary for an offence (incomplete attempts799), the point in 
time at which the offence would have come about will remain in the future. Therefore if, as 
Duff rightly points out, we should not attempt to predict future facts in relation to certain 
conspiracies, even if those facts are very likely to materialise, surely this should apply to 
attempts of this kind as well. Take the following example:800 
 
P informs D that his wife (V) would like to have sex with him (D), but will pretend to 
resist. D is not sure if P is telling the truth, and is concerned that V might not 
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consent, but agrees to have sex with V anyway. V is unaware of this discussion and 
has never indicated a willingness to have sex with D. 
 
Bearing in mind Duff’s comments above, it is very unlikely that his alternative would hold D 
liable for conspiracy to rape in this example. Although D intends to sexually penetrate V, he 
does not intend V not to consent and we do not know (definitively) if V would not consent in 
fact. Therefore, the realisation of D’s intentions would not necessarily result in rape, and D 
will not be liable for conspiracy. However, if we move this example forward to the point of 
an attempt, assuming D still has the same mens rea, has anything really changed? If D is 
prevented from raping V by the fortunate intervention of a third party (the police perhaps), 
the factual background to D’s conduct remains the same: it is extremely unlikely that V was 
about to consent to D’s advances, but it is not factually impossible. Therefore, as with the 
conspiracy, the applications of Duff’s and Stannard’s alternatives seem to lead us to an 
acquittal in this case too. This is a result that neither would wish to accept.801 
 
At the very least, the under-inclusiveness of these alternatives where there is a gap between 
D’s inchoate liability and the future principal offence would produce an artificial restraint on 
the expansion of attempts liability. Duff,802 like the Law Commission,803 has recommended 
that the actus reus of attempts should be extended to allow for the intervention of police 
and other authorities at an earlier point. However, if prosecution is made contingent upon 
                                                          
801
 Duff claims that his alternative ‘straightforwardly convicts of attempted rape a man who tries to have 
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the acts reus. The problem however, that Duff does not acknowledge, is that it is satisfying part of the actus 
reus at the temporal point of the attempt, as opposed to the point at which the principal offence would be 
committed. Duff, ‘Recklessness in attempts (again)’ (1995) 15 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 309, 317. 
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803
 See, Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts – A Consultation Paper (Consultation No 183, 2007) and 
Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts (Law Com No 318, 2009).  
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the presence of certain circumstances, and if earlier intervention makes it more difficult to 
demonstrate that those circumstances would still be present at the time of the principal 
offence, then the expansion of liability may lead to a number of problems.   
 
For our final point of discussion, we move from an area acknowledged to cause problems 
for Duff’s alternative into one he presents as a principal benefit of his approach: impossible 
attempts. Impossible attempts involve conduct that D believes will result in a principal 
offence, but that due to a missing circumstance, cannot be completed. For example, if D 
attempts to commit criminal damage by breaking his or her rival’s (V’s) umbrella, but it 
turns out to have been D’s own umbrella, then the attempt will have been impossible: D 
cannot commit criminal damage unless he or she damages the property of another. 
However, D will still be liable for attempted criminal damage. 
 
Focusing solely on the umbrella breaking example above, it may seem perfectly acceptable 
to convict D for attempted criminal damage. Although the attempt was impossible in fact, it 
is nevertheless true that D had carried out conduct that he or she intended should amount 
to the commission of a principal offence. However, if we apply the attempts policy outlined 
in chapter 10 (based on element analysis), requiring intention as to the act and result 
elements of the principal offence but allowing recklessness as to the (absent) circumstance 
element, then the range of impossible attempts that will be caught by the law increases 
greatly. It is this expansion that Duff has highlighted as a criticism of attempts modelled on 
element analysis, and one that he believes his alternative holds the key to addressing.804 As 
will be remembered, although Duff’s alternative also allows for recklessness as to a present 
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circumstance element, when the element is absent, Duff (and Stannard805) will not convict D 
unless its presence was part of his or her intention. 
 
Duff’s contention in this regard is best understood through its application to examples. 
Thus, Duff would also convict D of attempted criminal damage in the umbrella breaking 
example above, because D had intended that the umbrella should belong to V. However, as 
we move to cases where D does not intend the missing circumstance, differences begin to 
emerge. For example, in the case of Anderton v Ryan,806 Ms Ryan (D) purchased a video 
recorder that she believed was stolen. However, following a police investigation initiated by 
D’s confession, it could not be proven that the recorder was in fact stolen. Under the 
Commission’s approach, D would be liable for attempting to handle stolen goods, however, 
for Duff, such a conviction would be inappropriate. Although D intends to buy a video 
recorder cheaply and believes that this is possible because the recorder is stolen, she does 
not intend it to be stolen. Therefore, as it was not stolen in fact, D’s intention (to buy the 
recorder cheaply) will not necessarily end in a crime.807    
 
Even if this result is preferred,808 however, it soon runs into problems. This is because, in a 
host of similar cases, Duff and others would like to see a conviction. A common example in 
this regard is the case of Haughton v Smith.809 Here, Smith (D) took possession of what he 
believed to be a delivery of stolen corned beef. The beef had, in fact, been intercepted by 
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the police and was therefore no longer stolen. The police allowed the beef to be 
transported to D and then arrested him for attempting to possess stolen goods. Again, 
under the Commission’s approach, D would be straightforwardly liable. However, if we 
employ Duff’s alternative in the same manner as we did in relation to Ms Ryan above, surely 
D will not have committed an offence. He intended to take possession of the corned beef 
cheaply, and believed that this was possible because the beef was stolen, but surely he 
would have been happy if the beef was not stolen at all. Therefore, he could have achieved 
his intention (gain possession of cheap corned beef) without necessarily committing the 
crime and he will not be liable for the attempt. In fact, unless D had some manner of strange 
desire to break the law, it is very unlikely to ever be his or her intention that such goods be 
stolen. 
 
This is clearly a rather unsatisfactory conclusion, but it is one that has been largely accepted 
by both critics810 and advocates of this style of approach. For the advocates, the problem 
has been how to deal with it. For Stannard, the acquittal of Smith in the case above is simply 
the necessary price for a positive result in relation to Ms Ryan.811 However, for Fletcher, 
another advocate of this approach, it represented a sufficient basis upon which to abandon 
the approach in relation to a host of examples. Despite commenting that the approach 
displayed ‘considerable theoretical power’, Fletcher was uncomfortable about the nature of 
the inquiry into D’s individual motivations: 
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This provides a tenuous ground for abstracting the analysis of attempting from the 
particular individual and his possibly idiosyncratic motives; yet the problem admittedly 
does not lend itself to a compelling solution.812 
 
For Duff, however, this compromise does not need to be made. He accepts, to an extent, 
that underlings in a criminal operation may avoid liability if their motivations (and therefore 
intentions) only extend to their next payment.813 However, in many cases, including 
Haughton v Smith, Duff maintains that his approach would lead to a conviction. This is 
because, although Ms Ryan was only concerned with purchasing cheap goods, defendants 
like Mr Smith possess intentions that include elements of a criminal enterprise. Thus, 
responding to the observation that Smith only intended to avoid the police (and not that the 
goods should be stolen), Duff contends that: 
 
But if it was part of Roger Smith’s purpose that the beef should not have fallen into the 
hands of the police, then it was also part of his purpose that it should be ‘stolen 
goods’. The ‘stolenness’ of the goods is a complex legal property: they must have been 
dishonestly appropriated from another person with the intention of depriving her of 
them permanently, and must not have ‘been restored to the person from whom they 
were stolen or to other lawful custody or possession’.814  
    
This argument, however, is unconvincing. It is correct that if Smith had been informed that 
the goods he was about to receive (that he believed stolen) were being transported by the 
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police that he would not consider this a success. However, the same must also be true of Ms 
Ryan. If she was informed, for example, that the police were in possession of the video 
recorder and selling it to her in order to see if she was willing to attempt to handle stolen 
goods, then she would have the same response. In each case the parties intend to get cheap 
property believing it to be stolen, and in each case they would be happy if the property was 
not actually stolen. However, in neither case would that happiness extend to news that it 
was only not stolen because it had been seized by the police as part of an operation to test 
their criminal ambitions. Duff can manipulate his alternative to find liability in each case, or 
to acquit both, but the distinction does not hold up.  
 
Finally, on a more practical note, tests of this kind are likely to cause significant problems for 
the courts charged with their application. It is very unlikely, for example, that a defendant 
would admit that he or she intended the presence of a missing circumstance even if (for 
whatever reason) they did. As Williams has stated: 
 
No court would want to investigate the question whether a reckless cheat was such a 
dedicated knave that he would be disappointed if, having obtained money, he found 
that he had obtained it by a statement that happened to be true… Either we must say 
that recklessness as to a necessary circumstance is sufficient for an attempt, or we 
must say that knowledge or belief as to such circumstance is required; there is no 
possible middle course.815 
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As was the case with Williams’ own alternative, and that offered by Stannard, Duff is able to 
set out a plausible mid-way course. However, there are simply too many serious problems 





As we look forward to the role of element analysis within the criminal law, it is clear that its 
continued progress relies (in large part) on its continued use as a structure for the reform 
and operation of general inchoate offences. Without this role, the preferred method of 
element analysis will maintain its potential benefits, but it is unlikely to assume the kind of 
universal acceptance within the criminal law that is required to see that potential fully 
realised. 
 
The alternative approaches to general inchoate liability explored in this chapter are 
therefore extremely important. Although they may not offer the full range of potential 
benefits explored in relation to element analysis, if they were to prove more attractive in 
this particular context then they might still undermine the progression of element analysis 
in its formative stages.  
 
However, having compared the alternative approaches to the preferred method of element 
analysis developed within the preceding chapters of this thesis, we have found them to be 
lacking. Although preferable to a method of element analysis that cannot facilitate the 
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objective separation of elements, and although preferable to a method of element analysis 
that overcomplicates the law, they are not preferable to a method of element analysis that 
can avoid these problems. Therefore, if the preferred method of element analysis is taken 
forward within the reform of the general inchoate offences, adapting the method of 
element analysis current in use, we can be relatively confident of its future ability to 









The early chapters within Part I of this thesis plotted a brief history of element analysis. It 
was a story that began encouragingly. Element analysis has appealed to both legal 
academics and law reformers for many years, both as a tool for legal analysis and as a 
potential tool for law reform. Indeed, in relation to the general inchoate offences in 
particular, element analysis has offered new and interesting answers to what had previously 
appeared intractable problems; attracting considerable attention across the common law 
world.816 The story, however, soon turns sour. Although the potential benefits of element 
analysis have ensured that it is rarely far from the debate, fundamental and hitherto 
uncontested criticisms of the technique had seemed to undermine its potential. Of these, 
two stand out. The first, attacking the very basis of element analysis, claims that individual 
offence elements cannot be objectively distinguished from one another. The second 
maintains that even if they could, the technique would introduce an unacceptable level of 
complexity.   
 
Despite these criticisms however, with the Law Commission’s recent report on inchoate 
assisting and encouraging,817 and Parliament’s acceptance of this within Part 2 of the 
Serious Crime Act 2007, the use of element analysis has made its way into legislation. For D 
to be liable for assisting or encouraging P to commit a principal offence, he or she must 
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either intend818 or believe819 that the act element of that offence will be completed by P, 
but need only be reckless as to whether it will come about within the proscribed 
circumstances and causing the criminal result.820 Thus, for the law to operate fairly and 
consistently, it must be possible to objectively distinguish between offence elements: if we 
were unable to identify part of an offence as either act element or result element for 
example, we would be equally unable to identify the mens rea required by D. It is also 
necessary for the technique to operate straightforwardly: as with the other general inchoate 
offences, this area of the criminal law is already highly complex. However, despite the 
damaging application of the two major criticisms, each one has remained unanswered. 
 
Recognising the appeal of element analysis, yet also recognising the logical case made by its 
critics, this thesis has attempted to meet those criticisms head on. Thus, chapter 3 and the 
chapters within Part II have focused on how element analysis can be adapted in order to 
objectify the process of separating offence elements. The chapters within Part III then go on 
to discuss how this preferred model of element analysis can operate in-action, developing a 
usable and straightforward method. In each case, this is not done simply to prop up and 
justify particular policy choices made by the Law Commission, although it clearly facilitates 
their work. Rather, attempting where possible to avoid normative debates about what the 
law should be, we construct a model of element analysis that can be used to implement all 
manner of reform options.821 
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The preferred method of element analysis can be set out in the following terms: 
 
 Act element:  
o Actus Reus: The bodily movement (or omission) necessary for the offence. 
o Mens Rea: The corresponding fault. 
 Circumstance element:  
o Actus Reus: The facts at the time of the act necessary for the offence. 
o Mens Rea: The corresponding fault. 
 Result element:  
o Actus Reus: Those things caused by the act necessary for the offence. 
o Mens Rea: The corresponding fault.  
 Ulterior fault element: Fault required by the offence that does not correspond to an 
element of the actus reus.  
 
By developing a new method of element analysis that avoids the criticisms rightly levelled 
against its predecessors, the full benefits of the technique can finally be realised. In relation 
to the new assisting and encouraging provisions just mentioned, a clear and objective 
separation of acts, circumstances and results means that the offences can operate fairly and 
consistently. This would also apply across the range of other general inchoate offences and 
complicity, each of which has been targeted for reform by the Law Commission in a manner 
that relies upon such objective separation.822 Beyond its use as a tool for law reform, the 
preferred method of element analysis also promises to have a simplifying effect in several 
complex areas of the law. As we discussed at various points within Part III, not only can the 
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preferred model rebut the complexity criticism, but by separating and individuating 
elements of a crime, complex offences can be untangled to reveal a set of straightforward 
questions: a set of questions displayed in this thesis through the use of charts. 
 
Finally in chapter 14, having constructed a best-practice model of element analysis, we 
looked to the future of the technique. It has been acknowledged at various points in the 
thesis that many of the potential benefits of element analysis rely on (or are vastly increased 
by) the technique gaining a wider acceptance within the criminal law world. In the absence 
of codification, we concluded that the widening of recognition and acceptance in this 
jurisdiction is likely to be driven by the use of element analysis to structure the general 
inchoate offences: offences that would potentially require element analysis to separate the 
elements of any criminal offence. 
 
Recognising the important role to be played by the structuring of general inchoate offences, 
however, is also to recognise vulnerability. If an alternative technique (not based on 
element analysis) is preferred in this area, then despite the wider potential benefits of the 
model of element analysis constructed in this thesis, it may never gain sufficient exposure to 
allow that potential to be realised. It was on this basis that we conducted an evaluation of 
the five major alternative structures for the analysis and construction of general inchoate 
offences. We found that whilst some of these may have been preferable to a method of 
element analysis that failed to facilitate the objective separation of offence elements, or 
added to the complexity of the law, they did not offer advantages beyond those of the 
preferred method of element analysis. Indeed, although each alternative offered some 
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initial appeal, this appeal was soon undermined by the exposure of a number of serious 
problems.823  
 
Reaching the end of our narrative, it may still be that the preferred method of element 
analysis does not represent a perfect solution. There is no magic formula. Indeed, our 
discussion of complicity in chapter 12 in particular has exposed several areas where 
improvement may still be required. However, as a simple response to a problem being 
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